








Thi present thesis »«barks on the study oi three 
distinct aspects of the Costa Rican Development ^corporation s 
operations.
• I
The first section presents the Ethos undei' which the 
organization was created in 1972| and follows the enterprise a 
development until the present day in order to analyze how weii î  
has adhered to its fundamental precepts, as well as how 
significant its contribution has been to the national eccnomy.
The following chapters cover in detail the present 
stats of the four major areas of investmer.ti oament facto*’*, es, 
sugar cane based sugar and ethanol production, aluminium 
semi-crocessing, and fertilizers. Alternative strategies are 
discussed for each of the sectors involved, in an attempt to 





Ir. the analysis Gt the Costa Rican Cement industry, 
national coniumption/installed capacity forecasts until the ind of 
the century are included. Also, the comparative competitive 
position of the Codesa plants (quality, quantity, price, 
distribution) both nationally and internationally, is discussed. 
Finally, the impact of new massive construction p-ograms on 
demand (dams, public housing, etc.), as well as the potential such 
programs could provide to enhance the expert possibilities by the 
sale of similar package deals (design, construction, materials 
(cement), skilled labour, etc.) abroad is presented.
^ . 1
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The use of alcohol as combustion fuel, both as a 
complement to petrol (gaschcl), and as an independent combustible, 
represents the main theme of the sugar cane chapter. A dynamic 
xmoact study of the implemantotion of different oil substitution 
programs in Costa Rica (land use, alternative energy crops, cost 
competitiveness with respect to fluctuations in the price of oil, 
etc.). New technological developments in the production of alcohol 




In the Aluoinium section, sn analysis of the ’̂orld 
ttlumii'.ium industry scene is rade, in an attempt tc determine the 
subsidiary company's statagic outlook (currently the company has 





potential ior integration; Establishment o-f backward linkages to 
secure the flow ui raw materials into the process (fro* national 
bauxite deposits), as well as forward linkages to establish the 
production and marketing of end products (and recycling) to 
improve value-added position are discussed.
In relation to the fertilizers plant, the 
g'ffort has been focused on two main areas; raw materials and 
the study of energy usage (including steps for an energy audit, 
and the establishment of an energy management system). Finally the 
review of chronic working capital problems of the past and the 
development of more adequate performance evaluation criteria and 
pricing policies are suggested.
The final section is devoted to organizational 
airucture. Different organizational set-ups for the company, 
provided by management throughout the years, are reviewed and a 
revised structure, more adequate to fulfill the company s rai son  
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H.i Matianal DtvtInnaMt PUnninQi_
Thtrt *r# vtriou» distinct ipprotchss to tconoaic 
dovtlopotnt planning. Tht factors shich dsttrsins shat path a 
country is to chooss in ordsr to attain its sconooic and social 
goals, includa tht follouingi political systaa, gtntral andousant 
situation (ran aatarials, availability of capital, availability of 
labour) il), slza, ralianca on foraign trada, ate.
A classification of soaa of tha aost iaportant 
altarnativa paths of davalopaant is prasantad baioni







Focusas on tha aliaination of trada 
barriars and rastrictions, i.a., "tha oparation of aarkat forcas 
and fraa trada"i2) raprasants its aia. Tha rola of govarnaant 
should ba rastrictad to discriainata intarvantion in araas nhara 
aarkat forcas ara hindarad froa baing affactiva.
Tha aain axponants of this doctrina at 
presant ara the United States (Reaganoaics - D. Stockaan) and 
Great Britain (Thatcherisa) in tha developed world, and Hong Kong 
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suasâriztd «s folloNti
Thf goâlt of thii doctrin# «ay ba
a.- Reduction of the size of the State
(reduction of the PSBR, eervicee, taxe«, etc.)
b. - Elieination of trade barrier«, to
alloN free world trade (though regional treatie« which proeote 
protectioniee againet outeider«, «uch a« the EEC, eay prove too 
large an obetacle for thi« to be achieved on a world wide «cale as 
aieed by the General Agreeeent on Tariff« and Trade (BATT) of 
1947, a spin off froe the Bretton Hoods conference (1944))
(3,2,1).
c. - Privatization of public coepanies,
including utilities, public transport, etc.
d. - Enhanceeent of the allocative
efficiency (4) of earket forces for all (or eost) activities 
within the econoey, including wages (Heitzean), as has been the 
case in the U.S. autoeobile and airline industries, the
Venezuelan public sector, etc.
f.
• f.
In sueeary, developeent should not be a direct 
responsibility of governeent, apart froe it* intervention to 
proeote the effectiveness of earket forces.
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1.1.2 C § $ trâl Plê»»i»Ct
(Public PUnning/Public Ountrthip)
ih« cpps^it» o4 th» lâtttr âpproâchf this 
■tthod conctntratsi thi dtvtlopsint planning tffort in Ctntral 
Govtrnaanty for txaaplt th# ffospiaa (Stats Planning Cosaittss) and 
ths dofssab (Stats Supply Cosaittss) in ths U.S.S.R. (5). In ths 
Sovist cats, th# Sofpiaa rscsivst inforsation fros Hiniitriss and 
Industry (xayariri - applications for inputs) by which ths plannsrs 
sstisats ths additional 'capital stock rsquirsd for ths futurs 
provision of goods and ssrvicss' (5). Aftsr this procsss, ths two 
institutions asntionsd abovs, ssploy ths asthod of "aatsrial 
balanças' (production, supply and distribution) throughout ths 
sconoay, in ordsr to snsurs ths sffsctivsnsss of sach plan. (Plans 
ars dividsd into currant (ons ysar, aonitorsd on a khozrêsehêt 
basis, profit and loss accounting), asdiua tara (fivs ysars) and 
parspsctivs (15 ysars or sors).
'.'.V 'V.
Hsrs, ths govsrnssnt functions as ths hub 
of ths dsvslopasnt procsss. All activitiss in ths sconoaic systsa 
ars Bonitorad or dirsctly opsratad by ths Stats. For sxaapla in 
agriculturs, Kolkhozy (coopsrativss) and Sorirhozy (Stats faras) 
oust producs on a quota basis, with fixsd pricss for fhsir 
produce.
The priaary claias of this systea are that
> * ■
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Avoids cyclical critts (expansion and
contraction) present in the capitalist systee.
b. -> Adapts production to the rising
aaterial and cultural needs o* the population
c. - Maintains lull eeployeent




Even though the general role ol governeent 
(throughout COMECON) with respect to the planning process has been 
eaintained, ieportant relores have been introduced in various 
eeeber countries.
The eost widely noted case ol these 
experieents is that ol Hungary's "New Econoeic Mechanise" (7), 
which stresses the ieportance ol decentralized planning. The eost 
relevant leatures ol this approach are outlined below (7):
" 1. The central adeinistrative specilication ol
enterprise production and sales prograeees was abandoned, 
and enterprises were pereitted to detereine their 
production patterns on the basis ol contracts with
custoaers.
2. Central adeinistrative allocation ol eaterial inputs 
was also ended, aside Iroe a lew einor exceptions.
3. One-year operational plans, disaggregated to 
enterprise level were discontinued and the live-year 
plans were to becoee the chiel orientation lor econoeic
11
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dtvilopitnt ând tht ‘»Ittring* oi tht «conoay.
4. Th« prtctice of fixing ««g« scâl«s centrilly cê«« to 
ân «nd, but avorago waga laval« of antarpri««* aara 
«avaraly ra«trainad by a naa tax on waga incraa«a«^
5. Tha pradoainantly cantral allocation of r««ourc«« for 
invaataant aas changad to a «y«taa in which 
fiH-financing froa profit had a aora iaportant rola to 
play« although cantral «uparvi«ion of inva»ta«nt activity 
aa« to ranain «trong.
6. Tha chiaf objactiva of «ntarpri»« activity wai to ba 
tha pursuit of profit, and incantiv«« for aanagars and 
workar« wara linkad to profit, «inca thi« wa« to ba ba«i» 
for antarpriaa fund foraation.
7. Saparata foraign-trada aultipliar« for tha CONECON and 
Ha«tarn*world aarkat trading araa» wara introducad to 
link doaaatic production and ovaraaa* aarkat«. (Plaa«a 
rafar to 'Quastion« by GATT, and an«war« by tha Hungarian 
govarnaant” Gatt docuaant No. 3426, 1969, for not «o 
convincing «xplanation« for thi« dichotoay) (7),
8. A coaprahansiva prie« rafora adjuatad ralativa 
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Dua to worries of stagnation. 
Inefficiency, lack of incentives, etc., recent reforas have bean 
introduced even in the Soviet Union (27th. Congress of tha Central 
Coaaittee of the Coaaunist Party of the USSR) and China (I2th.
‘ I:
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Ctntril Coaaittff of tho Cooauniot Pirty of th# Ptoplt't Rtpublic 
of China), tho two aoit important ixponintt of cantral planning. 
Hhat has rssultod fro« th««« ««If-criticisa «x«rcis«s has b««n 
call«d by th« Chin««« “Socialist Mark«t Econo«y“i6^ «hich
introduco« th« following charactoristics*
a. - Contrai goal sotting and ownorship is
■aintainod. (Excopt whoro privato or colloctiv« ownorship «xistod 
bofor«).
b. ~ Horo indopondonc« to co«pani«s which 
aft»r fulfilling tho contrai quotas can oxchango thoir production 
frtoly (for oxaoplo in tho kolkhozy in th« USSR and industrial
coopanios in tho Sichuan Provine« of China).
c. - Eaphasis on b«tt«r quality/ oor«
varioty of goods, i.«., tho introduction of consuoor choic«.
d. - Harkot to bo usod as a Monitoring tool
undor contra! control.
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«.- Attract fortign technology (China)
i.1.3 iHdicMtiifi
(Public Planning/ Mixod Ownorship)
This for« of oconooic dovolopoont is host 
represonted by tho Fronch (8) post-war oxporionco. In this case, 
four distinct stages are involved in the planning process? 
analysis, dialogue, foraulation, and iapleoontation.
The first step is that of analysis. During
■i.
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thi* ptriod, iníor«*tion 1« gathtrtd (through xnt#r«ini*t#ri*l 
ftudy group*) in riUtion to ptrciivtd long t*r* probi*«» in 
»pacific ir**** th* Ubour **rl{*t, industrial policy, th* public
•octor, *tc. (9)*
A* a r*»ult, a larg* «conoottric *od*l i* 
foraulatod iFlFI, i.*., Financiar* *t Fliiqu*, financial and 
physical), forecasting th* state of the econoey "x" years into the 
future, considering no specific action is taken to change th* 
course of events (i.e., if i laisieWiir* approach eer* pursued). 
An interesting feature of this initial stag* is the evaluation of 
two separate econoeic sectors: one "protected" constituted by 
non-tradeables (essential foods, so«» ra*i eaterials, etc.) where 
strict controls are enforced, and an "exposed" sector in which 
prices reflect international values.
> 'i ;
If the expected projection resulting froe 
the FIFI exercise reveals worrying tendencies, new scenarios 
(siaulating the effect of different policies) are coeputed in an 
atteept to devise an optieua approach which would counter th* 
original disadvantageous outlook.
I
Having coepleted this preparatory phase, a 
period of deliberation follows. For this purpose, a nuaber of 
sectorial coeeissions (and coaeittees) including representatives 
fro« the governaent, the private sector, unions, etc., are foraed 
to analyze separate aspects of the econoay. After a concensus is
t I
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ri.chtd of »h.t tho b « t  itr.tfiy for thi ptriod (u.u.Uy fivt 
y.tri) ii to bt, tho p U n  i» forodUy forouUttd ioUi# 3).
Finilly, in th# i«pli«int»tion ph«i# 
(•tagt 4), prograttt* ol inctntivts art initituttd. Thi* i* 
nactftary dut to tht lack oi a ctntral »ourct oi dtciiion taking, 
such as l* tht ca«t in Ctntraliztd tconotit» (7, p. 25), to 
ptriuadt cotpanit*, both privatt and public, to abidt by tht 




f.1.4 ddtitistratiya guidateti 
(Public Planning/Privatt Ountrship)
This approach is txttpliiitd tost 
dratatically by Japan (othtr countrits art Singaport undtr tht 
guidanct of Ltt Kuan Ytt, Taiwan undtr Chiang Kai Chtk, and South 
Korta undtr stvtral regitts). Robtrt S. Ozaki, proftssor of 
Econotics at California Statt Univtrsity (Hayward) (10) has 
dtscribtd it as: ■ a cast of progratting for dynatic growth of a 
conpttitivt tconoty} planning is thus an instruitnt of pragtatist 
dtvoid of socialist idtological conttnfo
t r
j I
Tht ait of this approach is to fosttr 
unrsstraintd industrial growth, with tht govtrnttnt as tht ctntral 
planning source. In Japan the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry is such an institution. Chalters Johnson, professor of 
political science at the University of California at Berkeley
t " f I
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•vit«. tht HIT! *1 tht .etivi.t hub of tht dovolopomt.l » U t f
( 10) .
Th« gov#rn«tnt t*rg#tt profiling irtai of 
dtvtlopoont (ulth th# htlp of doUb#r»tivo council* »boro oxport* 
of * uid* «poctruo of knoulodj* »r* invitod to contributo) ind 
*ub**qu*ntly portundo* (cirrot* *nd *ticl(* pr.ctico* (tO)) privato 
ontorprioo to dtvolop thoo, oithor indopondontly or coUictivoly 
(qroups of indu»trio*) dt»rog«rding tho conioqutnco* of oonopoly 
»ituotion* «riling fro* thoi* colUborition», i.o., «nti-nonopoly 
Ians *rt not s ssin concorn«
Othtr charactsristics of this approach
art:
basic scionco
- tho oophasis on production R+0 ovor
- tho direct oonitoring of porforoanco
Nith rospoct to Norld coopotition by tht govtrnotnt
- no sptcial eophasis on social
dtvtlopoont if it it not directly related to overall tconooic 
ptrforoanct.
- protectionist against foreign 
coepetition in the local earket
•
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1*1.5 Tht SMÉdish Syfttex 
(Mixed Planning/Mixed ONnetrship)
' ■»: *'} 
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r H
In SMtdtn d#v#lop«#nt plinning is csrrisd 
out by th# Labour Marktt Board. This is a council forotd by tuo 
•••btrs oT Qovtrnoint (Diroctor Btnoral (chairoan), and Otputy 
D.R.), throo aoabors froa tht Confodoration oi Eoployors, throo 
froo tho Con^odoration of Trado Unions, too Salariad Eoployoos, 
too froo tho Profossional Staff Association, ono Fooalo Morkor and 
ono roprosontativo froo tho Agricultura soctor ilJ>.
i:,. •
Apart froo tho LWB, thoro is a stato oonod 
Corporation, tho Statsforotag, but its sizo is rolativoly soall, 
though it is actlvo in koy aroas such as lining, stooloorks, 
touriso, forost products, otc., (29 industrios, lanagod by thirty 




Evory coipany in tho country oay koop 40X 
of its pro-tax profits for capital invostaont (46X of thoso lonios 
aust bo dopositod intorost froo at tho Control Bank of Suodon). 
Whan tho f i n  is roady to invost, it oust prosont its plans to tho 
LMB and this authority will docido if it nay or oay not uso tho 
invostoont funds it had proviously sot asido. If tho invostoont is 
dttaod to bo bonoficial to tho country, novortholoss, tho LWB oay 
ovtn provido assistanco in tho foro of grants or loo intorost 
loans, (again a carrots and sticks approach). In this oannor, tho 
LMB oonitors tho oay in ohich tho nation's dovolopoont prograooos 
ara oxocutod onphasizing thoso aspocts ohich it considors to bo of 
lore urgont ioportance.
’ ■ I ’ *
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i.i.A f̂ltroicftL
(Hixtd Pl«nning/Mix#d Owntrihip)
Thi* i* th« «ost typic«l p*th of 
divtlopaint chottn by «any Third «orld countriti. Th# tiitnct oi 
tht idtoloqy bthind it is bast txaaplifitd by Gandhi's principia 
oi Saaraj aad Snàdfshi (13) (StM-rula and aalf-ralianca, 
patriotiaa). Hii vita that -unadultaratad Hoaa Rula, hoaavar 
in^arior in quality it aay ba (ihould ba praiarad to any lora ol 
Foraign Rula)* (14), aay ba axlandad to tha aanagaaant ol lira*. 
It i* tha ra.pontibility ol tha Stata to «triva toaard* tha 
achiavaaant ol sarrodaya , or "uplilt, aallara lor all“ lociaty, 
(lor ahich it aay intarvana diractly in tha aanagaaant ol 
antarpri*a*, to an»ura lull aaployaant, davalop kay industria*, 
ragulata loraign trada, atc.) (14)»
For aany yaar* noa, thara ha* baan an 
ongoing dabata a* to tha banalit* ol loraign aid and loraign 
invaataant in racipiant aociatia*. Holli* Chanary in -Qbjactiva* 
and Critaria ol Foraign A**i*tanca" (14), atatad that *Th# aaia 
obj§ctiv9 of »id is to produc» th» kind of politic»! »»d »conowic 
»nviron»»nt in th» ttorld in which th» U.S. can haft pursu» its own 
goals* in ralation to U.S. aid prograaaa*. Foraign aid and Diract 
Foraign Invaataant (DFl) ara viawad with acapticiaa by aany LDC 
laadars. Tha lagacy ol colonialisa, and turn ol tha cantury, 
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txploitation (in Utin A«»ric* ior #xt«plt) *r# r#»pon«iblf ior 
thi» pirctption.
It is ippartnt that this choica o4 
dsvslopatnt policy is basad both on rational and irrational 
alaaants. 1 shall concantrata on thosa aspacts which can ba
quantifiad in soaa way.
Tha avaluation of tha banafits or 
drawbacks of DFI in LDC's (aainly tha rasult of Transnational 
Corporation (TNC) involvaaant) is not an aasy aattar. For aany 
LDC's, tha attraction of TNC invastaant and production facilitias 
raprasants tha aora faasibla aaans of acquiring tachnology froa 
tha davalopad world. Navarthalass, tha conditions in which this 
Transfar of Tachnology (TOT) occurs dapands on tha ganaral 
charactaristics of tha host aconoay: siza of tha doaastic aarkat, 
coapatition, ate.. Nhat this atans is that what aay ba a 
raasonabla option for a TNC with raspact to a country such as 
Brazil (whara tha "associata davalopaant“ policy (coabinad 
invastaant by govarnaant, TNC, and tha local privata sactor) has 
baan tha aora affactiva fora of davalopaant) aay not bo whan it 
considars invasting in a saall country lika Costa Rica. In 
ganaral, Varnon contands that TNC invastaant in LDC's dapands on 
what ha calls the "product cycle hypothesis" (4) (Plaasa note that 
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- availability of ociontioti and tnginitr*
with rtquisito skills
- low prico olssticity of dtnsnd for tho 





Production abroad to sorvo bottor ovorsoas narkots
(Europo for oxanplo)i
- Tochnology bocooos ooro standardized
- Coopotitors apptar and costs of 
production btcono ooro ioportant
Staoo No. 3l
Production transforrod to LOC's
■ 'I-.
» *
- production bocoots standardizod
- price cottpetition intensifies
In conclusion, whatever technology is
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•vtntually trtniftrrtd to LDC'i »ill not bt "loading odgt" and 
.Oft probably »ill in oHoct bo obfoloto. Cooounication 
ftratogiof in »orld oarkoti (15), also providot tho poifibility of 
difforontiating bot»oon and u»»r oarkots, tolling no» products to 
ooro coopotitivo onvironaont»» and supplying loss advancod 
products to othor oarkots, thus ostablishing difforont objoctivos 
in difforont locations. Exaoplos of tho oxport of outdated 
technology to servo specific oarkots (usually duo to tho aio of 
tho host oconooy to acquire foreign technological and oanagorial 
kno»ho») art very coooon, (FIAT in Spain (SEAT), tho USSR (LADA), 
Poland (Polski-FSO), Yugoslavia (YUSO); RENAULT in Rooania 
(DACIA), Volks»agon in Brazil, etc.).
As an alternative to accepting tho 
unrestricted participation of TNC's in their oconooios, oany LDC 
govornoonts have opted for th* direct oanageoent of »hat they 
consider to be key industries (coooanding heights (17))• This is 
ho» oany of the largest enterprises in LDC's are publicly o»ned. 
An overvie» of ho» ioportant this intervention has been follo»s:
» * H
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Public OwnT«hio in LDC*t< (4)
(lirgctt #nt#rpris#t in #ach country)





ALL LOG'S 52 34
(Fortune 500, 1979. (4)
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Public Ownership in LDC's
(largest firms in each country)
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Following the general principle oi 
nationalism (commanding heights)« though in a more moderate guise, 
the Costa Rican Development Corporation, CODESA, was created. The 
following sections are devoted to the presentation of this 
institution.
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stati divilopaint inatitutioni in LDC'i art craatid 
to achiivi a nuabir of objictivia. Such a ait of guidilints, 
•xtractid froa Pitir Nunninkaap'a articli "Stati Entirpriiii in 
Diviloping Countriii" is prisintid nixt: (ti)
a.“ Bovirnaint control of kiy industriis 
("coaaanding hiights") via public intirprisis is intindid to 
riduci thi influinci of foriign coapaniii and to privint privati 
aonopoliis. Furthiraori, govirnaints wish to fostir 
industrialization and influinci thi path and diriction of 
divilopiint (this would apply to thi Codisa subsidiariis Ciaintos 
dll Pacifico, and Firtilizantis di Cintroaairica, c.f. siction 
1.3).
b. - Non-coapititiVI privati coapaniis facid with 
bankruptcy a n  nationalizid in ordir to laintain thi jobs, (or 
stratigic activitiis afloat), (this appliis to Firtica, Ciiintos 
del Valli, and othir subsidiariis, c.f. siction 1.3).
c. - It is ixpictid that public intirprisis will 
iaprovi thi supply of goods falling into thi basic niids catigory 
at socially acciptabli pricis (In Codisa's caso this would apply 
to the transport sector subsidiaries)
d. - Public enterprises should help the upgrading of 
unskilled labour and contribute to a better supply of lanagirial 
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t.- In tht fitld of fortign tradì, public
intirpriii* thould incriaii national *iH-aufficiincy by iiport 
lubfttitution and proioti thi ixpaniion and di vinification of 
national «porti (Alunaia and Firtica could qualify bin, c.f. 
fiction 1.3).
BiloM a diicription of thi ivolution of thi Codita 
proposal it priiintid.
i.g.l Politicai Piviloiaiiti a»d Probi« Artidi
Ino traditional political loviiinti havi 
doiinatid thi Coita Rican icini linci thi I940'i: Thi Partido 
Libiracion Nacional (National Libiration Party) of Diiocratic 
Socialist Idiology, and thi Coniirvativi iictor of lociity, 
riprisintid throughout thisi dicadii by diffirint partili, all 
folloMing a libiral iconoiic lini. Thin partili havi bunt 
Partido Ripublicano Nacional, Union Nacional, Unificación 
Nacional, Unidad, and finally its currant day ixponint Partido 
Unidad Social-Criitiana (Christian Social Unity Party).
Niidliii to lay, Libiracion Nacional has 
bian thi proiotir of govirniant ixpansion, giarid towards thi 
creation and opiration of infrastructuri organizations which 
attindy primarily, thi basic mads of thi population. It is 
through this approach that institutions such as thi Caja
I'.
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Co*tarric#nit d# Saquro Social (CCSS) in hoalth cart, tht 
Instituto Coitarrictntt dt Eltctricidad (ICE) in ilictricity 
gtntration, ttltphont, and ttltcottunicationi ttrvicts, tht 
Instituto Nacional dt Vivitnda y Urbanisto (INVU) in council hott 
construction, tht Instituto Costarrictnst dt Acutductos y 
Alcantarillados (ICAA) in wattr purification and distribution, 
ttc., havt bttn tstablishtd as tonopolits. Othtr tonopolits covtr 
financial activitits) for txatplt, tht Instituto Nacional dt 
Stquros (INS) conducts all insuranct dtalings in Costa Rica, and 
tht Sisttta Bancario Nacional (SBN), forttd by all national 
banks, txcluding sott stall privattly otntd cotpanits providing 
financial strvicts, thich nontthtltss art rtgulattd by this 
govtrnttnt body. Tht systtt alto controls all bank dtposits, and 
rtgulatts tht txttnsion of crtdit (with tht ait of dttocratizing 
this function).
1.
1.2.2 £¥olution oi thf Codtia orotofili
FolloNing tht satt gtntral idtology, in 
tht tarly 1960*s, btcaust of various worrying factors such as a 
vtry high population growth ratt, an intxptritnctd privatt stctor, 
and dtvtlopttnt conctntration in and around tht capital city with 
littlt or no atttntion dtvottd to othtr artas of tht country, tht 
then llinistro dt Hacitnda (Stcrttary of tht Trtasury), Lie. Raul 
Hess, fostered the idea of extending the scope of govtrnttnt 
invtstttnt into productive activities. For this ait he suggested 
the creation of a dtvtlopttnt corporation "for the prototion of
KV. . ' I 
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dtvtlopMKt i» th. country- <tS>. T h U  Initltutlon to devoto 
•11 ol ito ottorti to»»rdo tho lollouingi («uthor'o poropoctivo)
Tht crtàtion of now productiv#
•nttrpriiM to absorb th# growing d##tnd in th# labour aarkat
- Th# d#c#ntralization of th# industrial
and agroindustrial activitiss fro# th# H#s#ta Cantral (capital 
city and surrounding ar#as) to othsr rsgions of th# country, in 
ord#r to incroas# ##ploy##nt opprtunitias in th#s# parts and 
thsrsfor# slow down th# «igration of p#opl# fro# th# countrysid#
to th# ##tropolis
- Th# craation of an inrfMctriii oas# for
furthar privat# antarpris# growth
- To contribut# to th# balanc# of payaants
by both incraasing th# country's axport output, as wall as 
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During th# following dacadc, various 
projects war# put forth discussing the scope and legal 
fraaawork such an organization should have. In 196S, Lie. Bernal 
Jiaenaz Hong#, Ministro da Hacienda, proposed the creation of an 
Investaent Corporation as a new branch of the National Banking 
System (SBN), supporting his reasoning on the following 
considerations: (19)
The need for an expeditious
v'- 11
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triniforMtion of Iho country'* productiv* *tructur§*
- Tht «tâgnâtion th* country thowtd in
doaling with important aacrooconoaic varlabla*i Balança of 
Payaanta, Par capita Incoaa, Laval of Eaployaant, ate., aggravatad
by an iaportant incraa*a in tha population* growth rat*
- Th* hiatoric ralationahip which *tata*
that "tha lowar th* laval of davalopaant a country ha* , th* lowar 
th* availability of aanagarial axparti** it will hava".
- Tha naad to produca aora good* than th*
privât* **ctor alon* wa* capabla of
- Tha naad to a*tabli*h a broadar product
ba*a in th* country
- Th* opportunity th* *tata had to invaat 
in projact* “of national iaportanca" which aithar bacau** of th*
larga outlay* n*c***ary during th* aarly atagas of davalopaant,
%
tha high ri*k* and or th* low initial raturn involvad, th* privât* 
*actor wa* unabla or unwilling to undartaka. It au*t ba notad that 
aftar th**a initial pariod*, ownarahip of th* raaulting 



















In 1969, anothar bill <which naver 
bacaaa law) wa* praaantad by a conaarvativa govarnaant (20), by 
th* board of tha Cantral Bank, propoaing th* craation of a 
Corporation for Invastaant and Econoaic Davalopaent (CIOÈ) with 
the following general power*:
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coipânitt, liaiting it* participâtion to 40X of coioon «har# 
isauts
- To protott Monty Marktt activitit*,
aittd toward* th* **tabli*ht*nt of th* Costa Rican Stock Marktt
- To participât* in, or protot* th*
crtation of national or Contrai Attrican cotpanit* asi an 
associât*, shartholdtr, providtr of financial tndorstttnt, *tc.
- To txttnd crtdit to invtstors (short,
atdiut, or long tort)
• To rtgulat* th* txploitation of natural 
rtsourcts in th* country, issuing Itasts, tstablishing proctdurts 
and ground rulta for th* distribution of the benefits resulting
fro* these operations, etc.
- To participate teaporarily in managing
national private enterprises, when so required
- To study new sources of industrial
developeent, as well as th* iaproveaent of present day 
installations in order to increase efficiency
- To proaote the export of Costa Rican
Finally, in 1972, th* Asaablea Legislativa 
(Senate) passed a law (No. 5122, which incorporated ideas fro* th* 
three documents presented above), by which th* Corporación 
Costarricense de Desarrollo, Sociedad Anónima (CODESA) was 
created, (a complete translation of this document is included in 
Appendix 1).
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During th# finnl dtbatt of tht Codtsa lawi 
in tht ytart 1971 - 1972, tht tott itportant oppoiition touardi 
tht approval of tht bill, wa* ctnttrtd not on tht ttttnct of tht 
activititf it tai to carry out, but inittad, on tht Itgal 
organization thii public tntity tat to havt. Up and until that 
tiat, all largt itatt otntd tnttrpriit* had bttn itructurtd at 
•autonotoui inttitutioni*, following tht Uruguayan guidtlint* on 
public adiiniitration tanagtntnt practical.
Btcauit tht Institücionts ^utoRotas wart 
rtgulattd undtr tht Lay dt Adtiniitracion Financiara (Law for 
financial adainiitration of public fundi)), which wai thought to 
bo (by tht propontnti of tht bill. Lie. Danitl Odubtr, lattr 
Prtiidtnt of tht Rtpublic, 1974 - 1978, and Lie. Jtnaro Valvtrdt) 
a vary Itthargic rtgitt, that would havt itptdtd tht corporation i 
afftetivtntii dut to txcossivt burtaucratic proctdurti 121) t a 
privatt tnttrpriit itructura, Sociodad Anonita, (PLC in Britain), 
wai prtftrrtd. Thii itirrtd itvtrt criticiit pritarily frot tht 
Cottuniit Party rapraiantativt (diputado^. Lie. Hanutl Hora 
Valvtrdt, who wai worritd about tht "workability" of luch an 
arrangtatnt within tht govtrnttnt tnvironttnt. Ntvtrthtltii, tht 
bill was passod as propostd on 16th., Novttbtr, 1972.
As was statod btfort, tht Partido
Libtracion Nacional (PLN), has bttn tht tain supporttr of tht
)•:' ■« •
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Codtia idta. With tht btntfit of hindiiqht, it can bt obaarvtd 
that unlikt th# othtr atat# institution*, th# corporation i* 
rtgardad (and has bitn sincf it* incaption) as a "party* concarn, 
rathar than a national antarprisa. For this raason, thosa who 
favour it* axistonco, or rapudiata it* craation, focus thoir 
arguaant* around that cantral dilaaaa, without looking any 
furthar. Tha 19B2 - 1986 PLN Codasa board attributad all of tha 
antarprisa's flaws on poor aanagaaant during th* last Unidad 
adainistration (1978 - 1982) (22). On th* othar hand, thos* who 
oppos* public antarprisa, aost fira supportar* of th* "fra* 
antarprisa* doctrina, viaw privatization as th* panacaa for th* 
solution of all th* corporation'* problaas (2J). It is th* 
author's baliaf that naithar stanc* contributa* positivaly toward* 
th* achiavaaant of battar rasults for this sactor of th* aconoay. 
Instaad, a concartad affort (or working agraaaant at laast) , a* 
in th* cas* of th* autonoaous institutions, is raquirad to sat th* 
political stag* for objactiva and affectiva tachnical / aanagarial 
solution*. It is iaportant to not* at this point that (through 
personal axparianca) bacausa of th* Sociadad Anoniaa sat up (du* 
to th* lack of foraal controls), th* subsidiary coapanias a* 
wall as th* corporat* unit, can ba aasily aisdiractad or 
politicizad by th* party in powar, aainly aiaad at th* achiavaaant 
of short tara goals, a situation which laavas very little scope 
for strategic (as opposed to tactical) dacison asking. Du* to this 
loophole in tha current legislation, along with the aconoaic and 
technological changes raquirad, th* legal organizational fraaework 
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pUnning pr*ctic«* (24).
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Tht Co»ti Ric«n venturi into tho 
#ftabli*hofnt of a stato control ltd productivo soctor, was not a 
non occuronco in Latin Aoorica. Sinco tho I940*s countrios liko 
Chilo and Hoxico had alroady organizad oquivalont institutions 
(25). At prosanti public ontorprisos concontrato iaportant stakos 




With rospoct to tho logal 
fraooMork undor which thoso coopanios oporato, it oust bo said 
that it varios significantly botwoon countrios, as wall as botwoon 
diffwront activitios within ono singlo nation. This is vary citar 
froo tho cast of Hoxico (26).
r-,'
 ̂I»'
Tho singlo tost ioportant aspoct 
of this fraoowork is tho rolationship botwoon Control Sovornoont 
and each of the fires in question. Next, I present a graph 
froe Horacio Boneo's Saber Ver las Eeoresas Publicas, which should 
help clarify this point (26).
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DIHENSION NON-COlfCRCIflL T COMERCIAL
E)(TM-EC0N.0B0ECT1IESS ? " HAHV T NONE
POHER HICH T LITTLE OR NONEA ■;
E)(TEIU«)LITIES IMPORTANT T INSIGNIFICANT
 ̂F1N.SELF-RELIÌINCE LON T VERY HIGH
[kLATION H.GOIERNHENTI CENTRALIZED T DECENTRALIZED
In the analysis of public 
tntirpriscsi ths sitting of ground rulis for thi optration of 
thest coopanits should bt on a casi by casi basiSf in ordir to 
reflict as closily as possibili thi niids of lach particular fiild 
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Ovirall, in thi casi of 
productive compititivi interprisis (see *co«aercial* above) i 
objective evaluation of results should be possible. Nivirthilissi 
in the particular case of Costa Ricai Codesa's coipaniis are 
caught betieen nornative directives froe Central Sovirnient
■t' 4
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(ctntriliitd co.piny ch«r*etiri*tic), *nd »ti*« bu»inf*i-likt 
cooptrlson « U h  th. prlvU« .«tor (d«.t.tr.llz.d co.p.ny 
ch.r.et.ri.tic), «hich i. r.Utiv.ly «r.. <roo 90V.rn..i>t 
rtoaUtlon. «hit rMult» <rp. thl» .itu.tlon, und.r th. Soci.d.d 
Anonia. (PLC) ich... « . d  i. • co.bin.tion «hich do.» not <it into 
Bonto's clASiification.
1.2.4.b Fitldt 0« Actioni 
(bated on Boneo)
Thl span of activitiis Nhich 
public intirpritif cover in Latin Aeerica it very extensive. The 
range starts with infrastructure, public services, or sore broadly 
put, those activities in which the private sector is not willing 
to participate.
* i
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A second group is directed 
towards the establisheent of backward and forward industrial 
linkages with the private sector, such as in the case of steel 
sills or intermediate process operations (a good example of this 
type of industry is Alunasa, as will be discussed later).
ISA third classification 
constituted by those institutions created for the development of 
specific regions within a country, which up to that point in time 
had been excluded from national development programmes (an example 
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dfvtlop«#nt of th# Atlantic coastal a n a  in Costa Rica).
Ths fourth, and last group, 
Nhich closts this britf introduction into tha flalds in which 
Public Coapanits optrata in Latin Aaarica, is that of tha 
coaaarcial antarprisa, i.a., organizations solaly diractad towards 
craating a naw sourca of national waalth, axports, and as a 
rasult, aaployaant, industrial davalopaant, ate.. This catagory 
has not baan claarly idantifiad in tha past in tha country, aost 
probably bacausa it raprasants a vary controvarsial issua. 
Thasa ara coapanias (with profit-aaking goals) whara govarnaant 
intarvantion would ba rastrictad to stratagic laval dacision 
aaking. As a rasult, thay could ba aora easily evaluated and 
aonitorad by all intarastad parties, i f  for no other reasons, 
because of tha nuaaric siaplicity of tha results drawn froa their 
operation, disregarding infrastructural, social welfare or other 
connotations.
■ I
The great variety of objectives 
presented above, gives an idea of the difficulty of unifora 
evaluation. Noraativa direction and extensive central govarnaant 
intervention should yield favourable results in groups one and 
three above. Nuaber two, would fall in an intaraadiate catagory, 
to be evaluated in a case by case basis. Finally, it is not a wise 
proposition, as was discussed above, to extend 
noraative-interventionist central governaent policy to tha fourth 
category, as this represents a field where tha iaportanca of
; .■
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coapttition, Mrktt forctt, continqtncy pUn* and th# likt, art 
thi highttt priority (indtptndtnct). In luttary, a cotpany « 
futur# in this group is dtttrtintd by its ability to riact to 
changts in its tnvironttnt, and not by tht attaintont o* rigorous 
prt-stt goals, which at tht titt thty art rtachtd tay bt outdattd. 
In thtst casts, tht participation of ctntral govtrnatnt (contrary 
to what has happtntd in tht past at Codtsa), should not bt 
significant, and should bt litittd to tanagtttnt by objtctivts (by 
CODESA htad quarttrs) and/or txctption aanagtttnt, (24),
»' •* .*
1.2.4.C Exatplt of tht Influtnct of 
Ctntral Sovtrnatnti
Tht crtation of Ctttntos dtl 
Pacifico, tht corporation's first tajor own projtct, is a cltar 
sxatplt of inttrvtntionisa frot tht Prtsidtnt of the Rtpublic 
hiastlf, in tht affairs of tht corpofation, dtcidtdly afftcting 
the outcoie of a project.
) < , •
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Below I present a suttary of a 
report approved by the corporation's board of directors session 
No. 27, of the 2nd. October, 1973. (27/ on the desirability of the 
investnent in question: if ' \  Hfe* It •'1’ *
I
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I. Prtt»nt«tiOfii
A. Fra«t of rtfortnct*
- tourco of raw aattrials
- Poftibility of aarktting product
"4
$ '
B. Htthod of Studyi 
- Staga It
- Doteraint quantity and quality
of n itarials
Study tha possibility of 
sailing tha proposad production voluaa locally, abroad, or a 
coabination of tha two.
- Staga 2t
- Faasibility studias: 
» tachnical
- Staga 3t
- iconoaic and social
- financial
Nagotiata financial taras.
structure bid cartels, ate.
' ' . I
C. Possible econoaic gains:
- Regional davalopaant
- Generation of eaployaant
M .1.
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- Incrtasi BNP
- Balanct of Payotnts
(laportant fictori otituri X national valut addtd on final 
product)
D. Daicription of tht projoct:
- Xho propostd plant would bt ablt to 
product 1,250,000 HT/yr., of a cotbination of ctttnt, for rtgional 
conautption, and clinktr for txport to plants in othtr countriis, 
ttpaciaily tht US (Atlantic Coast, and tht factory would bt
locattd in tht Costa Rican Pacific coast)
- Infrastructurt rtquirtd: convtyor btlts
to transport clinktr to dtdicattd port facilitits, which alto havt 
to bt built.
'• ' • r  '
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TOTAL US$ 100,727,821
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Proposed Cost of Project
3 yr. ML(arrMrt)
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II. Rttult of Stud!til
A. Rim  Hattrial Dtposits:
Quantity: Prtlitinary survtyi have
reported extensive deposits of required eaterials in the region.







- United States: total clinker ceeent 
iaports: 4.4 million MT/yr. (Source: US Bureau of the Census; US 
Imports for Consumption, calendar year 1972). CEMPASA's capacity 
would amount to approximately one fourth of total needs.
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- Cottpttitions HtxicOf Canâdii Biha**«»
AU n#«t door ooiçhbori to tho U8. Tho oott Uportont coït in tho
count iiporting bulino» il troniportotion.
Cantra! Aatrica* Total ntads Tor
rogionol cooonti ioporti 1972: 34,000 HT., virtuolly
stlf'fuTTicitnt narktt.
- Othtr poftibli aarkitts
> tha raconstruction oT Managua
(dfitroyad by an aarthquaka on 23rdo Dacaabar 1972.)
- ICE projactf Arana! and Boruca
(Hydro>a!actric acbaaas).
C. Tachnologys
- naa procais caüad "sintarization* (not 
offtrad in currant daa!) can produca 2 x to 2.5 x aora caaant than 
thi propoiad plant with a raduction oT bataaan 5X and lOX 
reduction on expected values. (Sourcei Revista Progreso Oct/Dec 
1972)
I'.;" .1
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- drastic changes have been presented by 
the proponents of the deal (aainly regarding feasibility studies)
- Price Materhouse ♦ Co. in charge of the 
audit did not back the financial stateaents cash flow projections, 
etc., presented by the proponents.
- Repayaent period is to short for a
project of this aagnitude: 10 yrs.
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- Intareat is too high (offtrtd by a 
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Duo to tho advors# oarkot conditions! tho Hnancial 
uncortainty, and othor considerations such as the obligation to 
purchase the equipeent froe ATEINSA of Spain, the Board rejects 
the proposal for financial assistance to the Ceeentos del Pacifico
project.
D o c u e e n t
Note» After heated debates, eost of the directors resigned, or 
Mire ousted, and the plant (eith an initial capacity of 450,000 
MT/yr.) Mas constructed by ATEINSA of Spain. Current exports 0 HT, 
Current utilization of plant  ̂ 43X (1986). (Overcapacity 
situations are coneon in State sponsored investeent: please see 
Nunnenkaep (17).
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DMcriotion o * Codttà*f tctivitim.
As Mât ftattd aarliar, thi Coita Rican Dovtlopatnt 
Corporation (Corporacion Coatarricini# d# Dtaarrollo S.A.) waa 
foundid by U h No . 5122, oi 16 Novtabar, 1972.
Tht corporation'» inv»»ta»nt prograa ha» 
conctntratod in lour oain fitld».
Th» lir»t ol th»»» i» dirict inv»»t»»nt in induitryt 
fxtractiv», chaaicaly int»ra»diata, and agroinduitrial. In 
fxtraction, tht organization ha» locuitd it» »Hort» in th» arta 
of ctatnt production (Cotanto» dtl Vali», CEMVASA, and Cotanto» 
dtl Pacifico, CENPASA). In th» chotical fiold, fortilizor» aro 
producod (Fartilizanto» do Controaoarica S.A., PERTICA). In th» 
catigory of industrial linkag», an aluainiua seti-processing (frot 
ingot fort) facility supplie» various tanufacturing cotpanios both 
in Costa Rica and the Central Atorican region nith inputs for 
their processes (Alutinios Nacionales S.A., ALUNASA). Finally, 
the other field of tajor involvetent is the industrialization of 
sugar cane nith three tain outputs: sugar, tolasses and alcohol 
(Central Azucarera del Tetpisque S.A., CATSA). All of the above 
enterprises are subsidiaries there Codesa holds more than a fifty 
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In atcond placa, Codaaa has financad naw third party 
projacts irom tha privata sactor, of siali aacroaconoaic iapact, 
(affiliata coapanias, ahara tha corporation holds lass than fifty 
parcant of tha stock),as aall as spacific vanturas aithin 
astablishad firas for ranaainq plant, ate., aithar by invastinq 
diractly into tha coapanias, or by qrantinq quarantaas on foraiqn 
loans. As a rasult of this policy, Codasa has suffarad substantial 
lossas and has had, as an ultiaata aaasura, to oparata soia failad 
coapanias.
Thirdly, tha corporation has sarvad as a financial 
intaraadiary (brokar) bataaan foraiqn sourcas of capital and local 
concarns.
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Lastly, dua to prassuras froa diffarant sactors of 
sociaty, tha corporation has baan forcad, diractad by cantral 
govarnaant policy on an ad hoc basis, into tha aanaqaaant of 
infrastructura institutions. Hara, tha aaphasis has baan focusad 
on the transport sactor (TRANSHESA in urban aass transport and 
FECOSA, tha national railaay systaa).
i ■ ' u*.
.. * * . ■ • II
This thesis Mill concentrate on tha analysis both of 
tha corporate unit as a ahola, as Mali as on tha four larqast 
investaent areas aaounting in 1984 to approxilately 807. of tha 
corporations financial exposure. (23,29)
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Th« concern* to bt tvaluattd «re: Conentos d«l Vallo 
(140,000 HT/yr. noainal clinktr production capacity), and Ciotnto* 
del Pacifico (450,000 MT/yr. noeinal clinker production capacity), 
in the extractive industrie»; Fertica, a fertilizer» plant 
producing nitrogen (nitric acid* 450 MT/day, Aeeoniue Nitrates 
350 MT/day), sulfate (Aeeoniue Sulfates 200 MT/day) and physical 
eixture coeplexes (400 HT/day); Catsa, a 5,500 MT/day (sugar 
cane input) sugar sill and 240,000 L/day agroindustrial set up; 
and Alunasa, a 32,000 MT/yr. finished product alueiniue seei's 
production facility.
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Fin*llyi I ih*ll pr#s#nt a chart oi CODESA's d#bt 
•ituation with thf Ctntral Bank oi Cotta Rica (BCCR)« at at 30 
Stpttabtr, 1904 (30), At will btcott appartnt in lattr chapttrt, 
tht currtnt financial petition of tht corporation it not good. Thi 
total debt with tht BCCR amounted at the end of fitcal year 1984 
to US# 230 lillion.
Sott atpectt worthy of cotttnt frot tht figurtt 
btlow art tht following: Mott debts have been contolidattd at the 
corporate level* The financing of the invetteent prograeeet hat 
cote in the patt, ettentially frot BCCR bond ittuet. The brokerage 
activity hat becote CODESA't tain tource of income, due to the 
fact that the enterprite has been cut off of new capital frot the 
BCCR, at a retult of the governoent't negotiationt with the IMF.
• . 4 * . . .
Plissé note the importance of raw taterials 
purchases for two of the subsidiaries to be covered in the present 
study: FERTICA and ALUNASA, as this is a major strategic problem 
which shall be dealt with in the following chapters. (Average 
exchange rate it 44.3 Cotta Rican Colones (CR C) per US dollar.)
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7 ,̂  Introduction!
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Cvatnt production activity ha* *xi*t*d in 
Cotta Rica for ov#r tuonty y»ar*. Th* first plant built for thi* 
purpota, wa* that of tha Industria Nacional da Caaanto, S.A., 
(INCSA), an affiliata coapany of tha Swiss congloaarata Holdarbank 
Financiar* Blaris, A.B. (Haupstrass* 44, CH-8730, Blarus,
Switzarland) (IK





For ovar a dacada, thi* privat* sactor 
oparator anjoyad a aonopoly situation, supplying th* country with 
aost of its naadt (caaant and concrat* products) in th* 
construction sactor. Through th* yaars, a nuabar of linkaga 
(sistar and affiliata) coapanias, covaring araa* such as pra-cast 
cement structures, quarries, concrete aixing, fibra-caaant 
products, etc., grew alongside INCSA. Nowadays, the whole network 
constitutes, without doubt, on* of th* aost established and 
exparienced vertically integrated activities present in th* 
country's aconoaic life.
W * I
The INCSA plant is located soa* 30 
kilometres away froa tha capital city of San Jose, within what has 
been designated the highest caaant consuaing area in tha country, 
i.e., the Naseta Central, where approximately 74Z (2J of the 
product is sold.
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Th« proct*« its#H i* con^oritd by a two 
kiln layout. Thi 4irst ont. originally a -wtt" proceis (slurry), 
traniforsod in th# oarly sovtntits to optrat# undtr tht oort 
tntrgy tificiont "dry" conditions, has a nosinal capacity oi 
bftwssn 400 and 450 astric tonnss/day o* clinkir throughput 
(tstiaatas varitd froa sourca to sourca). Tha othar production 
lina, a aora up to data dasign installad during 1974 (dry 
procBSs), has a noainal capacity of batwaan 600 and 800 aatric 
tonnas/day (again, tha valuas variad dapanding on who was 
providing tha inforaation)•
According to coapany officials, it is 
unlikaly that tha first of thasa procassas (currantly stoppad) 
Mill avar oparata again dua to its outdatad tachnology, i.a., it 
would ba racoaaissionad only as a rasult of a suddan draaatic risa 
in danand. Tha prafarrad routa to noainal capacity axpansion has 
baan idantifiad as tha updating of tha nawar production facility, 
by tha introduction of anargy saving (and aonitoring) aquipaant 
and practicas, and pra-calcination systaas. Basad on tha currant 
invastaant projacts baing carriad out at tha plant, thasa 
iaprovaaants could yiald up to a SOX incraasa in capacity, i.a., 
to approxiaataly 1,200 - 1,450 aatric tonnas/day (3). For tha 
purposas of this study, tha figura of 1,200 aatric tonnas/day will 
ba used whan projecting the coapany's contribution to total 
available capacity in Costa Rica for the period 1985 - 2000.
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2.1.2 COPCSAl V.., . A
2.1>2.a Ciatntot dil V«llt| S.A.i
Tht othtr tMO ceMnt plAnti, 
CtMtntot dll Valli (CEHVASA) and Ciaintoi dil Pacifico (CEMPASA) 
bilong to CODESA.
'ly * 't. I 
# ‘
• ’ f
Tht firit wai abiorbtd by tht 
corporation froi thi privati sictor, aftir thi original coipany, 
Calhidra S.A. (which itartid thi conitruction oi thi plant in 
1972) filid for bankruptcy! bifora finishing thi projict. Aftir a 
piriod of riaisiiiiint, CODESA concludid thi plant having 
istiiatid that additional was riquirid, dui to thi prospict of a 
rtlativi ihortagi of national supplyi a* a risult of thi rapid 
growth ixpiriincid in thi construction sictor in thi liddli and 
late sivintiis (i.e., consuaption growing faster than installed 
capacity). Finally} the coipany started producing client in 1978.
' ,<r V
• : . — . ' I  M
The plant's characteristics and 
location a n  quite dissiiilar to that of its other two 
coipititors. Its capacity is approxiiatily one third of either 
INCSA or CEMPASAi around 400 iitric tonnis/day. The production 
installations are located very close to the lain centre of 
consuiption, roughly 15 kiloietres away froi the capital city.
In Septeiber 1983y due to the
. ) .4 • •
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draiatic drop in consuoption «xporitnctd in tho country, tht 
govtrnoont dtcidod to shut th# plant down, rtnaininq so until tht
prtstnt day.
.u *•: -'I
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2.1.2.b Ctttntoi dll PacHicoi
Tht stcond CODESA cotptny, 
Ctttntos dtl PaciHco S.A. (CEMPASA) has tht tost up to datt plant 
in tht country. Tht industrial sitt »as built by ATEINSA oi
Spain, in conjunction with Allis-Chalttrs of tht USA which 
supplitd most of tht tquipatnt. Asland, Spain's largtst ctatnt
productr was in chargt of tht start“up phast, at wtll at tht 
training of kty ptrsonntl. (Both Attinta and Atland art tubsidiary 
coapanitt of tht INI, tht Spanish tquivaltnt of CODESA).
Tht production capacity of tht
CODESA plant is of *^1,250 attric tonnts/day or approxiaattly
450,000 attric tonnts/ytar, and its raw aattrial dtposits art 
ricogniztd by tost ptoplt intarvitwtd, at tht richtst in tht 
country and probably in Ctntral Aatrica. In fact, at a noainal 
capacity ratt of txploitation, tht tstiaattd supply pottntial 
(availability of raw aattrials) would bt of up to two hundrtd 
ytars (4), coaparid to approxiaattly forty ytars in tht cast of 
INCSA's quarrits (Z). (An important drawback of CEMPASA's rock 
deposits is thtir high concentrations of alkali, which could 
prevent the company from exporting into the American market).
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tht coap«ny, i* it ii to coaptta in thi national aarkat, liai in 
tha fact that its production sits is locatad far away, soa# 250 
kiloaatrts, froa th# aain cantra of consuaption, through 
aountainous tarrain (CEMPASA's installations ara locatad at saa 
lavai, ahila tha capital city is at M,000 fast abova saa lavai). 
It has baan astiaatad that tha cost of transportation to tha 
Hasata Cantral is bataaan 20X and 30X of tha total production 
valúa, a figura which placas this firo in a poor stratagic 
position with raspact to tha othar two producars.
■ f
In ralation to coaparativa 
coapatitivanass (apart froa that aantionad abova) of tha public 
and privata sactor businassas in tha industry, it aust ba strassad 
that INCSA is auch battar situatad. Tha raasons ara as follows: 
dtapar knowladga of tha sactor dua to its graatar axparianca in 
tha national aarkat, tha axistanca of sistar and affiliatad 
coapanias absorbing dadicatad production, sarving as a aora stabla 
basa for futura planning, and finally tha tachnological links with 
tha intarnational group froa which graat axpartisa is drawn (for 
axaapla, currantly, tha financial racords oparation is baing 




The following charts present tha 
relation of sales to noainal capacity for tha three plants, for 
the past ten years. As can be seen , while INCSA and CEMVASA 
operated side by side, no crowding out affect was evident. In
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U c i ,  CM#nto» d#l V.llt e » M  to fulfill « 1" tl««*
grouth in contuoption (Uti 70' and tarly BO'i).
Nfvarthtlttft, whin Ctaantot d#l 
Pacifico ftartid its opirstions, and tha •♦fact of tha 1981 
aconoaic crisis struck, tha conditions rapidly chanqad. This fact 
can ba claarly obsarvad in tha “Total Production“ graph No. 4. 
Horaovar, for 1983 through 1985, aithar of tha largar two 
coapanias could hava, on thair oan, fulfillad tha total national
daaand.
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2.1.3 Co §»èrifo» uith C m t r é J  Mitrigli.
Having prastnttd a britf dttcription o4 
•ach oi thf Costa Rican coatnt producing faciliti#«, I «hall non 
dadicat# «oa# paragraph« to th# coaparison of th# in«tall#d 
capacity situation in th# Cantral Aaarican countri#«.
•’ !.t
1 hav# chosan to has# th# study both on 
ovarall valuas, as nail as par capita ralationships. In taras of 
ovarall capacity, Costa Rica ranks first in tha araa, avan though 
four of tha othar fiva nations in tha ragion hava largar 
populations (thraa of thaa substantially largar). Mhila Costa 
Rica has 21.72X of tha installad capacity in Cantral Aaarica, tha 





Analyzing tha par capita valuas closar, na 
have that tha country's potential production capacity is tnica tha 
avaraga for tha araa (8.86 bags (8 42.5 kg«.)/yr vs. 4.43 
bags/yr). The folloning chart depicts this situation in greater 
detail: (Sources: (4) and Horld 4iianac 1985.)
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1M8TALLED CEHEMT CAPACITY IN CENTRAL AHERICA 
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IMBTALLED CEMENT CAPACITY IN CENTRAL AHERICA
Cauntrvi Inttallsd Caoacltv Population _________Ptr Capita
(42 kgi bagt/yr) (baga/yr)
* ■ i
** i1. * 4 J * , V' i
Suattssla 21,197,647 7,714,000 2.75 • .*] « Mf »J
El Salvador 22,012,941 4,685,000 4.70 ■ ':4
Honduras 20,953,059 4,276,000 4.90 f •' t J
Nicaragua 3,261,176 2,812,000 1.16
Costa Rica 23,235,883 2,624,000 8.86
./-i
, 4 ;. 4 • ’•'*'*,*■ •







AVERAGES: 17,827,765 4,028,167 4.43 ' / «' 
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Furthcrsort, th« ptr capita 
figura quoted for Costa Rica, 8.86 bags pir capita, or:
8.86 bags x 42.S kgs./bag « 376.55 kgs. ptr capita 
Mould be enough to satisfy an equivalent deeand to that of the 
United States of Aaerica for 1980 (5) . Clearly, considering the
great separation in the stage of developeent for these two 
societies, the country will experience a severe spare capacity 
problee for «any years to co«e, if sales are restricted to the 
national scene. Below I present a chart which shows the 
consuaption values for all the Aeerican countries, so that this 
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Farthtraorti the par capita 
figure quoted for Costa Rica, 8.86 bags par capita, or!
8.86 bags x 42.5 kgs./bag > 376.55 kgs. par capita 
would be enough to satisfy an equivalent deeand to that of the 
United States of Aeerica for 1980 (5) . Clearly, considering the
great separation in the stage of developeent for these two 
societies, the country will experience a severe spare capacity 
problea for aany years to coee, if sales are restricted to the 
national scene. Below I present a chart which shows the 
consueption values for all the Aeerican countries, so that this 
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CEHENT PER CAPITA CQN8UHPTI0N IW ftHERlCAM COUNTRIES (1980)1 





























C I  H i  n T P H O O U C T I O H f»q§ 57
‘ 3̂
2.2 D f  nd AnalYfifi
2 . 2 . 1 IttrodMCtiotf
2.2.1.« Cariti Agritatntii
At prtstnt a «trias of cartai 
agraaaants (é) axist batatan CODESAi CEHPASA and INCSA. Tha 
working« of thasa ara a« followsi
al.- CEHVASA do«« not oparata. 
In raturn, it racaiv«« CR C 2.00 ("'2.5 p.) for «ach bag «old by 
•ithar of tha othar two producar«. Mith thi« incoaa, tha coapany 
i« abla to aaintain a ««all staff, and carry out nacassary 
aaintananca work on ita «quipnant, (this agraaaant data« fro« 
March, 1984).
a2.- Canantos dal Pacifico and 
INCSA aach hold a fifty par cant quota of tha national aarkat. 
Neverthalass, a contingancy clausa astablishas that INCSA aay 
product up to 64X of tha national daaand, in so far as it 
conpsnsatas Ceaentos dal Pacifico with CR C 42.00 (^52.5 p.) par 
liag sold in axcass of tha pradatarainad quota (SOX). Nora 
recently, the actual sales figures have been stabilited at 57X 
INCSA and 43X CENPASA. This "equilibriu«" level was reached as a 
result of the evaluation of CEHPASA*« cost of transportation to
i  ' •' ■I
> .
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the Hint« Cintril vi. thi coapiniation providid by INCSA.
• .'•j
2 .2 . l.b Fintnciil  Potltioni
A «u««ary oi thi actual
oparatlvi ritult« for thi two public iictor coapaniia follonai
bl.- CEHVASAi A« nii atatid 
bifori, CEHVASA ftoppod its plant in Siptiabir 1983. Dui to this,
its incosi is ristrictid to thi coapinsation fii paid by thi
Industria Nacional do Cooonto and Ciointos dol Pacifico, for sach
bag of cooint thiy soil locally.
I '
Bocauso of thi particular status 
of tho coopany at prosont (it is offoctivoly "oothballod"), any 
financial riport would not bi riprosontativi of CEHVASA*«
potontial porforoanco undir noroal coopotitivo conditions.
Kooping this in aind I shall noa 
prisant soai figuras. Thi historical valuó of thi coapany s fixid 
assats aaounts to CR C 124 aillion (‘*’ £ 1.53 aillion). Its
“currant" assots would bi constitutod by its invintory valui, 
CR C 51 aillion ("*£ 637,500) and its accounts riciivablis of 
CR C 6 aillion (*̂ £ 75,000), a total figuro of CR C 57 aillion 
712,000), though thi plant biing shut down, thi realizabli 
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1.T1
, ♦
Hoving on to tht dibt «ituationy 
(CR C 112 Killion long torn docuntntt piyiblt, ind CR C S4 nillion 
long ttrn tccount» p«y«blt) â totâl of CR C 166 nillion or  ̂
£ 2.07 oillion art owad.
Apart froB thaia figurasi a 
furthar worrying aspact of CEHPASA't position ralatas to a court 
casa baing haard in tha Stata of Nom York, ralativa to a conflict 
arising froa a frustratad affort to axport caaont to Haxico. Tha 
coapany is baing suad by tha shipping firn which transportad tha 
shipaant concarnad to and froa Maxico (in fact tha Haxican 
iaportar want bankrupt in tha aaantiaa), for USf l.S Billion 
£ 1 Billion). According to tha lagal advisors to tha Coaision
Nacional Para la Raastructuracion da CODESA, tha prospacts of 






In suBaary, avan though it is 
difficult to assass tha financial position of a coapany which is 
not currantly oparating, it is claar that tha dabt situation, avan 
«ora so if tha court casa is lost, is iaportant, considaring tha 
siali siza of tha first
i
Eatiaatad Total Dabti
Long tara dtbt ^ Court cas# costst 
£ 2.075 Billion ♦ £ 2.0 Billion
« '' £ 4 Billion
C I  »  í  n T ^ i t o o t t e r i O H Pê§§ éO
VERSUS
Ettilatid Total Yttrlv Ravtnuti
K  i]
^  Vj ' . .'1
140,000 aitric tonnii x 1,000 kgt/42.S kga/bag « 3,294,000 baga/yr
i CR C 140/bag (avtraga for 1983)t 
■ CR C 461,160,000 or £ 5.764.500/yr.
•»
•t- ; '
b2.* CEHPASAi Roving on to 
Ctatntos d l l  Pacifico S.A., a ralativi balança ha« baan »truck, 
rasulting froa tha cartal agraaaant mith INCSA, aith ratpact to 
tha oparating ratult», yialding a aarginally positiva rasult for 
1985 of soaa CR C 16 Billion or '*' £ 200,000 (ignoring dabt 
chargas).
Navarthala««, uhan aa taka into 
account tha dabt situation, aa saa that tha coapany's ability to 
covar it is graatly in doubt. CODESA Haadquartars is tha aain 
craditor, having absorbad lossas for CR C 174 aillion (^£ 2.175 
■illion), and still holding loans for CR C 368 aillion C*£ 4.6 
aillion), undar highly subsidizad conditions* CR C 266 aillion at 
8X intarast, 3 yaars graca, and 9 yaars payback pariodj and CR C 
102 aillion at OX intarast with 3 yaars to pay. Finally,* tha 
total long tara dabt aaounts to CR C 395 Billion r^£ 3 aillion) or 
64X of tha total asssat historical valúa of CR C 616 aillion or 
'£ 7,700,000. (Plaasa nota that a 600X devaluation occurred in 
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In iu«««ry, tvtn though th# 
coopany if not rtturning an oparating deficit at praitnt, itf 
profptctf of functioning as an indtptndtnt coopany in a 
coapttitivi environoont are very poor, due to ite very Ion return 
on inveeteent <even baaed on historical values, the operating 
profit/assets ■ 2.SX).
n é- ■
2.2.2 a§ti09§I wartft Historicai Ì9h»¥ÌQurt
As a first step in the study of the local 
ceeent deeand, it is prudent to exaeine the sector's behaviour 
over the last tuenty years, the period since ehen ceeent has been 
produced in the country.
, * ;
In relation to thè coeparison of resulta 
froB year to year, per capita consuoption values bave been chosen, 
finca these reflect a clearer picture of thè state of thè industry 
at any given point in tiee. As a result, for our purposes, an 
iaportant variable Nould be that of thè rate of population groNth.
! , <1
In per capita teres, deeand grew on 
average, during this period, at a rate of 4.15X/year, having 
reached levels of 19X both in 1969 and 1972. The average per 
capita consueption eas of 147 kgs./yr. eith a eaxieue value of 243 
kgs./yr. in 1980, ehen the highest consueption level in the
VJ
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country's history wss «chitvod, i.t., 332,220 «ttric tonnts/ytsr.
Starching dttpir into tht analysis oi tht 
chostn paraatttrs, m# obsorvt that up to 1980, btfort tht crisis, 
tht avtragt ptr capita growth ratt aaounttd to 8.4SZ/yr, (tith 
iaportant fluctuations), with a ntarly constant population growth 
ratt of  ̂2.7SZ/yr. Unfortunattly, with tht drop of tht country's 
ovtrall tconotic activity in tht tarly 1980's, whtn ntgativt 
growth ratts in tht construction stctor wtrt cotton, tht twtnty 
ytar avtragt (1963 - 1983) ftll to tht 4.13Z/yr ttntiontd tarlitr.
*(• ;
In fact, thrtt wtll tstablishtd trtnds art 
tvidtnt for tht study ptriods tht first ont of trratic but 
iaportant txpansion (1963 - 1972); tht stcond of consisttnt but 
Itss significant growth (1973 - 1980); and finally a last stags of 
profound crisis and vary waak racovtry frot 1981 to tht prtstnt 
day, (in fact OZ growth is foracast for 1986 (i))»
Btlow two tablas art offtrad, dtscribing 
in dttail tht ralationships batwatn population growth, 
consusption, installtd capacity, optrating capacity, as wtll as 
ptr capita valuts (for consuaption, installtd capacity, and 
oparating capacity) for tht ptriod batwtan 1963 and 1983. 
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ytar ôfttlatiaa 0p §r§tiB§ ltMti9»aI ^•Caf ^.Ca#
Caiacity CaaacitY Coeseee. lest Oaar Coat •« * 1, 
•:w
1969 1515292 140,000 140,000 111,714 74
• t
t * , *
1966 1567230 ■ a 108,075 69 W- . >,
1967 1615480 m a 114,809 71
V- s . 64 ■
1968 1664581 • a 129,527 78 ** *' 1 j
1969 1710083 a a 158.858 93 . i'; ’■, k• ■ •
1970 1766120 a a 187,361 106
.
. V • 
■ '
1971 1811290 a a 210,952 116
139
i
1972 1867045 a a 258,658 • • . r* A
1973 1878409 a a 278,196 148
* l»f
V
1974 1938000 450,000 450,000 301,974 232 232 156 •' f’4'
1975 1993784 a a 326,780 226 226 164 • It't • •




1977 2098531 a a 408,703 214 214 195 9 -■4* . r* ,
1978 2131870 594,000 594,000 462,715 279 279 217 •
4 i 
•11 ■■ »■
1979 2219815 a a 524,268 268 268 236
•k1980 2276676
a a 552,220 261 261 243
1981 2339829 1,044,000 1,044,000 484,277 446 446 207 K
1982 2403781 a 882,000 419,684 434 367 r75
1983 2467339 n 738,000 342,020 423 299 139 ••‘  ̂1.. < 1 ■ 7
1984 2536424 a a 415,321 412 291 164
i
1
1985 2624000 M a 438,373 398 281 167
ji
r
Sources: <3), <7), (9), 4nd CODiSA Annual R9fiort§
! ’V.;a
p. ■-, *
V > *• • . *
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Coaaantt Ttbla 2.2.2.at
Inforaation for coluani 1 and 4 aai providtd by 1NC8A (3) and (7). 
Othar valuta frot tha othar aourctt aantionad, appari froa tha 
lati thraa coluana ahich atra calculatod by tha author. Coluan 2 
prtaanta tha inatallad capacity for tha country during ovary 
poriod quotad. Coluan 3 daacribaa tha capacity undar oparationi 
until 1977, thia includaa tha tuo INCSA procaaaaa) batNoan 1978 
and 1980 that of both INCSA kilna and CENVASA; for 1981 all thraa 
pianta) during 1982 tha valua rapraaanta INCSA'a two procaaaaa 
and CEHPASA conbinad; finally, froa 1983 to tha praaant it ia 
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Tabla 2.2.2.bi Cfawt Pfand in Cotta RiCêi
Ttar P§r  camita ^ofuiatiaa Kariatioa
Caasaaatiaa____ -------------- Iff fÇ gffftf..
196S 73.72
1966 68.96 3.43 -6.46
1967 71.07 3.08 3.06
1968 77.81 3.04 9.49
1969 92.89 2.73 19.38
1970 106.09 3.28 14.20
1971 116.47 2.56 9.78
1972 138.54 3.08 18.95
1973 148.10 0.61 6.90
1974 155.82 3.17 5.21
1975 163.9 2.88 5.19
1976 178.13 1.89 8.68
1977 194.76 3.30 9.33
1978 217.05 1.59 11.44
1979 236.18 4.13 8.81
1980 242.56 2.56 2.70
1981 206.97 2.77 -14.67
1982 174.59 2.73 -15.64
1983 138.57 2.64 -20.60
1984 163.70 2.80 18.10
1985 167.06 3.45 2.10
1986 estiaata — > '0.00
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CoMtntt Táblt 2t2.2tb
Tht ficond tablt ihoNi tht bthaviour of thi tiltcttd parootttrt 
for tht ttudy frot ptriod to ptriod. Pltait not# tht grtat 
variation in par capita contuoption grotth. Also, Iron tht data 
providtd it is appartnt that population valúas havt not bttn 
collactad at 12 aonth intarvals, Itading to aisraprasantation in 
soaa casts of par capita figuras.
■
;
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Tht following gr«ph prtttnts tht 
rtUtionihip bttwttn inttalltd capacity, capacity in oparation, 
and national coniuaption. It it iaportant to not# firtt of all, 
that in 1980 tht total inttallad capacity in tht country wat 
abtorbtd by local contuaption, for which rtason tht proposal of a 
ntw plant was not out of plact.
NATIONAL DEMAND
CAPACITY vs. CO N SUM PTIO N
r
Q  InsLCap. 
Oper Cap.
Nat Cons.
II II I I iT iiin n r
1.2
1866 1868 1871 1874 1877 1880 1883




Ntvtrthtltti, dut to tht sizt of tht ntw 
facility, it was tvidtnt that tvtn continuing with a ittady growth
in consumption (dotttd lint), an iaportant amount of spars 
capacity would bt availablt for many ytars to coat (tort than fivt 
as can be seen from tht graph)• Estimating the amount of this 
spare capacity five years on (198S), under normal conditions, wt
l\ • • I
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havt that thii Mould havt aoountid to approxioatily 240,000 aitric 
tonnts/ytar or thi tquivaltnt of all of CEMVASA's production plus 
ont fourth of CEHPASA's capacity (assuaing a lOOX utilization rati 
for INCSA).
A sicond aspict that can bi dram froa tha 
graph, is tht acuta drop in consuaption rasulting froa tha 1981 
crisis.
9
Noving on to par capita valuas for 
installad capacity, oparating capacity and consuaption, ua gat a 
claarar viaa of tha stata of tha industry at any point in tiai. 
Froa tha data froa tabla 2.2.2.b, it is possibla to obsarva tha 
draaatic affact that ganaral aconoaic conditions hava on tha 
sactor as a ahola. Tha iapact of tha 1981 crisis (first 
davaluation occurad in Saptaabar 1980), droppad consuaption 
figuras to par capita lavals axpariancad in tha aarly savantias, 
■ffactivaly, a tan yaar backaard shift in tha country's 
construction activity. In fact, tha par capita consuaption lavals 
for 1983 - 1983 fall balou tha 1974 valua. Anothar consaquanca of 
tha crisis can ba saan ahan aa analyza groath trands. Sinca 1983, 
par capita consuaption groath appaars to hava a auch lass 
significant slops, than that axpariancad in tha past dacada. Baloa 
I present a graph ahich depicts these aspects acre clearly.
.4
k'l
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FinAlly« biloN tuo gr«phi «re offtrid, 
Mhich study th« b«h«viour of the resulting p«r«seters fro« this 
section i.e.i population groeth ratei end per capita ceeent 
consueption variation from period to period. Please note the 
relative stability in the population groeth values. AlsOi observe 
the three stages described before in relation to the behaviour of 
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2.2«3 Brotith froitctioiist f*" • :
2.2.3tA ForiAl FortCAitingi
Thii fiction it didicatid to thi 
ftudy of thi potintifl gronth of nation«! ciiint coniuaption 
bitNiin 1985 and thi ind of thii cintury.
It it citar, bicauti of variout 
factor«, tuch at patt hittorical bihaviour, vary coipititivi 
intirnational temi, ite., that thit induitry dipindt, and Mill 
dipind in thi futuri, viry hiavily on thi local larkit for itt 
turvival.
. i ,
Having ittablithid in thi 
priciiding paragraph« that thin ixittt a vatt «pan capacity in 
thi country, it it thi purpoti of thi« ixirciti to ittablith up to 
Nhat point niw tourcit of talit autt bi purtuid to taki thi 
induttry at a Mholi to a i o n  favourabli potition, i*i*, hoi auch 
count autt bi told outtidi thi noraal local diaand tcini (through 




Forial forecatting of the groith 
path of consuaption for the next fifteen years, based on the 
record of the past tiinty, is an altirnativi ihich is not likely
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2.2^3 Bromth ProJtetioait
2.2.3.« Fora«l Foractttingi
Thii «action i« dadicatid to tha 
study of tha potantiil groath of nation«! caaant consuaption 




It is claar, bacausa of various 
factors, such as past historical bahaviour, vary coapatitiva 
intarnational scana, ate., that this industry dapands, and Mill 
dapand in tha futura, vary haavily on tha local aarkat for its 
survival.
Having astablishad in tha 
pracaading paragraphs that thara axists a vast spars capacity in 
tha country, it is tha purposa of this axarcisa to astablish up to 
what point now sourcas of salas aust ba pursuad to taka tha 
industry as a whola to a aora favourabla position, i.a., how auch 
caaant aust ba sold outsida tha noraal local daaand scana (through 




Foraal forecasting of the growth 
path of consuaption for tha next fifteen years, based on the 
record of the past twenty, is an alternative which is not likely
iil* * . I
* r* VJ
e i Ê i K T P M O D ë C 7 I O K Pë§§ 72
to yitld rtfttonâblt rtiultt, btcâutt of tht orratic bohaviour, 
ixplaintd in tht latt itction. Apart frot anything tliii tht 
prtftnt tconotic clitatt in thich tht country it itatrttd Mill 
hindtr any largo txpantivt trtnd in tht conitruction ttctor to 
takt placo for tany ytari to coot.
Not taking account of thoto 
facto, C0DE8A hat forocaot (8) strong continuad grouth for tht 
induotry (198S - 2000), baitd on tht rapid txpanoion of tht 1960't 
and tarly 1970't. In fact, thty havt propottd a fortula for por 
capita conounption grouth, of tht fort* y« a ♦ b a In x, at thtir 
uniqut ootinato (no contingtncy tctnarioo), which would load to 
unbound growth into tht futuro, i.t., it would approxioatt a 
vortical aoyoptott (infinito growth vt. a horizontal atyoptoto 
"liait to growth” approach, with an infltction point whort PC 
conouoption growth it bound to slow down and gradually lavai off). 
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n  coifuiftitf»
1984 429904 2452103 175
1985 657674 2590503 254
1986 698492 2666000 262
1987 740772 2733476 271
1988 787208 2801452 281
1989 832140 2869447 290
1990 881095 2936983 300
1991 928281 3004147 309
1992 976661 3071260 318
1993 1029326 3138188 328
1994 1080018 3204801 337
1995 1131754 3270965 346
1996 1187818 3336568 356
1997 1241620 3401698 365
1998 1296480 3466525 374
1999 1355988 3531218 384
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As can ba obsarvtd, CODESA is 
Morking on ths basis oi a S3X incraast in salas batNaan 1984 and 
1985 <tha raport aas arittan in Octobar 1984, and ravisad in 
1986). Tha official figuras according to INCSA (3), stata an 
incraasa in local consuaption of only 5.51 (basad on calculations 








. *. ; ',
a2.- Actual Rasults <INCSA):
1984 1985
415,321 at. 438,373 at.
Tha gap batnaan 1986 astiaatas 
is siailar in aagnituda. COOESA ovarshooting tha «ors meant INCSA 
figura by *^260,120 aatric tonnas. In contrast, INCSA is not 
foracasting any growth for tha construction (privata) sactor at 
all, a viaw sharad by various sourcas in tha industry:
a3.- Estiaata for 1986 (Noraal Consuaption):
CQDESA INCSA
"'698,490 at. "-440,000 at.
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2.2.3.b Hultiplt 8i«ul«tionti
f
In ordtr to avoid falling into 
tht taao trrori oxptritncod in tht COOESA axtrcist protonttd 
abovti I hava dacidad to follow an altarnativa routa. Tha 
projactiona providad balow involvt tha coabination of a tarias of 
growth pattarna for both population and par capita conauaption, 
which ahall yiald axpactad ovarall conauaption lavala.
Tha rangaa for tha choaan 
paraaatara ara aa followa: population growth batwaan 2.6Z and 3.01 
a yaar (tha avaraga for tha paat twanty yaara haa baan ‘̂2.8Z/yr.). 
Mith raapact to tha rataa of growth in par capita conauaption, a 
ranga including a paaaiaiatic aatiaata of IX/yr balow tha avaraga 
for tha pariod 196S - 1985, and an optiaiatic valúa of O.SZ abova 
tha 1965 - 1980 avaraga haa baan aalactad. A "aost likaly" path 
haa baan alao choaan at around 7X/yr. par capita growth rata and 
2.6X/yr. population incraaaa, baatd on a aodarata to atrong 
racovary of tha national aconoay, i.a., 6NP growth rataa of 
'3X/yr. (par capita caaant conauaption haa baan obaarvad in tha 
past to grow at batwaan 3X and 4X abova 6NP (97), and a gradual 
drop in population growth, raapactivaly (population incraaaaa ara 
bound to drop dua to coabinad afforta by tha national haalth board 
and other organizations, towards this and.)
..*1
* V
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2.2.S.C An«lytit of Rotulttt
Rtvioning tho
rttulting froo tho oultiplicotion of tho chostn porj 
tho foiloNing gtnoral rosultii
itorationo 
)ttri NO got
cl.- Thi lovol of ovoroll 
contuoption for 1980, tho highoit in tho country's history, would 
bo roschod oost probably around 1988, with an optioistic figuro of 
1987, and a possioistic ono of ^1989 (lovol « 550,000 ot/yr.).
*1 ; .
c2.- Tho coobinod installed 
capacity of Incsa (1,200 ot/day or ‘̂432,000 ot/yr.) and Coopasa 
(1,250 ot/day or ^450,000 ot/yr.) would bocooo insufficiont 
approxioatoly in 1993, tho optioistic valuo boing 1992, and tho 
possioistic ostioato, 1998.
c3.- With rospoct to tho por 
capita consuoption ratos, which rofloct tho stato of tho industry 
■oro objoctivoly than ovorall consuoption figuros, tho rosults 
suggost that tho highost lovol oxporioncod in tho past (rosulting 
froa the boon in coffee prices in world oarkots towards tho orfd of 
the 1970's), i.e., 243 kgrs. PC/yr. for 1980, would bo reached 
again by ' 1991 (1990 * optimistic ostinate, 1998 » pessioistic).
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c4.- Finally, in reftrtnca to 
tha txhauition of tha total national inatalltd capacity, i.a., 
CEHVASA ♦ CEHPASA ♦ INCSA, thit Mould occur around 1995, uith 
optiaiitic and ptttiniftic valuta falling around 1993, and 2000, 
raapactivaly. Bi Ion tht uholt tat of raaults ia providtd for 
furthar inaptction.
Tht firat tuo tablta (2.2.3.b and c) 
prtatnt tht auggtattd patha of growth for tht two choatn 
parantttra, i.t., population and ptr capita conautption. Tht ntxt 
stqutnct, (d, t f and g) ahowa tht rtaulta of tht ittrationa 
carritd out bttwttn tht two atta of paratttora, frot which tht 
choict of "noat liktly”, optiniatic and ptaainiatic fortcaata art 
atltcttd. Finally, a atrita of grapha art prtatnttd at tht tnd 
ahowing tht rtlation <X occupation for tach ptriod) bttwttn thtat 
thrtt fortcaata and both inatalltd and optrating capacity (which 
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Tâblt 2.2.3.bt PopuUtion Browth ProJtctioni 







19À5 1,515,292 1,515,292 1,515,292
1966 1,567,230 1,567,230 1,567,230
1967 1,615,480 1,615,480 1,615,480
1968 1,664,581 1,664,581 1,664,581
1969 1,710,083 1,710,083 1,710,083
1970 1,766,120 1,766,120 1,766,120
1971 1,811,290 1,811,290 1,811,290
1972 1,867,045 1,867,045 1,867,045
1973 1,878,409 1,878,409 1,878,409
1974 1,938,000 1,938,000 1,938,000
1975 1,993,784 1,993,784 1,993,784
1976 2,031,520 2,031,520 2,031,520
1977 2,098,531 2,098,531 2,098,531
1978 2,131,870 2,131,870 2,131,870
1979 2,219,815 2,219,815 2,219,815
1980 2,276,676 2,276,676 2,276,676
1981 2,339,829 2,339,829 2,339,829
1982 2,403,781 2,403,781 2,403,781
1983 2,467,339 2,467,339 2,467,339
1984 2,536,424 2,536,424 -2,536,424
1985 2,624,000 2,624,000 2,624,000
1986 2,692,224 2,697,472 2,702,720
1987 2,762,222 2,773,001 2,783,802
1988 2,834,040 2,850,645 2,867,316
1989 2,907,725 2,930,463 2,953,335
1990 2,983,325 3,012,516 3,041,935
1991 3,060,892 3,096,867 3,133,193
1992 3,140,475 3,183,579 3,227,189
1993 3,222,127 3,272,719 3,324,005
1994 3,305,903 3,364,355 3,423,725
1995 3,391,856 3,458,557 3,526,437
1996 3,480,045 3,555,397 3,632,230
1997 3,570,526 3,654,948 3,741,197
1998 3,663,359 3,757,287 3,853,432
1999 3,758,607 3,862,491 3,969,035
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Tabu 2.2.3.Cl Ptr Capita Consu»ption Orowth Proitctiont
For tha Pariod 1989 “ 2000
P o r  c a p i t a  C o n t u o p t i o n
y#ar eroMth i 71 Qromth 9 9t CroNtk f »1 Sronth § 3Z
1,985 167 167 167 167
1,986 179 180 182 172
1,987 191 195 198 177
1,988 205 210 216 182
1,989 219 227 236 188
1,990 234 245 257 194
1,991 251 265 280 199
1,992 268 286 305 *205
1,993 287 309 333 212
1,994 307 334 363 218
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Tâblt 2.2.3>di CwntiTotâl Cftnt Contuaotion ProitctionA
Matric Tonntt/yttr
Ytir *Hott Liktly" Optiaittic Pttiiaittic 
• 7X PC ê 2.<I • 9X PC ê 3.01 i 31 PC I 3.0Z
‘ 1
j
1985 438,208 438,208 438,208 • !■' ■ ' ■
1986 481,074 491,976 464,895 • » ' 1
1987 528,132 552,342 493,207
1988 579,794 620,114 523,243 1 1'i‘ ' ■
1989 636,509 696,202 555,109 ' ' ■
1990 698,773 781,626 588,915 1 • ' • ■ !
1991 767,127 877,531 624,780 ■*Ï -11992 842,167 985,204 662,829
1993 924,548 1, 106,089 703,195
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Cesia ffJàænzjfBcaions o f T<M  
Consusipiibn Gfoaih "S5-2XfO
M  < p 7 % p c a i t %  
n  ® 3 % p c a a o %
I M S  1 M 7  I M S  IS S I  I S M  I S M  1S S 7 I S M
Iterations
Tht itirationt on Mhich tho abovt luaoary 
of choicts has botn drawn art prasantad balow (tablas a,f,g):
Tabla 2.2.3.H Gasanti Proiactiont of Total Consuwotion 
Browth i 7X Par Capita Incraatas and Various Population Ratai
Yaar Itaration No.l Itaration No.2 
8 71 £C k 2.dX 8 71 n  8 2.8%
Itaration No.3 
• 71 PC ê 3.01
1985 438,208 438,208 438,208
1986 481,074 482,011 482,949
1987 528,132 530,193 532,258
1988 579,794 583,191 586,602
1989 636,509 641,487 646,494
1990 698,773 705,610 712,501
1991 767,127 776,143 785,247
1992 842,167 853,726 865,421
1993 924,548 939,065 953,780
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I I I I' i I t i I -H i






c e II £ M r f n Q 9 9 c J I Q n 95
•I «
CEMENT: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CX)NSUMPTION
GROWTH AND OPERATING CAPACITY ’86 -  2000








^  f 9 7 % P C A 2 . 0 % ^
(9i%PC&2.0% I
^ a % p c « 2 . o %  I
— 1 ^ 1 1— r — S
1004 1000 1000 1000 1002 1004 1000 1000 2000
Perkxl
Nott: Plvast consult tht rtsults prosonttd sbovt uhon rovitMing 
thi folloMing stction. In this ssnntr, tht assisfstnt of the 
iapact of large consueption scheees on overall deoand will becoee 
clearer.
1 .  V I  *,  •
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2.2.4 Làr§9 C09$uwpti09 froi§cts$
utì
According to INCSA't Extcutivo Proiidtntf 
Hr. Edoond Hoodbridgt, at Ntll ai othor coapany officiala (2), 
largo consuoption projactif which could significantly incrtatt 
contuoption abovo tho lovtlt ditcustod in tho last taction 
(darivtd froa noraal activitiat), could only coatf at a ratult of 
public tactor invattoant. Tha aain targat araat for such 
prograooat would bt low coat housing, hydro*alactric ganarating 
plants, and road works.
V;
2.2.4.a Low Cost Housings
* i
Spacific proposals hava baan 
aantionad by tha prasant (nawly alactad) Prasidant of tha 
Rapublic, to raduca tha national housing daficit of soaa 120,000 
hoaat, through tha iaplaaantation of aattiva construction 
projacts. Kaaping this in aind, I hava calculatad tha iapact such 
a prograaaa would hava on tha national installad caaant production 
capacity.
V*
In tha following pagas, caaant 
use astiaatas ara givan for thraa diffarant pariods of duration 
S, or À yaars), basad on two diffarant typas of houta (60 ats. 
sp., tha aost popular privataly built housa siza, and 48 ats. sq.,
/'ft , I
V  • I
e t K i H 7 P » 0 D M C 7 I 0 H n § 9  17 . »'i
thi ttàndard duvlling sizt built by tht IHAS, tht public 
inftitution in chargt of povirty livil houiing progroooit).
t I
Unfortunattly, tho iopact thii 
•chooo Nould havt on tht currint initilltd capacity if not vtry 
grtati bttuttn 4.7Z/yr, if 20,000 houttt ttaauring 48 «ts. tq.
Ntrt to bt built in a ptriod of «ix ytart, and 8.8X/yr if an
"optitiatic* pian got undartay, i.t., 30,000, 60 att. aq. botta 
built in four ytara.
In auttary, a aaaaivt houaing
achttt Mould not on ita otn aolvt tht undtrlying apart capacity 
probità, though it uould contributt poaitivtly totarda rtducing 
tht prtatnt gap.




Potion Al -Ootitiatic EftiMti!!.
1. Houat aiztt 60 ata. aq.
2. Ctatnt Uati
- 1,000 blocka
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3. Ratio oi blocks to Ctsont bags 
(Sourcti Bloqutra *E1 Progroso")
- 49 blocks/bag.
or 1,000 blocks / 49 blocks/bag • 22.22 baos V. .
4. Total bags psr houstt 
90 bags for concroto ♦ 22.22 bags In blocks *
72,22 baos/houst
or 72.22 bags/houss/23.929 bags/nt ■
3.07 HT/houst
9. Estisatod total consuaption of projscti 




- 4 ytarsi 41,400 NT/yr.
- 9 ytarsi 73,770 HT/yr.
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U D iC t  A i w > n t  on Capacityt
1. MuahT of hou»»m built d t  davi
1 . Optrating Capacity (INC8A * CENPA8A)
OPTION As 2,450 HT/day / 3.07 HT/houtc 
~ 20,000 houiaa in 25 daya
- 24,000 houtta in ^ 30 daya
- 30,000 houaca in 38 daya
OPTION Bs 2,450 HT/day / 2.46 HT/houaa «
- 20,000 houata in 20 daya
- 24,000 houaaa in 24 daya
- 30,000 houaca in 30 daya
* f
* 1
b. Total Inatallcd Capacity <INC8A ♦ CEHVA8A * CEHPA8A)
OPTION As
- 20,000 houaca in  ̂ 22 daya
- 24,000 houaca in ^ 26 daya
- 30,000 houaca in 33 daya
OPTION B:
- 20,000 houaea in 18 daya
> 24,000 houaca in 21 daya
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6.96Z of Oparating Capacity 
3.88Z of Inatallad Capacity
8.36X of Oparating Capacity 
7.04Z of Initallad Capacity
10.44Z of Oparating Capacity 




S.S7X of Oparating Capacity 
4.70Z of Inatallad Capacity
4.68Z of Oparating Capacity 
5.45X of Inatallad Capacity
4 yaarai
8.3SX of Oparating Capacity 
7.06X of Inatalltd Capacity
Note: Ceaentoi del Valla, on ita own could cope uith the deoand 
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Ai a final nota I hava dacidad to show 
graphically tha iapact tha bait of thaaa tao plana (option A) 
Mould hava on tha country's oparating and instailad capacity 
dapanding on tha thraa basa pattarns of bahaviour dascribad in 
saction 2.2.3 (i.a., *aost likaly", optiaistic, and passiaistic 
projactions of national consuaption). In this raspact, it is 
assuaad that tha housing prograaaa, baing diractad at tha vary 
poor (aho otharaisa aould not build a houso on thair oan), 
oparatas as a coaplaaantf (not a supplaaant) of noraal 
consuaptioni
C B i E f ^ : m P A C r O F e Y R H O U S Ì f ^ P m G R A à Ì à f £  
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b. Hydro-elictrieal Schiitti
Tht ixpectid incrtati in 
coniuaption (ovarall) for 1986 ovar 1985 (4.9X) it aaaociatad 
solaly with tha construction of ICE't (Utility coapany) 
Vsntanaa-Barita hydro-alactric projact (̂  21,600 NT or  ̂2X of tha 
national inatallad capacity). Unfortunataly, no othar larga 
tchaaat would ba raquirad in tha aadiua tarn (apart froa tha 
option potad by tha Boruca plant ditcuitad in tha Aluainiua 
chaptar of thii thatit). In conclusion, no furthar significant 
contribution is axpactad froa this tactor for toaa yaart to coaa. ilr'l
i
c. Road Buildingi
Tha traditional aathod for 
building roads in tha country it by tha usa of taraac turfacas. 
Concrata, bacauta of tha highar initial capital invastaant 
involvad, and tha poor cliaatic conditions (rainy saason lasts for 
9 aonths/yr.) ara raraly utad. Mith tha drop in tha prica of oil, 
it is unlikaly that policias in this fiald will changa vary auch 
in the near future. As a result, tha prospect of expecting 
increased ceaent use, based on new road building prograaaas does 
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2.2,5 £M»ortst
BaloN, tht coaplttt racord of Coito Rican 
ctatnt txportt i t  protonttdi
Tablt 2 . 2 . a . a  Cotta Rican Ciiont Exoortii ( i t t r i c  tonnoi)
(no txportt btfort 1980)
Cttvata Cttpata TOTALS














# Includtt ctatnt involvtd in Itgal catt, rtftr to Ctavata taction 
abovt.
(Sourctti Incsa (3^, Cod§s», H9wori§s Axuiits) I'
r.
y.
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□  c a y i m A
Export! bogan in 1981, favoured by tho 
drop in the value of our currency (at eell at the introduction of 
nee production capacity, CEHPASA). Neverthelei!, ai can be leen 
free the figures, as soon as the costs returned to their noraal 
levels, the depletion of national exports has been very 
substantial. In fact, for 1983, only inesa exported and solely by 






The chances of penetrating nee earkets, 
according to both Cenpasa (4^ and Inesa i1) are very slie, either 
because of the entry of nee exporting nations froe the region, 
which have such lower energy costs than Costa Rica:
c i » i ti r___f H i  g if C i M  ff ^aft iOi
Tabla 2.2.3.bi Entrov Coat Coaoariion
Caft iuaker •CVRT Cost ilect./tlT *
Haxico US «1.66/HT clinkar f3.16/HT clinkar « ‘ H
Vanaiuala fl.66/MT clinkar 52.13/HT clinkar i -Ï■>: "i,
Cotta Rica; tll.76/HT clinkar $6.63/HT clinkar
(Mott: ih§s§ f i g u n s  Ntrc supfilitd in April 1985. Uith thn rtctnt 
drop in th§ MorJd price of oil the gap should non be saaller.)
or bacauaa of tha aubaidtzad axport aalaa in Latin Aaarica by 
traditional axportars (3)t (Spain in particular), which could toll 
coaant in Cotta Rica chaapar <^f28/HT in 1985) than wa can product
it.
£ A / £ / t G y œ s r C O M P A f f / S O A /
«3S8SS.W
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A tuaaary o4 tht Morld ciatnt tcina it 
provided below (1981) iiOi,
Irtli-Ziiigtc. »grld Ctttnt ffitii l?8lt
(eillion Metric Tonnes)
* includes 16 Million MT froe Japan
2.3 Policy Instrueents to leorove Perforeanctt
2.3.1 ietrev Ooeiteriee. Ceeserratiee aed S u b s t i t u t i o n
■ I \
Real on Output laoorts Exports App Cnsp ’ *
Europe 283.2 8.4 39.4+ 252.0  ̂ ‘
T' • ' |
USSR 127.0 0.6 3.0 124.6 ‘'V
Africa 27.3 10.4 2.0 33.6 * 4 ' A* ‘ 1
Mid'East 34.6 32.8 2.7 61.3
* . V j 
1
Americas 1S1.2 7.2 4.9 151.0 ■i)'r
Asia 2SS.6 11.5 21.2« 246.5
* •u-\■ t\
Australasia 6.0 0.03 0.2 5.8
* i*r • •(
TOTAL 757.8 70.3 70.3 750.2 * '' * <• f'
M $





In an industry where *̂ 50X of the total 
cost of production is directly associated with energy usei it is 
of the utmost iaportance to focus on its efficient eanageaent. • -*l
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Entrgy 261.30 16.6X ■ ‘I
Futli 348.64 34.7X
"■■il
Hitiriali 209.06 13.2X '■''I





Labour 212.03 13.4X ‘ 1















Al txplaintd lort fully in thi ftrtiliztri
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chapter, energy auditi and lubiequent eonitoring ehould be soee of 
the firet priorities in this type of activity. Eqergy conservation 
and the study of the feasibility of oil substitution with 
indigenous fuels, such as coal, uhich has been recently located by 
Recope (in substantial quantities) in the Talaeanca region of the 
country (Í2), therefore constitute ieportant areas of joint action 
by both governeent and the coepanies in the industry, (a detailed 
description of how energy audits should be carried out is 
presented in the fertilizers chapter).
2,3,2 9àckàa§ 9§al Caascitv Deraleeeeeti
It eay well be the case that the only 
substantial source for future continued growth of the industry 
lies in adopting a concerted caepaign to proeote exports of 
bundled construction packages including design, eaterials,
construction, skilled eanpower, etc., to less technologically 
advanced countries in the region (Nicaragua constitutes a prise 
target due to its ssall installed ceeent capacity, the proxisity 
of Cesentos del Pacifico to its sain center of consusptiont the 
Hanagua area, etc.). Costa Rica has a relative advantage with 
respect to sany other Central Aserican and Caribbean countries in 
teres of engineering design expertise. In fact, local consuTting 
firas are constantly involved (independently) in projects outside 
the country. Hany nations (most notably in South East Asia: Korea, 
Japan and Singapore, exporting to the Middle East f i n, for 
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favourabli coapatitivt poiitionf to achitvi thtir oun divilopoont 
targttf. Tht purpott of rtducing tht rtlativt iaportanco of tht 
coft of tht ctttnt Nith rttptct to tht ovtrall valut of tht 
projtctf involvtd, tttai to bt a rtatonablt option, tinct it it 
Nidtly acctpttd, that on iti otn tht txport of ctntnt it unliktly 
to occur on a lignificant tcalt.
Finally, largt national construction 
tchtttt, much at tht low cost housing progratnt planntd by tht 
prtstnt adtinistration could providt tht ntcttsary training ground 
(if planntd corrtctly) for futurt projtcts abroad. Tht dtvtlopatnt 
of a ntw product, i.t., tht packagt dtal, would thtn ttta tort 
rtalistic, as prosptctivt clitnt countrits could stt for 
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3.1 Introduction!
l.i.i Pr9S§9têtiowt
At dilcutltd in thi tarly ttagtt of thit 
thttit, FERTICA Ntt not originally proaotod by COOESA. In fact, 
tht cotpany optratod for tntnty ytart outiidt tho govornatnt of 
Cotta Rica't controls ttarting undtr Aotrican tanagaotnt in 1960, 
and aftir a dtcadt patting on to Htxican otnorthip (ttatt onnod 
cotpany) until Fob, 1980.
•k.
Tht plant it locattd in Puntartnat, tht 
tain Pacific port, tott 120 ktt. away frot tht capital city of San 
Jott. Itt inttallationt includt plantt to product nitrogtn battd 
<battd on attonia which it itporttd tainly frot Htxico, ^70Z of 
total production cott), tulphur, and photphati (P-2 0-5) 
ftrtiliztrt, phytical fortulat, ttc., at wall at Nitraain - a 
nitrogen fornula for the production of explotivet. The inttalled 
capacity of the plant it *^192,000 HT/yr. of intereediate product! 
(nitric acid and tulphuric acid), and ^427,000 HT/yr. of finithed 
product! (attonia tulphate, attoniut nitrate, wet procett Pec., 
dry procett CI/Birdler tixed coopound product!, and physical 





Following an independent (aultisector) 
cottission's recontendation, CODESA't board approved the purchate
■fi,
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of 90X of th* ftrtiliztr coapany'« sharts on th« 29th. of 
Fibruaryi 1980 (2), (Rtcopc, tht nationilizid oil rifintryi had 
prtvioutly purchatad tha raaaining lOZ). Tha tranaactlon aat 
carriad out through a govarnaant to govarnaant nagotiation 
involving tha Cantral Bank of Costa Rica and Haxico's National 
Bank for Intarnational Trada (Banco Nacional da Coaarcio Extarior, 
S.A., Naxlco). Tha prica aas considarad to ba axtraaaly Ioni US$
22.5 aillion, but as Nili ba discussad latar, this aay bava baan 
dua to tha obsolascanca of tha plant, during highly anargy 
conscious tiaas. In Tact, tha govarnaant of Haxico proposad tha 
shutting doan of tha Nhola coaplax as tha only othar option opan 
to thaa, apart froa tha transfar of oanarship to Costa Rica (3K
Tha dacision to bring tha fartilizar plant 
into public ONnarshipi as axprassad by tha study coaaission's 
raport f , had claar political rathar than businass-1ika 
ovartonas. Tha aain arguaants put forth at tha tiaa of tha 
purchasa includad tha folloNingt stratagic iaportanca for tha 
agricultural sactor Nhich NOuLd ba assurtd of a raliabla sourca of 
fartilizars tha Ion asking prica (plaasa nota that tha 
axpanditura tha govarnaant had to aaka during tha first fiscal 
yaar on tha plant, including tha purchasa praaiua paid, cradits 
ate., rosa to tha aaount of CR C 1,020,972,000 or '*’US f 120 
aillion, considarably aora than tha figura quotad aarliar); and 
tha appropriatanass of axprassing a gastura of good Nill on tha 
part of tha govarnaant of Costa Rica toNards tha Naxican 
govarnaant, Nhich suppliad tha country Nith oil undar prafarantial
*1 {
.< ,1
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ttrait
* the political price to pay in order to acquire Mexican oil 
at OPEC prices rather than at the spot aarket rate* n;
FERTICA, froB the start, eas to play a 
political role which would prevent effective aanageeent decision 
asking. This circuastance has carried grave financial 
consequences.
»• . '.I
Having in aind what the original scenario 
of the subsidiary's initialization into public life was like, we 
shall now devote to the study of the aain problea areas identified 
in the enterprise's present state. Concurrently, alternative lines 
of action will be proposed , which if iapleaented could contribute 
significantly to better overall perforaance.
*1 i
3.1.2 FiMMueiMl I»forw§ti09i (7)
The activity of the coapany appears to be 
dependent very heavily on the efficient aanageaent of its stocks 
(raw aaterial, in process and finished product). This is due to 
the high value of this category in its asset structure! h6X of all 
current assets and 40.81 of total assets (based of historical 
fixed asset valuation).
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(Cl,210,000,000 « current «tttti, and C479,000,000 « currtnt 
liabilititt). Navtrthtlttf, tht rotation of tht ttock apptari to 
bo vtry tlon (or tho asking prictt for tho products too Io n ), 
sinct a currtnt dtficit is an idtntifitd probità arta, as 
rtfltcttd in tht fact that for tht first ttn tonths of 1985, tht 
cotpany had an optrating loss of 076,000,000. (Rtctntly, a grant 
for $8.25 tillion frot tht Inttrattrican Bank has bttn obtaintd 
for tht purchast of ran lattrials).
• .’1
•h
In tht long toro Ftrtica's dtbt aiounts to 
^1,556,750,000, ^50Z of thich is Nith CODESA undtr inttrtst ttrts. 
Notti oost of thtst dtbts art Ion inttrtst soft loans frot aid 
institutions for tht purchast of rat tattrials.
•r-::
3.2 Tht 8trattoic Outlook!
In a sitilar fashion to its sisttr coapany, ALUNASA, 
PERTIGA stands in a vtry poor strategic position. Not producing 
ataonia (nor any other plant in the country) as Ntll as other ran 
aattrials of lesser iaportanct (aagntsiua oxide, urea, borua, 
etc.), Nhich art estiaated by the plant's aanagtaant (5; to 
account for approxiaattly 70Z to 80Z of the end product value, it 
is totally dependent on foreign suppliers for its production 
activities. This has led in the past to repeated crises in the 
coepany's ability to procure its process inputs ( 6 ) , Although at 
present aassive resources have been aadt available to Fertica for 
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($8.23 Million grantod by tht Inttraotrican Bank and tht Hiniitry 
of Agricultura during 1983-1983), tha ttandard aathod of purchata 
continuas to ba through cradit linas (aainly asaonia froa Noxico), 
paying substantially highar pricas than thosa pravailing in world 
aarkats (5).
.t
On tha output sida again, <tha spaca for aanoauvra 
with tha currant product lina is vary rastrictad, dua to 
politically lad fartilizar prica controls axarcisad by contrai 
govarnaant (4,6), Such an approach is undarstandabla, considaring 
tha iapact fartilizar costs hava on tha aconoay of a priaarily 
agricultural nation, but not ona that brings any banafits to tha 
coapany. (Plaasa nota that tha subsidy to tha consuaar is not aada 
diractly, but instaad it is axarcisad through undarcharging by 
PERTICA). As a rasult, tha coapany has chronically (as can ba saan 
in tha dabt chart prasantad in Chaptar 1), built up a larga dabt, 
darivad froa tha purchasa of raw aatarials (^$30,000/day ara usad 
<5)).
'I 1
In suaaary, tha coapany is situatad in tha aiddla of 
two opposing trandsi paying high pricas for its inputs, and asking 
low pricas for its outputs.
3.2.1 Tha Scoff for Actio^t
Tha ganaral situation dascribad abova 
requiras that various altarnativa contingant linos of action ara
n m u z u  n d n u c i i o n ill
idintifitd and prapartd for ovintual oxacution. Tha critaria for 
chootinq any strataqy ovar anothar will dapand on tha availability 
of fininca, tha coapatitiva position with raspact to tha handling 
of raw aatarials, tha in procass afficiancy, and tha allocation of 
tha coapany's production nationally and intarnationally. 
Encoopassing thasa alaaantSi tha political will to ancouraga 
battar afficiancy, whila astablishing aora aquitabla (aora widaly 
spraad) distribution of tha financial rasponsibility throughout 
tha agricultural activity, aust ba prasant.
It is iaportant to distinguish batwaan 
oparating afficiancy and financial parforaanca at PERTICA. If it 
is tha govarnaant's will to distributa fartilizars at pricas balow 
tha cost of production, spacific accountabla subsidias (and not 
luap suo additions to working capitai) should ba introducad. This 
would facilitata tha avaluation of parforaanca by aanagaaant, as 
problaa araas could ba pinpointad aora aasily).
Having raachad such a consansus tha 
following proposals could hava a positiva iopact on tha coapany's 
oparation. It aust ba strassad, navarthalass, that such plans 
should ba adoptad only whan spacific sats of critaria ara 
pravalant.
i,2.2 Th§ Short/HtdiuB Tarai >•' À
1 For tha tiaa baing, dua to tha rastrictiva
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plant's optration it tha only alttrnativa.
Thrti artat havt batn idontifiod at bting 
crucial to accoaplith this andi Enargy Hanagaaant, and 
Product/Sarvica Hix and Narkating aanagaaant.
3.2.2.a Enargy Nanagaaanti
At idantifiad by tha Morld Bank 
Raport "Tha Potantial lor Enargy Efficiancy in tha Fartilizar 
Industry* (8), iaportant savings can ba achiavad by battar 
control I adaptation and usa oi tha diffarant plants in tha anargy 
intansiva aorld ai nitrogan and phophata basad fartilizars 
production.
■ ■>!
the country as a Nhole is facing. as wall as tha
por financial record which precludes any aajor ' * ♦,♦' J 1 ' * 1
, tha search for iaprovaaants within tha currant
j • 
•
Whan visiting tha coapany's 
installations in March 198S, various signs proaptad aa to baliava 
that not anough aat baing dona along thasa linat. For axaapla, 
having two procassas for tha production of nitric acid, (currantly 
only ona is usad dua to tha contraction of tha daaand at a rasult 
of tha Central Aaarican conflict), tha lass afficiant, aora 
obsolete equipaant nas preferred. The reason for this decision it 
that the older plant is driven by an electric aotor vs. a bunker 
fueled turbine in tha case of tha naaer process. The problaa hat
i
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bten idtntifitd by the ttchnicil ttia, tht ftaiibility of 
inttrchanglng both powtr pUntt hot boon dtttroinod (in fact ouch 
a courst of action hat bttn rtcotttndod by outtido fortign 
contultantt), but at ytt no action hat bttn forthcoting to rttolvt 
tht tituation.
Anothtr atptct which ttrongly 
•ttracttd ty atttntion wtt tht atount of aonitoring tquipitnt out 
of ttrvict. At can bt inftrrtdi btfort ont it ablt to ttaturt 
accurattly tht ptrfortanct of tht plant bting ttuditd, littlt can 
bt dont to attttt itt tntrgy tfficitney.
V
Following tht rtport ttntiontd 
at tht btginning of thit ttetion, a tutaary of tptcific tntrgy 
aanagaatnt tttpti which thould iaprovt contcioutnttt aaong 
nanagtrty at wtll at tavt aonty, it prtttnttd btlow.
Entrov Contirvation Plan 
(froa World Bank Ttchnical Rtport No. 35)
Stta Mo. i. Entrgy Auditi Tht initial action to bt taktn would 
bt to attttt currtnt ptrforaanct through tht following:
- Inttall tntrgy accounting lyttoa.
* Ettablith petition of tntrgy coordinator.
- Rttrain production aanagtr on tntrgy taving
atthodt.
* Conduct unit by unit tntrgy auditt.
>..
i I \
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Continut follow-up prograa battd on audits, 





1. To astablish ovarall aconoaics of tha plant. 
Aftar consarvation procaduras hava baan iaplaaantad to optiaiza 
anargy usa, a claarar pictura of tha coapatitiva position will ba 
availabla.
2. To racord anargy balanças of inputs and outputs 
and locata aajor araas of loss and inafficiancy.
3. Proaota aanagaaant involvaaant in tha analysis of 
anargy aattars.
4. Ba abla to idantify costs and banafits of 
probabla actions to ba takan.
*> 'I
« .
Stfp Ho. 2. Araas of Action»
A. Good Housakaaping: (up to lOX - 20Z iaprovad 
valuas according to tha raport's findings).
I"..
This involvas a day to day aonitoring of 
all tha activitias within tha plant, kaaping dosa controls on 
aatarial and anargy balanças, intagrating tha activitias (opposing 
goals) of tha production and aaintananca dapartaants, and 
recording closaly tha usa of raw aatarials.
L.'




H«re the focut it on onturing bottor utago of tho
plant, achioving inertattd capacity utilization by inttgrating tho 
%
planning, oaintonanco and operator training activitioi. This Mould 
bo coobinod by an effort to reduce frequent plant breakdONnt, 
ettablithing effective pollution control! uhich could lead to 
better output/energy usage ratios. (For exaeple reduce NO 
eeoissions froo nitric acid plants by extended absorption, and of 
SO-2 eeeissions by extra conversion and absorption. A plant in 
Florida uas Modified into a double conversion/ double absorption 
process ieproving output froe 800 tons/day to 1850 tons/day). (8)
. (




To accoeplish this, the uhole systen should be 
checked for losses on a regular basis: insulation, flange 
tightness, steae traps, etc. Also, a close look should be taken at 
condensate recovery and utilization, using it Mhere possible for 
Ion heat requirenents. Finally, a revioN of steao availability and





Stâo Mo. 3. Evâluitioni
I ̂
Btlon, intrgy contuaptioni ai procatias fiailar to 
thott «t PERTICA ara pratantad. Thata should sarva as basis for 
coaparison of tha coapany's coapatitivanass aith raspact to 
siailar plants worldaidai
.1 ♦♦
A. Nitric Acid/Aaaoniua Nitrata Plants 
Optiauai 2.0 8J/HT of aaaoniua nitrata 
Industry Rangai low - 3.2 6J/NT
high - 4.2 6J/HT
h’
r
Nitric Add/Ammonium Nitrate Plants 
Energy Consumption
□
S  hidiiiltyljow 
s  to d m liy H Ig h
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St§ù Ho, 3, Evaluationi
Btloit, tnirgy consuaptioni of procottot tioilar to 
thott «t PERTICA ara prtsontid. Thoio should strvt as basis for 
coaparison of tha coapany's coapatitivanass with raspaci io 
siailar plants Morldwidai
A. Nitric Acid/Aaaoniua Mitrata Plants 
Optiauat 2.0 8J/HT of aaaoniua nitrato 
Industry Rangai Iom - 3.2 6J/NT




Nitric Add/Ammonium Nitrate Riants 
Energy Consumption
□
S  Induilnf L o w  
S  iBdu a ty H Ig h
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 
QJ/MT Ammonium Nitrate
‘j '
I . . 1
9 1.
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C. Photphatt Ftrtiliztr Plants (P~2 0*S)
X P-2 0-5 (all in 6J/HT)
Dihydrata Dry Rock fasd 
Dihydrati Htt Rock fsad 
Dihydrata Hat, Unground Rock faad 






Phosphate Piante (P2 -  OS) 
Energy Consumption Guidelines
Hydnii W H  ungrataid Rook FMd
OR^draii W ii Unground Rock Fatd
Mvdrnte WM Rock Féod
□  42%P2 06 | P*y ^ * ** P*y Rock Food
■  54%P2 05 
“  70%P2O5 0 6 10 1f 20 2S ao 96
QJ/MT
i '
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3.2.2.b Stock Hanagooonti
Tht tacond activity to bt 
raviiNtd in the abort tara ahould ba that of atock control. Froa 
inforaation providad by tha National Coaaiaaion for tha 
Ra-atructuring of CODESA, (quotad in aaction 3.1.2) aa aaa that 
tha lavala of atock hold by PERTICA at any ona tiaa ara of 
approxiaataly C800,000,000 or '^£10,000,000, i.a., 2.89 tiaaa ita 
billad abort tara aalaa and 1.44 tiaaa ita total billinga, a 
figura ahich by tha aay ia loaar than ita docuoanta dua (oNad). 
Such a condition auggaata a chronic drain of funda, aaking 
ra>atocking a aajor problaa, aa aaa acknoaladgad in tha 1983 
Annual Raport. (Rafar to tha $8.25 aillion loan.(or donation) by 




Having idahtifiad tha fragility 
of auch .an arrangaaant it ia ralavant to atraaa tha iaportanca of 
tfficiancy in atock procuraoant and uaa. Niniaizing tha coat of 
handling tha atock, bacauaa of tha voluaaa involvad, inharantly 
aay aaan iaportant aavinga. Syataaa auch aa HRP by IBN, tha 
aatabliahaant of a raw aatariala control poaition (prtfcaaa 
enginaer), ate. ahould prova halpful. Alao, aa in tha caaa of 
enargy nanagaaant, caraful aonitoring ahould ba proaotad 
throughout tha organization.
*.ùl I
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3.2.2.C Product/Sirvic« Hix and Narkttingi
At hat batn ditcuttad bifora, 
tha ralation of ttock to racovarabla incoia autt ba iaprovad. Tha 
praviout taction tuggattad an approach ahich if iaplaaantad should 
riduca tha coat of aaintaining ttock, and at a contaquanca Mould 
probably riduca tha voluaat handlad. Tha pratant propotai Mould ba 
diractad at tha thort/aadiua tara goal of iaproving product 
turnaround, tharaby incraating tha voluta of thort tara 
racaivablat. Tha coabinad affact of thata tao policiat should laad 
to aora indapandant financial parforaanca«
Spadai affortt should ba aadt 
to davalop arias Mhara prica controls ara not axarcitad such as 
axplotivas foraing activitias (tachnical nitrogan products, TNT 
— > Trinitro-toluana). Tha initial potantial salat (South Aurica) 
Mira astiaatad to ba of 30,000 NT/yr. in 1981. (8)
< I
It hat to ba takan into account that any 
coharant affort along thata linat: aithar at introducing axisting 
products to othar aarkats or niM products to pratant and niM 
aarkats it of graat ralavanca. Having lost Cantral Aaarica as its 
natural captiva aarkat, tha coapany aust axpand its horizons if it 
is to survive due to tha exeats in installed capacity, in a high 
raM aatarial cost, highly energy intansiva industry.
f . i
These three stratagias appear to cover tha
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action! viablt in thi thort/aodiuo tiro. Thi icopi for thif tioi 
fraoi should bi to tiik thi cuaulotivi contribution of riUtivily 
ioall inviitoint/quick payback policiit.
Apart frofl thin binifiti, uhich appiar to 
bi rtadily quantifiabli, an undirlying purpoai is intindidt thi 
divilopiint of tichnological aNariniit and capability. This it thi 
concirtid iffort to involvi tichnical and oanagioint pirionnil in 
talk forcit criatid to analyzi and cornet ricognizid problii 
ariai, and to idintify and study opportunitiis opin to thi 
coapany, and capitalizi on thia. Insofar as thi intirprisi 
succiids in thisi ariasi it should bi gaining ixpiriinci, valuabli 
for thi till Nhin long t i n  planning bicoais a riasonabli 
proposition.
S' I*.
Oahlaan it al. discribi thi stagis of 
tichnological capability (as will bo divilopid aori fully in latir 
chaptirs) in LOC's as: (9)
1. Capability in imaging
ixisting intirprisas.
2. Capability in iaproving
pirforaanci of thisi intirprisis.
3. Capability in thi choidi of
altirnativi invistaint projicts.
Such an approach is uhat I proposi in the case of FERTICA.
r.'. .
V1*
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Tht Actioni optn to tht coopany in ordor to ioprovo 
its coopotitiv# ttratogic position aro throat oquipoont 
roplacooonti intogration and divoriification.
Equipoont roplacooont would bo rolovant, first to 
phaso out obsoloto oquipoont (sulfuric acid plantSf for oxaoplo) 
to ioprovo voluoo output for now oarkots or to approach tho 
optinuo onorgy valuos prosontod abovo.
With' rospoct to intogration, backward linkago is tho 
attractivo option. Nany procossos are availablo for tho production 
of aoaonia, novortholoss tho proforrod foodstockt natural gas is 
not availablo in Costa Rica. Othor possibilitias should bo 
explored such as refinery gas or coal gasification through 
collaboration with RECOPE, and oothanol/aaoonia yielding processes 
using urban waste or alcohol process outflow as feedstocks (for 
exaople, tho Purox oothod developed by Union Carbide). ( U )
* <1
• «I
Nonetheless, whatever option is studied it should 
approxiaate the perforeance of new natural gas facilities i'.e., 
‘̂33 GJ/NT, with ainiaua perforeance of around 41.6 GJ/HT of 
aeaonia, this to stand in any favourable coapetitive position as 
can be seen froa the following table.
n o d u c i i Q u •̂fff t24
Tablt 3t2i4i World Aaaonia Capacity ind Entrov Coniuaotion 









■' r' i. q i 
1 * '
<1955 2.42 59.00 219.00
•1'
1 ,
55-60 1.69 51.70 192.00
• * 1 i I,- i
60-62 3.18 47.90 178.00
».J
63-65 6.79 46.70 174.00
* ■ •», 1
1
65-75 53.49 41.40 154.00 •' ’1
76-82 46.93 39.40 146.00 - i i
New 1985x - - 33.00 122.30 * ^
Total 1 --------— — >
r 1 
♦'r- Nt, .1 1 1 •1 - 1
Weighted Average ----------------> 41.60
s 1
i) ;




Dialing lith an aging facility is a difficult task. 
Thi first stip to taki is to optiiizi ptrforianci in ordir to ba 
ablt to coipart potintial pirforianca to that availabli at niM 
plants.
Along Mith this considiration, the introduction of 
new activities! nore profitable (and less affected by 
seasonality) product lines, the provision of consultancy services 
to fareers at hone and abroad, and the like, eay well be ieportant
>1
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courtti of Action to bo ituditd in «n tffort to ioprovo 
profitability.
aftir «n offort has boon oado to tniurt officiant 
oporation, tho coopany't porforoanco lags far bohind tho world 
avorago, thoro would bo a strong caso for closure or doop 
ro'invostoont, whatovor is dooood to bo ooro favourable by 
national opinion (since wo are dealing with a strategic industry). 
It oust bo clear though, that if it is dotoreinod, after all 
efforts are taken to ioprove efficiency, that potential
perforaance will not be coopetitive, soee action should be taken, 
if not the continuous drain of resources experienced in the past 
will be everpresent, and the enterprise will stand always at a net 
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CODESA'f aluainiua stai'proctiiing plant, 
ALUNASA, is locattd soas 100 kas. wast of San Josa, naar 
Puntaranas, tha country's aost iaportant Pacific port. Tha ranga 
of products it aanufacturas is constitutad aainly by intaraadiata 
goods which sarva as inputs for othar industrias in Costa Rica 
(forward linkaga), as wall as in Cantral Aaarica (30X of 
production) and tha U.S.A. <701),(i) Its installad capacity is of 
'36,000 NT/yr. of finishad product (discs, shaat, foil, tubing, 
•xtrusion pallats, atc.).U)
i  «'
Bacausa nona of its raw aatarials ara
productd locally (A1 ingot, ganrax lubricants for the industrial 
process, alloy constituents, etc.), the coapany depends on foreign 
sources for its input raquireaents. Its production costs are 
divided into the following categories:(2)
Raw aatarials • 90-95Z 
Variable costs and labour - 2»4X 
Interest Charges - 2-SZ
As can be seen, the coapany's situation in 
this respect is siailar to that of FERTICA (Chapter 3), suffering 
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4.1 Introduction:
4.Í.Í fntêntêtiowi
COOESA't aluainiua laai-proctfiing plant, 
ALUNASA, it located loet 100 kes. Meet of San Jote, near 
Puntarenai, the country's eott iaportant Pacific port. The range 
of productf it eanufactures is constituted eainly by intereediate 
goods which serve as inputs for other industries in Cotta Rica 
(forward linkage), as well as in Central Aeerica (30X of 
production) and the U.S.A. (702).fl) Its installed capacity is of 
“̂36,000 HT/yr. of finished product (discs, sheet, foil, tubing, 
extrusion pellets, etc.).n;
Because none of its raw eaterials are
produced locally (Al ingot, genrex lubricants for the industrial 
process, alloy constituents, etc.), the coapany depends on foreign 
sources for its input requireeents. Its production costs are 
divided into the following categories:(2)
Raw Materials - 90-952 
Variable costs and labour - 2-42 
Interest Charges - 2-52
* '
. ..j.
As can be seen, the conpany's situation in 
this respect is sieilar to that of FERTICA (Chapter 3), suffering 
as the latter of a chronic shortage of working capital.
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Another worrying Victor it that of its 
valut addtd tituation. According to tho plant's oanagooont <2) tha 
Itvtlf of valuo addtd at prtttnt U9B5) art txtrtatly Ioni 
purchasing A1 ingots at around ‘̂fl300/ton (up to #400 abovt tht 
inttrnational tarktt quotations); incurring in ‘̂$200/ton of 
production costs; and sailing at batwaan fl,500/ton and fl,800/ton 
(sola tuppliar which is also sola purchatar); this aaant that in 




4,t,2 Th§ 4i«Biaiui gusiatsfi
Tha aluainiua industry worldwida it dividad into 





Mining of Bauxita — > Aluainiua Ingot '
2. Intaraadiata Procassing:
Aluainiuffl Ingot — > Saai-procttsed
3. Manufacturing:
• /
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Stdi*‘alloyt — > Finished Products 
4. Rocovoryi
Old and Non Scrap — > Aluoiniuo Ingot
I * « I
’VI
Largo coopanios in tho past have choson vortical 
integration of tho stops presented above as the eost viable Niy of 
operating in the industry. Through this policy, six coapanies 
control noNadays over sixty percent of the refining business and 
approxiaately fifty percent of the aluainiua business as a Nhole. 
These coapanies are, three Aaericans The Aluainua Coapany of 
Aaerica (ALCOA), Reynolds Metals, and The Kaiser Aluainua and 
Cheaical Coapanyj one Canadiani Alcan Aluainiua Ltd. (parent 
coapany of British Aluainiua); one French: Pechiney S.A. (a 
nationalized enterprise)} and one Suissi SchNoizrische Aluainiua 
A.6. (ALUSUISSE: this is the only one Nith a Costa Rican 
subsidiary: Suiss Aluainiua Mining of Costa Rica S.A.).(4,S) « <
BeloN I present a diagraa uhich describes the 
industry's activities in sore detail. Also, I have included the 
scope of ALUNASA's operation within this fraae of reference.
• '4
S .
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Manufacturing n an ts
l/J]ALUNASA
M i End uses
P U N TS  OF THE ALUMINIUM INDUSTRY t4l
:1 »  ’
"t
t -
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• A ‘I
Al can b« lain froi the graph, tha coapany to tha 
praiant day hai liaitad iti fiald to tha production of 
laai'procaiiad alloyi (that ii diaci, ihaati, rolli, pallata, 
foil, ate*, of varioui alloy danoainationi), aith tha axcaption of 
loaa liapla final producti* tubing, roofing (only platai, linea 
tha ihaping ii carriad out at HETALCO, tha largait producar of 
aatal roofing ihaati in tha country), and doaaitic papar foil 
(diitributad by a nuabar of privata coapaniai, with no aantion of 
ALUNASA on tha packaga). Ai a raiult of thii, tha coapany appaari 
to ba in a vary dalicata itratagic poiition. It followi froa luch 
an arguaant, that intagration of loaa lort would prova to ba an 
iaportant coapatitiva iaprovaaant. Tha following paragraphi ara







Tha axploitation of bauxita dapoiiti in 
tha ragion of El Ganaral in tha South Pacific ragion of Coita Rica 
hai baan diicuiiad for aany yaari. Sinca 1951, ALCOA lacurad an 
exploration and axploitation licania.
• >4
In 1968, congrais discuiiad and rejactad 
a proposal put forward by thii coapany for tha conitruction of a
r'; A
fl y:
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i '• iA
At can bt sttn ^roa tht graph, tht coapany to tha 
praaant day has lialtad its fitld to tht production of 
stai-proctsstd alloys (that is discs, shoots, rolls, pollots, 
foil, otc., of various alloy donoainations), with tho oxcoption of 
soao siaplo final products: tubing, roofing (only platos, sinco 
tho shaping is carriod out at HETALCO, tho largost producor of 
total roofing shoots in tho country), and doaostic papor foil 
(distributod by a nuabor of privato coapanios, with no aontion of 
ALUNASA on tho packago). As a rosult of this, tho coapany appoars 
to bo in a vory dolicato stratogic position. It follows iron such 
an arguaont, that intogration of sooo sort would provo to bo an 
iaportant coapotitivo iaprovoaont. Tho following paragraphs art 
dovotod to tho analysis of this possibility, within tho national 
scono.
• 1
Ìa2 — Intooration Potontiali
4^ 2 , t »octward Linkàa§t
* ■’*
Tho oxploitation of bauxito doposits in 
tho rogion of El Gonoral in tho South Pacific rogion of Costa Rica 
has boon discussod for oany yoars. Sinco 1951, ALCOA socurod an
exploration and oxploitation liconso.
1 •. ,
In 1968, congross discussod and rejoctod 
a proposal put forward by this coapany for tho construction of a
1 I' * • : ^
i >
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Al can bi nan iroi thi graph, thn coapany to tht 
P *̂****t Oay has liaitod iti fiald to tha production of 
laai-procaiiad alloyi (that ii diaci, ihaati, rolli, pallata, 
foil, ate., of varioui alloy danoainationi), aith tha axcaption of 
loaa liapla final producti: tubing, roofing (only platai, linea 
tha ihaping ii carriad out at HETALCO, tha largait producar of 
aatal roofing ihaati in tha country), and doaaitic papar foil 
(diitributad by a nuabar of privata coapaniai, with no aantion of 
ALUNASA on tha packaga). Ai a raiult of thii, tha coapany appaari 
to ba in a vary dalicata itratagic poiition. It followi froa luch 
an arguaant, that intagration of loaa lort uould prova to ba an 
iaportant coapatitiva iaprovaaant. Tha following paragraphi ara
davotad to tha analyiii of thii poiiibility, within tha national 
icana.
* *1
Ìa2 — Intaoration Potantiali
4 , 2 , t EèckHard Linkàaat
Tha axploitation of bauxita dapoiiti in 
tha ragion of El Ganaral in tha South Pacific ragion of Coita Rica 
hai baan diicuiiad for aany yaari. Sinca 1951, ALCOA lacuratf an 
exploration and axploitation licenia.
' "t
In 1968, congrais discuisad and rajactad 
* proposal put forward by this coapany for tha construction of a
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*orty thousand ««trie ton aluain« plant.
L«tfr, in 1973 a task forca Mat foraad by 
atabtrs of ICE (tht national utility coapany), CODESA, and th# 
Hiniftry of Econoaic Policy and Planning to study tha casa for a 
bauxita to aluainiua ingot convarsion procass in tha ragion. Tha 
liaiting factor in that occasion, which pravantad furthar 
advancaaant towards tha projact phasa, was tha cost of tha anargy 
infrastructura raquirad. Baing an anargy intansiva application, a 
naw hydroalactric ganarating installation (coda naaad BQRUCA, 
approx. 850,000 kw capacity), had to ba built at a cost estiaatad 
at around C2,000 aillion (approx. US#300 aillion) of 1972. ('6;
-'I
Furthar davalopaants involvad tha dacision 
by ALCOA to withdraw froa tha country in 1976, aftar twanty fiva 
yaars of holding tha rights to axploit tha bauxita daposits. At 
this point th# rights wars transfarrad to CODESA which set out to 
study tha feasibilty of an axploitaton prograa.
i .*. ■’
During 1977-78, tachnical assistanca was 
providad by tha govarnaant of Roaania, through its raprasantativa 
METARON. Aftar survaying tha land in quastion, a sarias of raports 
wera producad (as part of a coaprahansiva tachno-aconoaic study) 
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an Italian coapany propostd th* construction of tht prisint 
installations of ALUNASA, a stags 2 sssi-proctssing plant. 
CODESA's aanagiasnt at tha tisi docidtd to postpono ths




At prasant, bacausa of naa davalopaants in 
tha Morld bauxita pictura, backward linkaga appaars to ba out of 
tha quastion for thraa aain raasons: cost of infrastructura, 
tachnological coaplaxity, and quality of tha ora. Tha following 
lines will covar all thasa subjects saparataly.
4.2.1.a Cost of Infrastructura:
As was stated earlier, tha
construction of an 830,000 kw hydroelectric power plant is a 
technically feasible proposition in tha region of El Benaral, 
using tha waters of tha Rio Grande da Tarraba, and enclosing tha 
largest available hydrographic basin in tha country. In fact, 
since the sixties, tha construction of such a facility has bean 
discussed nationally.
Bacausa of its large scale, by 
Costa Rican standards, such a plant would at present double* tha 
installed electric capability, resulting inevitably in excess 
potential. (At present the hydroelectric capacity stands at 
spproxieately 624,170 kw, with two aediun sized plants Ventanas I 
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including dit««l poNcrtd and ainor plants stands at around 780,000 
i(M. Kith tht contributions of thi two Vontanas plants as wall as 
ths Gtothtraal projtct at Niravallas Volcano tha ravisad capacity 
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Th« conitruction of BORUCA 
Mould thtrtfort yitld a substantial ovtrcapacity situation, which 
could bt utilized for other econoaic purposes apart froe 
supporting the national grid. Following this arguaent, we see that 
according to the World Bank report cited before (4)^ up to 35,540 
gigawatt hours/year could be devoted to the transforaation of 
bauxite into aluainiua, a quite extraordinary figure when Me 
consider the country's land area. (Please refer to accoapanying 
chart)(4):
Table 4.2.l.b







































Unfortunatily, thi sait riport 
offirs a word of caution with rispict to thi tffict aassivi 
infrastructural costs could havi on thi fiasibility of ixtraction 
and rifining projicts in undirdivilopid arias. It strissis that 
ivin if thi quality and sizi of thi bauxite deposits' a n  
satisfactory, a very close study into the extent of the 
infrastructural work required is in order. This element alone 
could prove the project uneconomical, especially in LDC's.
♦ I
r ••
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It Êêy Ntll bi tha c«ta that 
this liaitation it vary ralavant in this particular instanca dua 
to tha country's poor standing aith raspact to our National 
Extarnal Oabt and Balança of Payaants situation <sinca aost of 
tha infrastructura aould hava to ba iaportad), tao conditions 
ahich hava savaraly raducad tha govarnaant's invastaant prograas.
Dua to tha abova« furthar 
invastigation into tha othar tao variablas prasantad baforat 
technological coaplaxity of tha procats, as aall as tha 
coaparativa standing of tha ora daposits, is iaportant.
4.2«l.b Taehnological Coaplaxityi
¥ * '!
In tha naxt faa paragraphs a 
description of the conversion process! soil rich in bauxite 
content to aluainiua ingot (stage 1) is presented. Froa this 
discussion, it can ba observed that considerable expertise is 
required to aanaga such an enterprise. Costa Rica , as a naa 
entrant into an anvironaant controlled by transnational 
corporations aith vast axparianca in tha business, aould encounter 
serious difficulties in establishing an extraction coaplax on its 
oan. Most likely, extensive assistance froa abroad, either by 
collaboration aith tha TNC's, or by direct governaent assistance 
experienced producers aould be required. In suaaary, aithout 
e joint venture of soae kind, to ensure an adequate aediua for 
technological transfer, tha proposal is not likely to succeed.
# '
r ••
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Dfcriotion of Stao» li (4)
(Mining of bauxiti, tiparition of loil and bauxitt, yiald of 
aluaina (Al)2 (0)3, production of aluainiua) *9
Silfl— fti. Mining for the ore is usually through open pit operations 
(strip eining) eith the exception of France, Greece, Turkey, and 
Hungary, ehich have underground resources.
SllJl— Bl  Separation of soil and bauxite by physical processes 
involving crushing, drying and beneficiation (uet process) to 
increase aluaina content and reduce silica and iron presence 
(unuanted iepurities). An added cost here involves the replaceaent 
of overburden to original sites, so that the land can subsequently 
be used for forestry or agriculture. (The richest soils are those 
closer to the surface). If indiscriainate aining took place severe 
ecological daaage uould be caused: infertile lands, erosion, etc. 
SlDB Yield of aluaina (Al)2 (0)3 from bauxite (refining). This 
process involves two plants working in series:
* *1
< »
It Hydrate facility: transforas bauxite into aluaina 
hydrate in four stages:
a. Grinding and slurring: During this 
period, ore is crushed in ball or rod aills, adding later caustic 
soda, liae and hot water, in order to separate impurities 
(consumption of caustic soda depends on silica content).
b. Digestion: At this point, the slurry 
(bauxite and caustic soda) resulting froa the previous stage, is
t.
V f
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disfolvtd through tht B«ytr procttt foroing (NéAl)(0)2. Thrt# 
variationt of this proctss oxist diptnding on tht solubility of 
tht ort ustdi tht Attrican Baytr proctst rtquirts rtlativtly Ion 
ttaptraturt Itvtls of approx. 290*C, and it ustd for tasily 
tolublt gibbsitt (tryhydratt» orts; tht Europtan Baytr proctss on 
tht othtr hand| utilizts tuch hightr ttaptraturt Itvtls of '*’490'C 
and is dtsigntd for tort difficult orts such as bothtitt 
(tonohydratt)i finally, soatNhtrt in the tiddlt of thtst tuo 
txtrttt conditions, lits tht todifitd Attrican Baytr procttt 
designed to handle tixtd orts <tainly gibbsitt Nith sott 
bothtitt).
c. Filtration* Next, a filtration and 
settling of insoluble itpuritits takes place, to separate these 
froa the (NaAl)(0)2 (red tud).
d. Precipitation* After the sodiut 
alutinate <NaAl)(0)2 has been concentrated, it is seeded Nith 
aluainiua hydrate Nhich causes the alutina to dissociate frot the 












Finally, tha alutina hydrate' is 
transferred to the calcination unit Nhere it is treated for the 
retoval of aoisture as Nell as the chetical OH bond by exposing 
the hydrate to high tetperatures in the region of IISO'C - 1250'C 
using fluid bed calcinero (Nhich have replaced rotary kilns
*.
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siaiUr to th# principi# found in th# production of klinkir in 
cfotnt fâctori#«). Th# final product of th#t# tuo plant# is 
aluoina (Al)2(0)3| th# input #at#riil to aluainiu# s##lting 
plants.
StiB. , Pi Aluoiniu# Sssltingt Th# aluainiu# is obtainsd by th# 
•l*ctrolysis of aluoina <Al)2(0)3 to soparat# th# oxyg#n fro# th# 
■#tal. (This procsss is callsd th# Hall-H#'roult procsss).It is 
h#r# Nhsr# slsctricity is a aajor input. Concsrn ovsr th# Isvsls 
of consuaption of this snargy sourc# by th# tuo currsntly usad 
raduction aathods: pr#-bak#d anod# plants and Sodarbarg anod# 
plants, has lad to th# davalopaant of lass alactricity dapandant 
•athods such as tha ALCOA saalting procass. This procass involvas 
the chlorination of aluaina and postarior alactrolysis of tha 
aluainiua chlorida, which has raducad alactricity consunption by 
up to 20X (this procass has not yat baan appliad conaarcially).
Aftar tha aluainiua has baan saparatad, it 
is cast into diffarant aolds, and tha ingots rasulting froa this 
are sent of to saai-procassing plants.
H.
• V
#■  \ ]
# '
4.2.l.c Cospirativa Analysis of Oapositsi
• ■’*
Tha final alaaant to' ba 
scrutinized in relation to backward linkage of ALUNASA's current 
operation is that of the status of the ore available in Costa 
Rica. For this I have chosen to coapara general charactaristies of 
the country's deposits with those of other regions worldwide.
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Thi iaportant variablti 
contidartd arts tconoaic ratarvis, bauxitt-aluaina ratio, atrip 
ratio (bauxito to toil), typa of ort, and ailica conttnt.
Tha ragiona aurvayad (includad 
in tha World Bank raport) covar anough aupply for ovar ona hundrad 
yaara of projactad world conauaption.
With raapact to tha aiza of tha 
provan raaarvaa aatabliahad by METARON <7), i.a., 78.5 aillion
tonnaa, tha Cotta Rican aita ranka 30th aaong thoaa chosan 
(largar only than tha Unita'd States Arkanaas resarves, soaa 
Europaan locationa (Turkay and Franca), ona in Haiti, and ona in 
Shana). Furtharaora, it aust ba notad that ragionai coapatition 
froa Brazil, Guyana, Jaaaica, and Surinaaa, with dapoaita fiva to 
forty tiaaa largar, would ba ovarwhalaing.
.«f><i
« 1
In ralation to tha aluaina yiald 
froa tha axtractad bauxita, El Ganaral ranka 34th aaong 35. It 
*ust ba aaid, though, that tha apraad of tha yiald valuaa it not 
vary graat, with tha baat figura atanding at 2:1 for Guyana, 3:1
for Coata Rica, and 3.4:1 for tha Darling Rangaa in Waatarn 
Australia.
. - . j  -'
*■
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Tftblt 4.2.l.c Co«p«riton of Bouxitt Dtpotito Norlduidt <4) * •
9»uxit§ Siti Ccoa Atsorros 
rAiiiioo UT)
Bauxitff/Aiuaiaa Strip Aètio .2 
____ Aatia________2 iaajrita
.  ' * , / i  
‘ 1
Arkxniai USA 40.00 2.20 23.00
■
Jaoaica Sito A 1,030.00 2.40 100.00 *. ' J








Suyano 700.00 2.00 33.30
**
Surinaoo A 390.00 2.10 30.00 ' . * J
Surinooo B 100.00 2.30 100.00 4r  • 1
Brazil 4,070.00 2.10 33.30 II
Vonozuola 300.00 2.10 30.00 .VSrooco 700.00 2.30 25.00
Yugoolavia 460.00 2.40 28.60
.  1 1
Franco 40.00 2.40 23.00 * fiHungary 300.00 2.30 25.00 • u
USSR 300.00 2.30 25.00
Australia A 300.00 2.20 100.00
Auitralia B 3,100.00 2.20 100.00 !.• ri
H. Australia 1,200.00 3.40 100.00
4 1 
" 1
India 600.00 2.40 100.00
Indonosia 700.00 2.20 100.00 *# 1
China 200.00 2.30 100.00
Malaysia 100.00 2.40 30.00 r  ‘ •  1
Turkoy 30.00 2.40 50.00
t 1
•  '  1
Shana A 230.00 2.20 50.00
. * ' '  i l
Shana B 30.00 2.20 30.00 a l
Shana C 200.00 2.20 50.00
Suinoa A 2,300.00 2.30 100.00
1Suinoa B 1,000.00 2.30 100.00
Suinoa C 300.00 2.30 100.00
Suinoa D 300.00 2.40 100.00 1 •
Suinoa E 700.00 2.40 100.00 1
Suinoa F 300.00 2.40 100.00 1
Siorra Loono A 130.00 2.20 100.00 \ ■
Siorra Loono B 130.00 2.20 100.00
Caooroun 1,020.00 2.30 100.00 ■
f«
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Tabli 4.2.1.ai Rank of Bauxiti Dapoaita by Quality
./I








Surinant A 2.10 ; , <'
Shana B 2.20
Arkanaaa USA 2.20
Anatrali a B 2.20 • t
Indontaia 2.20 . V
Shana A 2.20 . .
Sitrra Ltont B 2.20
« 1 
«k
Siarra Laona A 2.20 r
Auatralia A 2.20 ' i
Shana C 2.20 Y ■' 
1 ' ■Caaaroun 2.30
Suinta C 2.30
Suinta A 2.30 r*' •
Suinta B 2.30 ‘ hi
Yugoalavia 2.40 1'1India 2.40
Janaica Sita A 2.40
Suinta F 2.40 * '
Suinta E 2.40 •i
Halaytia 2.40 *. • •
Franca 2.40
Suinta D 2.40 .•(
. 4 • 1Turkty 2.40
Hungary 2.SO ’ • • 1
China 2.SO
Srttct 2.SO P 1
USSR 2. SO il
Surinant B 2.SO ■' 1
Haiti/Don.Rtp. 2.70 4 1
Janaica Sitt B 2.70 •{ * * 1
COSTA RICA 3.00 * : 1
H. Auftralia 3.40 “ 1
A...
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Looking at thi tilica contant, 
wt iind valuti ranging froa ntgligiblt concantrationi to a maxiaua 
of 15X at Arkantat* Cotta Rica at 7.SX tilica prtttnct ranki abovi 
tha avaraga contant, aith valuta in tha ragion of 2.5X to 4.3X 
baing tha aora coaaon occurancat.
•Tha contuaption of cauttic toda dapandt principally on 
tha raactiva tilica contant and aud aathing lottai, nith 
an avaraga of 1.4 kilograaaat of toda (at NaOH) par 
kilograaaa of raactiva tilica” p. 12 (4).
Notai No inforaation it availabla on tha typa of ora pratant in 
tha ragion (ahich Mould dataraina tha Bayar procatt to ba utad). 
Navarthalatt, baing an Aaarican tita, it Mill probably contist 
of trihydrata gibbtita (toft ~ Aaarican Bayar procatt) 
aatarial, tiailar to that found in Buyana, Surinaaa, Vanazuala, 
Arkantat, Jaaaica and Brazil. No inforaation Mat availabla 
regarding strip ratios for Cotta Rica.
*• . I




At can ba taan froo tha pravious 
pagat, backuard linkaga doat not taan to ba an attractiva 
alternativa for ALUNABA. Unfortunately for tha forataaabla futura, 
the coapany Mill have to rely on outside sources to secure the 
inputs to its process. It is clear that, as Mill be discussed 
later, the possibility of adding aora value, (i.a., processing tha 
aluniniua further than the tani- stage, to final products) to its
1 ;
* .
ALvniimni f M o c i s s m a 145
product lines could bt a better approach in the progression 
towards a «ore stable strategic position. With respect to the 
supply oi raw aaterialsi soae agreeaent with saelters in the area 
would be beneficial. Along these lineSf little success has been 
attained, having the coapany to purchase its ingots froe a single 
supplier* Aluainios El Caroni froa Venezuela, an affiliate coapany 
of Reynolds Metals (5). Another possibility would be the 
construction of a seelting plant for the process of foreign 
regional ore (froe Jaaaica, Haiti, and Doainican Republic for 
exaaple) and thereby utilize the underdeveloped electricity 
potential, the only undeniable asset of the region* (4)
"Priaary aluainua production is energy intensive, 
approxiaately 13,500 kwh of electricity being required to 
produce one aetric ton of aluainua*..."the availability 
of sufficient supplies of low cost energy is one of the 
critical factors deteraining the location of saelters. A 
large nuaber of saelters built before the 1973 energy 
crisis are located in industrial countries*..."these 
trends point toward a shift in aluainua industry 
P*̂ *̂'̂ *'** new saelters will be located in regions with 
untapped energy sources which have little or no 
alternative uses, as aay be the case of hydropower, 
flared gas and low quality coal." p. 5 (4)
<Please note that available energy potential is auch greater than 
that of Jaaaica, Guyana, Surinaae, etc.)
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4,2,2 fomird Li9kBa»i
The folloMing chert prttcntt « percentage 
distribution of the consueption of alueiniue end products by 
various sectors of the eorld's econoey. This represents an 
iaportant guideline in the analysis of which product lines eight 
offer oore potential in the future.
* •
CofltuiPtion of Aluetniue bv end Usee. 1980 i4)t 
(Hetallgesellschaft, "Hetal Stats. 1971 - 1981)
Western World
Europe Japan U.8.A* Average
-------------------------------------------------
Transport 27.9 26.1 19.3 22.8
hechanical Engineering 6.8 4.8 S.4 S.6
Electrical Engineering 10.4 10.1 11.1 10.6
Building Construction 18.3 32.9 21.4 22.9
Packing 9.7 6.0 27.8 18.3
Ooaestic Office App. 8.S 5.S 6.3 6.6
Hetal Ind. & Misc. 18,4 14.6 8.7 13.2
ii
# '
Of the eost relevant categories 
<transport| electrical engineeringi building and construction, and 
packaging), two offer interesting possibilities! electric cable, 
and packaging products, because of their relatively uncoeplicated 
further processing, and readily available applications.
• 1
#.
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Aluainiua, btcAust of its Iom cost snd low 
Moighti hss rtplscid coppir in aany gtntral wiring applications. 
Hhilt coppor has hightr conductivity valuos por surfact artai 
aluainiua has btttsr ptrforaancf par waight and costi
•although aluainun's conductivity is only AOX of that of 
coppar, dua to its low dansity, an alactric transaission 
lina aada of aluainua waighs only 48Z of an aquivalant 
coppar lina* p. 14 (4).
Tha sacond proposal, that of packaging, 
plays a two fold purpose. Tha first has alraady bean discussed 
(contributing to value added parforaanca). Tha coapany alraady 
produces 'end product* doaastic aluainiua foil (though it does not 
distribute it, loosing therefore substantial profit potential: 
suparaarkat prices are at least lOOX higher than ALUNASA's rata, 
this according to coapany officials interviewed in April 19BS), 
which it could easily convert into a large range of packaging 
foras, "vaccuua sealed*, for axaapla. Tha second involves tha 
possibility of developing to soae extent, a stage four (recovery) 
operation, recycling used scrap to the ALUNASA aills for 
reprocessing, thereby reducing the dependence on iaportad raw 
■aterials. Such practice has had iaportant affect in developed 
countries such as tha U.S., Mastarn Europe, and aora iaportantly 
in Japan where aore than one third of tha consuaption coaes froa 
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Eftiwtfi Pi AUainiuii ConiuMtion - Low C w  
(World Buroau of Notai Statistics (4))
('000s Metric tonnes. 1985)
1 ;
Prieary Scrap Total Scrap/Total
Consuep. Recovery ConsuMp. (X) «
4




H. Europe 4,240 1,542 5,782 26.7 ■ •





Having rovioMid the strategic options open to 
ALUNASA, it is apparent that the eain areas to be attacked are: 
increasing the contribution of value added into the coepany's 
operation, and procuring a better position with respect to its 
source of rae Materials.
*f *• f«|
It eay Nell be the case, that the eleeent ehich has 
to be encouraged is that of technological capability, so that 
exploitable areas can be identified and their potential realized. 
Technological advantage is required to study the potential of the 
household "utensil" process present in the plant (currently 
stopped), to guide the introduction of neN products, to penetrate 
neN export Markets, etc. Finally, technological and aanageeent 
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 ̂’ .1 •» ‘ I
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9jJ INTRODUCTION! Catf P r f  nt Poittion
5^l,J P n t i B t a t i o B t
Tht Ctntril Azucariri dtl
Ttaptiqut S.A., CATSA, is CODESA's «xponcnt in tht agroindustrial 
fitld. Tha production sits is locatod ntar tht Tttpisqut Rivtr in 
Buardia, Provinct of Ouanacastt, soot 350 kiloattrts Northwtst of 
tht capital city of San Jost, and is capablt of producing sugar, 
tolassts and tost itportant, alcohol, through a cotbintd sugar 
cant till/distilltry layout. Tht plant's capacity is of '̂ 5,800 
HT/sugar cant input / day and 240,000 litrts of tthanol output / 
day.
5>i.2 FiaatciaJ P o s i t i o n  (1) i 1
CATSA's position at prtstnt is by no atans 
ancouraging. Indttd, its standing is so poor, that if tht cotpany 
was to optratt on its own (without tht Govtrnatnt's backing), it 
would nttd to filt for bankruptcy:
In tht short tart, tht cotpany facts a 
negative working capital of -CR C137 million -£1.6 million 
(reduced by -CR C103 aillion in the past ten months of financial 
year 1985), caused by current losses of -CR CSS million 
-£680,000, as well as a decrease in receivables.
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In tht long tar«, Catsa has a dabt of CR 
C673 oillion £7.9 aillion), tha aquivalant of 81.3 X of total 
assats historical valua of CR C828 aillion <‘̂ £9.73 aillion). Of 
thasa, CR C66S ara oaad to CODESA aainly for tha purchasa of 
plant, on aithar low, (82 for CR C323 aillion) or no (02 for tha 
rast) interast taras. Finally, tha fira has ovardua dabt payaants 
for CR C161 with Haadquartars (CR C86 froa intarast chargas and CR 
C75 froa aaortization) and CR C4 aillion with othar craditors.
•i .
It has to ba said at this point that a 
nuabar of stratagic problaas (aost of thaa bayond tha 
company'control) hava contributad negatively to tha currant 
financial crisis. Tha first of thasa is related with tha 
substantial drop in tha price of sugar, tha aost readily available 
output froa tha plant. This fact can ba corroborated by looking up 
the IMF's International Financial Statistics. (2)
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Analyzing a rough costing ostiaatt 
provided by th# National Sugar Producors Laagui (LAICA),' in 
February 198S, (3) we set the following;
The average cost of production for a bag 
of 100 lbs. in Costa Rica is approxieately US$10.50. This is
A L C O H O L  f ñ O D a C T l O H Pég§ 153
contra*t#d by 4 world (non-quota) prict which has fluctuattd 
betwesn ^US<0.03/lb and US$0.06/lb FOB (froo on board) at 
Caribboan port during tho last six sonths of 1985 (4), Tht rtsult 
of txporting sugar undtr tha abova conditions would aaan a loss of 
batwaan USf7.S0 and USM.SO par 100 lbs. bag shippad. 
Unfortunataly, tha scana is not likaly to changa for tha battar 
according to various racant raports, dua to continuad 
ovarproduction in aany countrias worldwida. (5)
Tha sacond problaa obsarvad is that of tha 
lagal coaplications which hava dalayad tha axpropriation of lands 
surrounding tha industrial sita which wara to ba plantad with 
sugar cana for tha procass. At prasant, dua to this dabata, Catsa 
has to transport its raw aatarials froa at laast 9kas, according 
to tha plant's aanagaaant (6)^ a figura which is vary significant 
if wa nota that in tha Brazilian axaapla <7), tha faasibla liait 
for vinhoto (outflow of tha procass) utilization as fartilizar 
using tankar trucks is rastrictad in tha bast of casas to batwaan 
2S and 34 kas ( 7| p.SO), of which this 9 kas radius araa would 
represant tha aost suitabla ‘̂lOX of tha land availabla.
!»■ J
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contrasted by a world <non-quota) price which has fluctuated 
between “"USfO.OS/lb and US$0.06/lb FOB (free on board) at 
Caribbean port during the last six eonths of 1985 Li), The result 
of exporting sugar under the above conditions would eean a loss of 
between USf7.50 and USM.50 per 100 lbs. bag shipped. 
Unfortunatelyi the scene is not likely to change for the better 
according to various recent reports, due to continued 
overproduction in aany countries worldwide. (5)
*1
The second problee observed is that of the 
legal coaplications which have delayed the expropriation of lands 
surrounding the industrial site which were to be planted with 
sugar cane for the process. At present, due to this debate, Catsa 
has to transport its raw eaterials froe at least 9kas, according 
to the plant's eanageaent fd), a figure which is very significant 
if we note that in the Brazilian exaeple (7), the feasible liait 
for vinhoto (outflow of the process) utilization as fertilizer 
using tanker trucks is restricted in the best of cases to between 
25 and 34 kas ( 7, p.SO), of which this 9 kas radius area would 
represent the aost suitable ‘*'10X of the land available.
' *
"é
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Catsa: Land Situation
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The third ntgativc charActvristlc lits in 
the inability due to various internal and external conditions, to 
secure the establisheent of higher value added applications for 
the suond possible output, alcohol:
1. The failure of the gasohol 
program during the Carazo Adeinistration 1978-1982, as well as the 
suspension of further action along those lines ever since.
2. The lieitation of being 
unable to produce beverages (liquor) using the anhydrous ethanol 
99.8% pure distillation process base, due eainly to the eonopoly 
situation that exists in favour of the Fabrica Nacional de 
Licores.
í .
The lack of dounstrean
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activitits using sthanol as thsir fttdstock for ths production of 
sthylsnt and its dtrivsd faaily of sattrials, for txaspU.
Btcaust of th# abovi, tht company has 
liaitad its oparation to tht axport of anhydrous athanol to tha 
Unitad Statas to ba usad thara for axactly tha saaa application as 
dascribad in tha last paragraph (No.3). Tha contribution racaivad 
froa this arrangaaant is aarginally positiva at can ba saan fron 
tha praliainary valuas providad by both LAICA and Catsa's plant 
aanagaaant during 1985 (3,6,8>t
1. Marginal Cost of production/3B litras (aquiv. to 100 
Ibs/sugar)
« USfl2.00/38 litras or USf0.32/litre.
.*= ♦
2. Salt Prica by Catsa ■ CR C18.S0/litra '*’US#0.34/litra FOB at 
Puerto Punta Moralat.
This raprasants a nagligibla aargin uhich 
is not anough to offsat tha dabt burden facad by tha coapany, but 
undar tha currant liaitad scanario, it is battar than exporting 
sugar at surplus (non-quota) prices.
The folloMing sections concentrate on tha 
study of alternative approaches which could yield better prospects 
for Catsa.
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U — Brttf Dfcription of tht Proe«»«i
ii2ii__s««if m i l l
This plant nas purchasad 
sacond-hand fro« Puarto Rico during tha Odubar Adainistration 
in an attaapt to ancouraga tha sugar cana activity in
tha ragion.
Tha ailling capacity (according 
to plant aanagaaant) is of 6,000 tons/day, producing as 
altarnativa outputs sugar and aolassas, or "sugar cana wina" for 
tha distillary. Apart froa this, tha crushad solid rasidua callad 
bagassa is racyclad to ba usad as fual to fira tha boilars which 
run tha whola oparation.
5.2.2 D i s t H U r ^ t
Furthar plans to davalop an 
agroindustrial installation producing alcohol wara considarad at 
tha tiaa, for which assistanca was sacurad fro« tha Brazilian 
governaent to study tha feasibility of establishing a gasohol 
program in the country.
This lad up to tha purchasa of a
’  V
(! ■'i
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distilltry froa « Brazilian industrial firs, Zannini Equipaaantos 
Pesados Hi;, Mith a ^irainting capacity oi S,8S0 tons of nint/day 
and a noainal distilling capacity of 240,000 litrts/day (though up 
to 390,000 litrss/day havs boon attained through tho introduction 
of ainor aodifications to tha procass). Tha bottla-nack of tha 
plant, according to tha plant's aanagaaant, is found at tha 
faraantation staga which currantly takas approxiaataly six hours 
to coaplata.
I lL I __Othfr J»stiJJ§ti09ss
Additional invastaant was 
raquirad for distribution pipalinas (froa tha sugar aill to tha 
distillary, and to and froa raw matarials and finishad product 
rasarvoirs), as wall as daposit tanks both for raw aatarials froa 
othar sugar aills (aolassas) and for final product awaiting 
shipaent (anhydrous athanol). Balow a graph dascribing in genaral 
terns tha distillation procass is prasantad. (An intagratad 
diagraa of tho whola coaplox is providod in the appandix.)
♦» •* I
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Thf Production of Alcohol frow BioMtti
Having priaantcd a britf dttcription of 
CATSA'f installation!, I shall non concantrata on tha alcohol 
production procass. This fual can ba obtainad froa aany sourcas. 
In our casa, various crops will ba avaluatad, in an attanpt to 
astiaata tha suitability of sugar cans as a faadstock.
__e*»ir*l A s u t t s i
Hhan talking about tha 
altarnative bioaass Inputs to tha distillation procass, one has to 
be aware of tha particular characteristics of each faadstock. Tha 
aain concerns involve tha yield of usable energy par land area, 
tha ease and cost of growing and harvesting each crop, and finally 
the intricacies of tha industrial procasses required to convert 
the raw aatarial into usable energy (coabustibla liquid fual, for 
axaaple). Below, a chart is offered (9)^ which describes a number 
of these characteristics for a range of tropical vegetation (most 
of which can can be cropped in Costa Rica).
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Table S.3. l.ai Comparison of Biomass Sources (Ethanol)i
« -
V' *
B I O M A S S CONVERSION B I 0 L 0 6 I C A L F U E L
{
<
s n c i e s PROCESS MEAT ¥AUIE y 1 £ L 0
7/Aa Kcai/Irg li/T U / h § •»
Sugar cane 50 Fermentation &400 70 3500
Cassava 25 Hydrol/Fern ¿600 180 4500 *1
Coconut 4 Hydrol/Ferm 6400 60 240 (
f'
Sueet Sorghum 45 Hydrol/Ferm 6400 70 3500
Smeet Potato 12 Hydrol/Ferm 6400 160 1920 • ft




Native Forest 20 Hydrol/Ferm 6400 200 4000
In the present case, ee Mill 
restrict the analysis only to those sources yielding ethanol as an 
end product, a consideration Mhich Mill be explained further along 
in this chapter . Keeping this in aind m «  aust realize that the 
first limiting variable is that of availability of good quality 
land to be used for energy crops . This represents a critical 
factor, because of the particular conditions of the Costa Rican 
territory: small country, abrupt topography, and relatively 
densely populated (this aspect has been discussed previously in 
Celis, R. (10) ).
V I'l
In this respect, from the table. Me see 
that sugar cane, mandioca (also called cassava or yucca), SMeet 
sorghum, and native forest mood present the best performance 
values. Next, concentrating on the production characteristics
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r»quirad <for thi trantforaation of aach bioaatf lourcii ni sto 
that only fugar cant avoids tht initial hydrolytit ttagt cotton to 
tht othtr pianti. This trtatatnt if rtquirtd to convtrt starch and 
ctlluloft into sitplt sugars. As a gtntral rult, tht tort cotpltx 
tht original toltcult is, tht tort laborious (and thtrtfort tht 
tort txptnsivt) this sttp till bt.
'* *
Sugar cant it constituttd as bi-taccharidt 
■oltcults (saccharost). All that is rtquirtd to txtract usablt 
antrgy froo it is to stparatt tht original toltcults into 
tono-saccharidtt (dtxtrost) at follousi
C(12) H(22) 0(11) ♦ H(2) 0 -- tnzytts---> 2<C(6) H(12) 0(6)>
(saccharost) tat tr) (dtxtrost)
and substqutntly convtrt tht tono'saccharidt substanct into 
ethanol:
C(6) H(12) 0(6)  tnzytts— > 2{C(2) H(5) OH ♦ C 0(2))
(dtxtrost)____________________ (tthanol)______ (carbon dioxidt)
"t
distilling the alcohol to a high purity grade of 99.8%. (The yeast 
inost contonly used for this process is Saccharoayces c t n v i s i i »  as 
explained by Lonts, T. (ii).)
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Mhtn NI txiiini thi othir bioiati lourcfi 
nivirthiliis, ni find that thi prociss involvid ii aoiiNhat lori 
cuabirtoii. 1̂
Finti in tha caia of atarchy cropti i.i., 
aaiza (corn), potatoaf, iNiat potatoaii caaaavai atc., it ii 
nacaasary to tranafora aora coaplax carbohydrataa (poly- 
aaccharidaa) foraad by aultipla aolaculaa of aono-aaccharidaii 
joinad togathar by axtarnal bonda, into aiapla augara. Thia ia 
achiavad, aa aaa atatad baforii by a procaaa callad hydrolyaiaf 
Mhara tha atarchy aatarial ia aubjactad to tha attack oi acid 
subatancaa (or aoaatiaaa anzyaaa) in a aatar anvironaant. Tha 
aolaculaa abaorb uatar and braak, saparating unaantad coaponanta 
froa tha aono*aaccharidia. Aftar thia, tha raaulting liquid aay ba 




Moving on to fibroua (calluloaa) planta, 
i*e.| cotton, foraat prodiicta, ate. ua diacovar that tha traataant 
necesaary is auch tha aaaa as for starch. Unfortunataly, because 
of tha aora coaplax natura of thasa aolaculas and tha greater 
abundance of call nail aatarial (callulosa, i.a., harder, aore 
solid constitution), tha convarsion (hydrolysis using sulphur 
dioxide, (12) is such aora difficult.
BaloN, I have included a graph ahich 
should help visualize tha differences batNian each bioaass source.
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{From thf ta«t study naasd at the btginning of this saction, 9 ).
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4.3.2 Suaér Caii§t
Having ditcuiitd soat tht
charactariftici oi tht availablt fatdttock« for tht tthanol 
production procttSf wt art not rtady to txatint thost which apptar 
to bt tht aoit Buitablt for tht Coita Rican cait. It ii citar frot 
thf lait ftN paragraphs that sugar cant is suptrior to tost othtr 
bioaass sourcts for a varitty of rtasons: sitpltr industrial 
sat-up, vast txptritnct in tht country in tht agricultural sidt of 
tha businasB, tinca it has btan croppad for tany yaars, ate.
Apart frot tha abova, an addad bonus it 
achiavad whan choosing sugar cana« which is not possibla with its 
coapetitors (aostly bacausa of tha hydrolysis staga): a positive 
energy balance, (¡3).
<«|
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Energy Balance in the R edu ction of Alcohol
From  Sugar O an e Feedstock .
Outgoing
eni

















Million Kcaiy T o n  of sugar cane
In conclusion, if possiblt for land and 
cliaatt considtrations (i.t., in Costa Rica: 1500 as - 3500 aa of 
rainfall/year, an avaraga taaparatura of batNaan 22.5 - 28 
degraas cantigrada yaar-round, and bataean 1500 and 2500 avaraga 
sunshine hours/yaar, 14 ), sugar cana appears to be the bast 
choice for such an application.
The limiting factor, nonetheless.
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Enersy Balance in the Production of Alcohol
From  Sugar C ane Feedstock .
O utgoing

















Million Kcal./ T o n  of sugar cane
ñ' 4'
#  I
In conclusion, if possiblt for land and 
cliaatc considtrations (i.s., in Costa Rica: 1500 ss - 3500 ■« of 
rainfall/ysar, an avtragt ttspsraturs of bttwotn 22.5 - 28
degrots contigrado year-round, and betneen 1500 and 2500 average 
sunshine hours/year, 14 ), sugar cane appears to be the best 
choice for such an application.
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conctntratfs on tho «vAilability of land. As ñas ststsd btforoy 
gravi conctrn has bttn txprtssid by various txports about tht 
displactaont causad by tht usa of rich agricultural land for 
anargy purposas instaad than for food cropsy aainly grains. Such a 
dilaaaa intansifias than aa considar tha siza of tha agricultural 
area in a stall country like Costa Rica. This leads us to suggest 
fflora efficient land use techniques even in those areas sat apart 
specifically for anargy crop groNingy such as those described in 
tha Proalcool (7) Nork naaad above (tha interspersing of other 
crops alongside sugar cane (paanutsy baansy soya baansy etc.)y and 
the rotation of different crops in these lands.). These practices 
have been shoan not only to yield acceptable levels of production 
for all the cultures involved, but also to iaprove the econoaic 
feasibility of bioaass based alcohol prograas.
.  ■
V i*!
SEPSAy the governaent agency in charge of 
land use planning has deterained that of the country's total area, 
50,900 ka2, 16,468 ka2 of Nhich correspond to rich soil lands 
suitable for agriculture, 750 ka2 can be devoted peraanently to 
energy crops, aithout upsetting the planned agricultural frontier 
scenario. (15)
. *il
To put this figure into perpective, I 
shall now present an estiaate of hoN auch alcohol could be 
expected yearly froa these landsi
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Yitldt 3,500 litr«s/ha.
Land axtansioni 750 iq kat. or 75,000 ha. . <'1
Uni tat
1 US gallon 
1 barrtl « 42 US gals.
3.785 litris
a. 3,500 litris/ha. x 75,000 ha. » 262,500,000 litras/yaar
b. 262,500,000 / 3.785 litras/US gal « 69,352,708 US gal/yr.
c. 69,352,708 US gal / 42 US gal/bb * 1.651.255 bb alcohol/var
U  Nt noM coapara this value with the 
current (Calis, R. at al, 1980 10 ) consuaption, i.a., 5,500,000
barrels of oil total, of ahich ‘̂70 Z or 3,630,000 bb oil 
corraspond to tha transport sactor, wa find that the ethanol 
value, whan translated to oil equivalent, would aaount to between 
‘̂41% (1,486,000 bb oil aq., if used as a suppleaant of petrol), 
and ^49Z (1,783,000 bb oil aq., if used as a coaplaaant to patrol, 






As can be seen, such an alternative 
(involving only sugar cane) would be insufficient to eventually 
provide a total oil substitution potential. It is important.
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thtrsfort, to considtr tho i«piiiontation of coapltAtntâry 
schcaes. Tha aoat rilavant approach appears to be, in the case of 
Costa Rica, the use of cassava both to extend the period of 
utilization of the distilling facilities throughout the year, and 
to increase overall production.
To illustrate the seasonality problea of 
sugar cane ee shall concentrate on Catsa's perforaance during 
1985. During this period, the zafra (Spanish tera for the cutting 
season) lasted for 87 days, according to coapany officials. This 
provided rae aaterials for the industrial process for an equal 
interval: roughly one fourth of the year (in the best of 
conditions, zafras could last up to ^150 days or five eonths). It 
is apparent that increasing the "industrial season* should iaprove 
the overall outlook. Cassava, being a perennial crop, not greatly 
affected by year-round variations, provides an attractive 
alternative. (16)
Various authors have noted the special 
qualities of this plant to endure sub-optieal conditions. In doing 
so, they have stressed the outstanding potential it presents as a 
cheap source of energy, either for huean consuaption of for 
ethanol production (11, 17 ).
Applying such research in the Costa Rican 
scene is especially iaportant, due to the problens singled out 
above in relation to the limited access to rich soils.
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thtrafort, to considtr tha iaplaaantation of coaplaaantary 
schaaas. Tha aott ralavant approach appaars to ba, in tha casa of 
Costa Rica, tha ust of cassava both to axtand tha pariod of 
utilization of tha distilling facilitias throughout tha yaar, and 
to incraasa ovarall production.
To illustrata tha saasonality problaa of 
sugar cana wa shall concantrata on Catsa's parforaanca during 
1985. During this pariod, tha za/ra (Spanish tarn for tha cutting 
saason) lastad for 87 days, according to company officials. This 
providad raw aatarials for tha industrial process for an equal 
interval X roughly one fourth of tha yaar (in tha bast of 
conditions, zafras could last up to ‘̂150 days or five aonths). It 
is apparent that increasing tha 'industrial saason* should inprova 
tha ovarall outlook. Cassava, being a perennial crop, not greatly 
affected by year-round variations, provides an attractive 
alternative. (16)
' '*I
Various authors have noted tha special 
qualities of this plant to endure sub-optiaal conditions. In doing 
so, they have stressed tha outstanding potential it presents as a 
cheap source of energy, either for huaan consuaption of for 
ethanol production (,11, 17 ).
Applying such research in tha Costa Rican 
scene is especially iaportant, due to tha problems singled out 
above in relation to the liaited access to rich soils.
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Following tht PlAnning Ministry's 
classification of thi country's lands (OFIPLANi Plan Nacional do 
Dosarrollo Forostal, 1979, bastd on Tosi, J.i *E1 Rocurso Forostal 
Cooo Baso Potoncial para ol Dosarrollo Industrial do Costa Rica, 
quotod by Uoana, Doryan, as abovo), wo havo tho following picturo:
T O m  LAND tREA - SB, A N  kus^
Costa Rica: Land Distribution
■’i'
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From this dascription, tht sugar cant 
quota for tnargy ust, would bt liaitid to thi 750 kts sq. 
atntiontd btfort, which would ba allocatad within tha 16,468 kas 
sq. availabla for convantional agricultural purposas, i.a., rich 
soils with good waathar, <thasa 750 kas sq. would corraspond to 
4.55X of tha rich lands and 1.47X of tha national tarritory).
Rafarring back to tha land distribution 
graph, wa find that apart froa tha prosparous land citad in tha 
last paragraph, thara axists in Costa Rica, a substantial stratch 
of land, 5,000 kas sq. or lOX of tha overall surfaca araa, of poor 
quality soil and banign cliaata (i.a., not too hot, not too cold, 
not too wat, not too dry, ate.). It is undar such conditions that 
cassava has baan raportad to yiald accaptabla crops, raquiring 
littla or no attantion. For axaapla, Brazil undar tha Proalcool 
(7) prograa, is in tha process of planting tha Carrado ragion of 
the country, 25X of that country's land area or 8.5 aillion kas 
sq., with cassava in rotation with soya baani Cassava praparas tha 
land for soya baans to grow whera thay would not hava baan abla to 
befora. In raturn, aftar tha soya saason, cassava plants yield 
better harvests, (it)
M Ml
Undar such an arrangaaant, this anargy 
crop would not, in the Costa Rican case, pose a threat to any food 
crop as none would grow in these poor lands. There would not be a 
competition for land between anargy and food crops putting in 
jeopardy the balance of the "»gricultur§l fronti*r".
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If wt noN txaaine tht pottntial production 
of fuch land arti (at a hypothttical lOOX uaaga lavai), avan on 
tha worst of conditions, for axaapla tha yiald axpariancad in 
saall faraar's parcals in rural Brasili 12 tons/ha. (as quotad in 
Proalcool, ibid., p.56, plaasa nota also that undar axcaptional 
conditions up to 70 tons/ha. hava baan attainad, and tha avaraga 
yiald in Brazil is 25 tons/ha., as can ba saan froa tha chart 
providad at tha baginning of this chaptar), wa hava that thasa 
lands would yiald on avaraga:
Yiald (ain.): 12 tons/ha.
Alcohol convarsion: 180 litras/ton
Alcohol Yialdi 2,160 litras/ha athanol
Now, using tha saaa units aaployad in tha 
case of sugar cans wa havai
i
Land araai 5,000 kas sq., or 500,000 ha. 
1 US gal « 3.785 1 
1 bb * 42 US gal
■I
a. 2,160 litras/ha x 500,000 ha « 1,080,000,000 litras/yr.
b. 1,080,000,000 litres / 3.785 litres/US gal » 285,336,856 gal
c. 285,336,856 US gal / 42 US gal/bb » 6.794.000 bb/vr ETHANOL
This figura on its own, avan in tha lowar
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cas* quoted btfort. Mould bo tnough for oventual total 
substitution of oil iaports.
Having analyzad tha land rastriction 
situation and found that Mith a coabinad sugar cana - cassava 
input scanariOy thara Mould ba anough raa aatarial to supply avan 
an anargy salf sufficiancy policy, Ma shall noM turn to tha 
analysis of tha tachnical and aconoaic iaplications of such 
andaavours, trying to dataraina up to Mhat point it is Misa to 
attaapt iaplaaantation.
8.4 Altarnativa Utaa of Alcohol»
8.4.1 Alcohol Ms.cotdustio» fu§J
8.4.1.a Introduction!
Tha first option availabla for tha usa of 
the altarnativa end products froa the Catsa industrial process, 
apart froa sugar for huaan consuaption, is that of ethanol as a 
substitute for oil in aotor vehicles.
Under the present visrld oil market 
conditions, 00/bb oil, such a substitution program Mould be 
uneconomical. Nevertheless, understanding that oil is an 
exhaustible resource Mharaas biomass sources are not, and that
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thtrtfore •xtraction costi m ìII, in tht long tira tsnd to risa in 
tha casa oil, and raaain ralativaly stadia (or avan drop 
bacausa of aconoaias of scala, iaprovad tachnologias, atc.) in tha 
casa oi ranaaabla rasourcas, (19). It aay wall ba tha casa that a 
contingancy pian for avantual or graduai iaplantation is in ordar 
in a saall, tropical oil iaporting davaloping country (OIOC) lika 
Costa Rica.
i
Furtharaora, H  wa folloa Hotalling's Rula 
Nith raspact to tha prica path of oil (20), which statas that in 
tha long tara, i.a., barring short tara inconsistancias brought 
about by ovarproduction cartals, aabargoas (parfact coapatition), 
atc., tha prica of oil will risa at tha pravailing world noainal 
rata of intarast (LIBOR, Priaa Rata, atc.), wa aust racogniza tha 
iaplications of this scanario for a country with chronic hard 
currancy problaas, a ralativaly high intarnal inflationary / 
currency dapraciation anvironaant and a heavy foreign debt burden. 
"Unless tha present discounted prica for every period is tha 
saae, tha narkat will not ba in aquilibriua. For exaaple, if 
tha prica of oil is expected to risa aora quickly than tha 
nominal interest rata, than all suppliers will hold on to 
thair oil anticipating higher profits. This raises tha prica 
of oil today relative to its prica in tha future and restores 
equilibriua. If tha prica of oil is expected to rise slower 
than the interest rata, suppliers will try to sell aora oil 
today and invest thair profits to receive tha noainal intarast 
rate. This flooding of tha narkat leads to a lowering of tha
.1..“
» !
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prie« today rolativ* to tht future and restores the 
cquilibriue path. Hence under the assusption of perfect 
coepetition, costless extraction, and a constant discount 
rats, the price oust rise at the noeinal interest rate." (Ì9)
The problee is al too clear Nhen ms study 
the case at hand (data fro« Celis R., (iO)^ and author's 
elaboration) i
During 1980, oil inports aaounted to 
USI185 «illion or 20% of the country's hard currency earning 
capacity ("’US$923 aillion in exports. Note: According to 
governaent figures for 1983, thass values reaained alaost 
unchanged).
Checking another paraaeter, iaports for 
the period were of the order of USIl.409 billion, 13.IX of which 
went towards the purchase of oil. (Again preliainary figures for 




On top of this, the foreign debt service 
during the last year aaounted to ‘̂30X of all exports or '^US$430 
aillion. -• i «■*
As can be gathered froa the above figures, 
a concerted effort to reduce the gap between hard currency 
requireaents and earnings in itself could prove to be a reasonable
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approach, apart from othmr tconomic considtrationi, tvtn Nhtn 
overall Return on Investment may be negative in hard currency 
equivalences <but paid in local currency). Belon I present a set 
of figures uhich compare RQI of local investments vs. proposed 
foreign purchase of oil (or any other convenience from abroad) at 
the nominal interest rates, in the setting of an unstable LOC 
(this is a very real situation if a country has to borrow hard 
currency in order to import):
k
Example:
Nominal Interest Rate: lOX/year.
Price Increase (Hotelling) of oil: lOZ 
in order to cover this increase a local investment would have to 
yield a return of:
n.i(dep)} X (1.10)
where i(dep) » rate of currency depreciation with respect to the 
relevant hard currency denomination. Putting some figures to 




Loan--------------1 year------------- > Repayment
(for the purchase of oil for example)
US$1.00 US$1.10 r . '1
! •
Nevertheless, in national currency this would require (in Costa 
Rica for year 1985):
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CRC 47.00 CRC 59.40
1*
dui to a divaluation of 151 during thi yiar or, folloMing thi 
foraulat
{1.15} X {1.10} » 1.265,
•I
1* •
l.e., a not inttrnal inttrtst rtquirtatnt of 26.51 to covtr tha 
lOX incrtai# in hard currancy. (If a foraign currancy loan aas 
usad to purchaaa tha oil, this would ha naaded to account for a 
lOX intarast rata).
• (
In an opposita fashion, bioaass sources 
such as sugar cane hava danandad little foraign currancy, after 
the initial capital invastaant phase has bean executed (iaports of 
plant and equipaant). This situation arises due to a nuabar of 
factors; First, the installations can be run on energy generated 
locally. Second, because affective prograas of biological past 
control have been iaplaaantad, a reduction in the use of 
traditional (iaported) pesticides has bean experienced. 
Also, vinhoto has bean utilized instead of nitrogen fertilizers 
when possible (this applies to the Brazilian experience, as 
discussed in Proalcool, (7) , pp. 45 - 52, and to a certain extent 
in Costa Rica, as gathered by the author on field visits to both 
the Catsa intallations and to LAICA's research station in 
Grecia). Finally, recent technological breakthroughs have closed 
the gap between the cost of oil and bioaass (eainly in relation to
r
i
I .  ^  f
»i;, »'■
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sugar cant and cattava) tvtn ^urthtr. UNISEARCH, a cotpany forttd 
by tht Univtrsity of N§m South Halts in Australia has dtvtloptd a 
bacttriut calltd Zitoionas w o b H i s  (through gtnttic tnginttring) 
uhich itprovts ftrttntation tilts for sugar cant, cassava, and 
othtr fttdstocks by four tilts. (2t,22). Furthtriort, this nti 
bacttriui is capablt of convtrting starch-bastd foodstuffs, 
including cassava, dirtctly into glucost (doxtroso), without first 
convtrting it to sucrost (i.t., bypassing tht hydrolisis stago), 
rtducing ftritnting costs by ‘̂10% (23).
i’
I.
In conclusion, in tho futuro this bioiass 
sconario coiprising sugar cant/cassava inputs, biological post 
control, tht ust of Ziaotonai Mobilis bacttriui in plact of tht 
Saccbaroiyccs c§rivisiti ytast (which would iiprovt distilltry 
throughput grtatly, rtquiring proportionally loss capital 
investient in fortign currtncy), and finally putting tht vinhoto 
outflow to btttor ust, afttr using its liiitad pottntial as 
fertiliztr, could, in tht long ton, provt to bt vtry btntficial 
and cost coipotitivo, whilt rtloasing fortign currtncy rtstrvts 




Tht following stctions will dtal in turn, 









Than ara tao aain optiona opan to tha 
utilization of athanol as fual for actor vahiclas: Gasohol, a 
•ixtura of up to 20X Ethanol (anhydrous) and BOX patroli and 
Hydratad alcohol as an indapandant fual. A third application would 
involva tha usa of athanol as an additivo to diasal, as a aixtura 
with diasal (diasohol) or as a substituta of diasal in coabination 
with vagatabla oils (aspacially froa palo oil| though soaa 
atteopts havo baan aada to aaploy coconut oil instaad, whara this 
sourca is vary abundanty as is tha casa of Indonasia), but this 
possibility is still at tha axparinantal staga avan in Brazil 
(rafar to Proalcool, ibid, p. 66).
I'-i
f •
Exploring tha first altarnative, i.a., tha 
use of athanol with patrol, wa find that iooadiata banafits can ba 
quantified. *• i .
Ethanol has a higher octane nuabar than 
petrol. Tha coobination of this fual with LOG petrol, which has 
been traditionally baan of a low anti-knock rating (‘*’80 
octanes versus 92 - 98 octanes in developed countries) produces 
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Sourci: Ascrican Pttroleua Instituts: (24,  10)
Ths octane value relates to the propensity 
oi fuel to ignite during coebustion. The higher the number, the 
more efficient the burning of the fuel will be (better anti-knock 
properties), i.e., the higher Temperature - Pressure conditions it 
will be able to withstand prior to combustion, resulting in more 
efficient performance. Low octane numbers on the contrary, cause 
premature burning of fuel, resulting in more consumption (less 
efficiency). Combining two fuels with different octane numbers 
would yield an intermediate rating. The equation to calculate this 
contribution is as follows:
f«
t »■
Fuel A Octane No. x (Y) + Fuel B Octane No. x (1-Y)
wnhare Y* X of fuel A concantration in the mix.
An example of the impact such combination 
could have in our case would be: ■-t.
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Fuel A: LDC Pttrol Octant No. SO 
Fuel B: Ethanol Octant No. Ill
Yt 80 Z
using tht iquation m i  gat:
80 (.80) 111 (1-.80) « 86.2
an laproviaint of ^7.75X in octant rating ovtr' LDC pttroly 




Tht application of dthydratad athanol to 
loM octant patrol prasants tharafora a positiva affact right atay. 
As will ba txplaintd furthar on, in tha Cotta Rican cast this 
would rasult in savings of batwaan USI1,220,000 to USI2,500,000 
per year (and batwaan USI4,025,000/yr and USf8,000,000/yr 
reduction in hard currency daaands) if a gasohol policy was 
adopted (on tha basis of Catsa's present potential of 100 kas tq. 
or 10,000 ha plantations) covering tha currant gasoline fleet, 
i.e., a gasohol and diesel scenario, assueing equal costs of 
production for I bb of alcohol and 1 bb of refined petrol, and 






An additional advantage of the use of
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ethanol at a compltatnt to patrol it that no todificationt art 




The only strict lieitation that hat to be 
observed is that of the presence of water in filling station and 
vehicle tanks. Ethanol is infinitely soluble in water, whereat 
petrol is insoluble. Adding water to the gatohol Mixture, even in 
very toall aeounts would lead to a phase separation between the 
two constituents, resulting in undesirable consequences. Depending 
on the aeount of alcohol present, vehicles would run poorly or not 
at all. In suaeary, a capital cost could be expected in relation 
to ensuring that deposit tanks remain water tight.
Apart froa those reservations expressed in 
the last paragraph, no other drawbacks have been reported with 
raspect to the use of gasohol, apart fro« corrosion damage, 
although this condition has been primarily associated with 
concentrations exceeding 20Z ethanol.
Finally, a potential for exports to 
Developed Countries is also possible. Ethanol can be employed as a 
substitute for lead as an anti'*knock element, keeping octane
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S.4.1.C Hydratid Ethanoli
Tho utc of ithanol (hydratod) as an 
indaptndant fual rtpresants a auch aora controvarsial issua froa 
that discussad abova. Tha reason for this is that the higher 
octane values of ethanol are countered by loMer specific heat 
values (both per eeight and per voluae).
The folloMing table, froa the same API 
source document as above, exposes this characteristic:
Table 5.4.l.b EWER6Y CONTENT:
F U U S t
Btu/lb. Kcèl/kf, Kcai/i. Z Fttrol
(1 unit voi
Sasoline 18,900 10,500 7,700 100
Diesel 18,500 10,280 8,740 113.5
Fuel Oil 17,200 9,560 8,800 114.3
Ethanol 11,500 6,390 5,050 65.6
Hethanol 8,570 4,760 3,790 49.2
f V
1% .!» 1
As a result this shortcoming, pure 
sthanol vehicles are less efficient than comparable units running 
on petrol. The net effect of using hydrated ethanol results in
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bstNsen lOX «nd 20X I»«« tfficitncy with rt*ptct to currtnt pttrol 
con*u«ption valuis, dtptnding on tht sophistication o*f ths alcohol 
engino dosign tochnology quoted (i0,26).
■ 4]
Disregarding this fact« which would 
require the cost of production for a barrel of alcohol to be lower 
than that of a barrel of oil to yield any overall positive 
contribution, as will be presented later, other obstacles eust be 
overcoee before establishing such a program.
The sain stuebling block resides in the 
fact that alcohol only engines eust incorporate a number of 
eodifications to the original OTTO cycle design, in order to 
function properly. A graph explaining in general terms what these 
changes are is presented below: (Note: Corrosion protection is 
especially important in carburetters, where nickel or cadmium 
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The cost of such trsnsformstions according 
to Slesser (as above) and Cells, et al., would aeount to 'US5500 
to US5600 per vehicle. It eust be stressed, though, that this cost 
Mould be averted if a phase-in prograe of purpose built alcohol 
engines is iepleeented, instead of eodifying existing Otto cycle 
poMerplants. A suggestion, as to how such a phase-in prograa could 
operate, would be to target fleets of vehicles as the first users, 
i.e., police cars, taxis, governsent Ministry fleets, etc.. Such a 
policy has proven to be very successful in Brazil (through partial 




d 1. Pollution froB Basohol Engines:
t •
In general terms, alcohol emissions are 
less harmful to the environment than gasoline ones.
First, in the case of gasohol, the 
addition of ethanol results in cleaner burning, reducing CO and HC 
presence. In fact, in the case of Sao Paulo, Brazil's largest 
city, a significant reduction in smog levels has been documented 
since the introduction of the Proalcool program. Experimental 
tests have produced the following results for a 20% ethanol / 80% 
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Tabi» 3 .4 . l . t  E««ii»tiiiim FfO« 9««BhoI Enaint« tn 9 r«U -
57 X riduction in CO taissions 
30 X reduction in HC «aiseiont 
15 X reduction in N(0)2 eeieeions
d 2. Pollution froa Alcohol Enginesi
As Mas stated earlier, the eiiect of 
alcohol eeissions on the environeent is in overall teres less 
haraful than gasoline ones. The eain reason for this being that 
due to the better anti-knock properties of alcohol, no additives 
such as lead are needed. Also, the levels of CO, and hydrocarbons 
in these fuses are in general teres lower, due partly to better 
coebustion performance of alcohol when compared to low grade LDC 
petrol. The table below presents a summary of results from a 
comparative study of the effects of both types of engines on 
laboratory rats:
Source: ler Simposio de Engeniheria Automotive, Brasilia, 1983
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1500 1700 2000 3000
RPH= Revolutions/wnute . . ^ ,
CUt/r Percent level of CO in exhaust funes
1̂  Petrol
E= Ethanol «
t= Average survival tiHe for 5 groups of 











As a general rule ŝf thusib, the aost 
relevant eeissions in cities are those associated with low 
revolution regiees (low rpn's)« because oi the effect oi slow
V-
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tragic. During rush hour tra-f-fic, and «ost o-f all, in th« siddla 
oi traiiic jams, wher* you gtt th« highest vehicle densities, 
those are the kinds of «Missions observed* idling engines, short 
bursts of poMer, etc.. In contrast, higher rp« values generally 
reflect highway conditions, which by definition are less likely to 
concentrate as static pollution, the main cause of ssog. (27)
< .1
In relation to other substances present in 
the alcohol exhaust fuses in greater concentration than that of 
gasoline ones, we find priaarily forsic and acetic aldehydes. The 
effect of these substances on the environaent is yet to be 
evaluated thoroughly. Preliainary results show notheless, that 
even though the aean life of these substances is relatively low, 
only a few hours, they aay cause respiratory deseases such as 
eaphyseaa (saae source as chart above).
t •
I "T
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tragic. During rush hour traffic, and most ai all, in th» *iddU 
oi tragic ja«*, whort you gtt tha highest vehicle densities, 
those are the kinds oi eeissions observed* idling engines, short 
bursts oi power, etc.. In contrast, higher rpe values generally 
reflect highway conditions, which by definition are less likely to 
concentrate as static pollution, the aain cause of seog. (27)
In relation to other substances present in 
the alcohol exhaust fuies in greater concentration than that of 
gasoline ones, we find priaarily foraic and acetic aldehydes. The 
effect of these substances on the environaent is yet to be 
evaluated thoroughly. Preliainary results show notheless, that 
even though the aean life of these substances is relatively low, 
only a few hours, they aay cause respiratory deseases such as 
eaphyseaa (saae source as chart above).
f.
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a.4.2 Ethanol for EthvU n «  Induftrv»
Tht ftcond broad application <for th« 
fthanol (C2-H3-0H) productd at tht plant, would bt to trantfort 
it, txpofing it to a dihydration proctss, to ithant (C2-H6) , and 
subatquent1y to tthyltnt (C2~H4), by sttam cracking.
Th# pottntial application! of tthyltnt in 
tht industry art vtry vast. Btlow, a chart fro® tht World Bank 
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lies with thi compttitivtness in terss oi price oi ethanol as a 
feedstock vs. for exaaple, ethanol froe natural gas as is being 
applied at the ESSO/SHELL coeplex at Hoiaorran, Cowdenbeath, Fife, 
which opened in May of this year (1986) (27), With the present 
state of affairs in the oil business this seees a long tere 
proposal, considering the «assive additional investaent required, 
both in plant and equipeent, and knowhow.
V <
a
It is for this reason that the final part 
of this chapter will encompass solely the transport sector 
substitution option. An industrialization stage for ethylene froa 
sugar cane would not be precluded by the approach chosen. Instead, 
the option would reaain open (since it is a technically viable 
process) for future linkage efforts.
r.
a.A.3 Prooraeae laaleaentation;
For this part of the study, I have chosen 
to follow two aain sets of criteria. The first is that set down by 
T.W. Barrie in (28)  ̂ which relate to the overall energy sector 
organizational set-up required to carry out integrated efforts in 
the field, aaong all the different institutions responsible for 




The second set is associated with the
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implBfliintation of th# alcohol-for-fu«l prograoot itstlf. Htr«, tht 
general approach of dynamic dtciaion making mill bt purautd, 
taking into account thm different set* of alternative course* of 
action that would be encountered at each point along the way, 
i.e., initially relying on Catsa‘s present potential, later 
working with the 750 kms sq. limit identified for dedicated sugar 
cane production for alcohol, and finally envisaging a sugar cane / 
cassava input scenario.
•
5.4.3.a O r oAAiZAtioAL
It is important to reduce as far as 
possible, th* potential for duplicity of function, or deviance of 
goals in any implementation programme in th* energy sector. In 
Costa Rica, various government institutions control different 
sub-sector* of th* energy scenes I.C.E. (Instituto CostarrÍcense 
de Electricidad) controls electricity (and telecommunications). 
RECOPE (Refinería Costarricense de Petróleo) manages refining, 
exploration and distribution of oil products (which are sold by 
independent stations). Th* Ministry of Public Works and Transport 
is in charge of th* transport activity including the direct 
operation of th* Electric Railway System (Pecosa) and the close 
regulation of the country's urban areas, through Transmesa (both 
Pecosa and Transmesa were Codesa companies until 1985). Finally, 
the Ministry of “industry, Energy and Mines, deals to some extant 
with the regulations governing the provision of energy to 
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the caie oi our intentt, CODESA ihould be added to the lilt of 
energy sector institutions (in the case of substitution
prograiies)>
e
It is evident that decisions taken under 
the current status quo, by any institution separately, could 
affect the others quite substantially. It is the author s 
experience froe the tiee he spent at the CODESA-Ministry of Public 
Works link-up institution (TRANSHESA), that coordination is 
usually absent. An exaeple of the consequences resulting from a 
lack of concerted policy action, is the disproportionate growth in 
the national diesel powered vehicle fleet during the 1970 s, 
caused eainly by the introduction of (indiscriminate) tax 
incentives by central government (backed by MOPT), favouring this 
class of vehicles over petrol ones, and a lower price for the fuel 
itself (artificially low). As presented at the World Energy 
Conference in New Delhi, 1983 (29), this heralds important
disadvantages. The “incremental cost of diesel", as it is termed, 
arises when country's (LDC) diesel vehicle fleet vastly outstrips 
its refining program (diesel proportion of the crude oil yield). 
The typical crude used in Costa Rica (Lagotreco from Venezuela) 
yields 21.3Z diesel, 28.IX petrol, 40.5X bunker C (fuel oil). In 
contrast to this, 66X of all the oil used in the country is 
consumed in the transport sector, where the distribution i» 
roughly divided into 707. diesel and 307. petrol. The resulting 
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Thirt ar« two optioni op«n to RECOPE. Tho 
fir»t Mould bo to product tnouqh diostl (if It» inttallod 
capacity poroit») to »ati»fy tho di»»tl dtoand, and »ub«oqu»ntly 
r»-»xport tho oxcodont of patrol, bunktr C, and othor diatillato*. 
Tho »ocond option uould bo to »ati»fy tho othor dioand» and ioport 
rofinod dit»tl (or »oot option in botuton tho»o two oxtrooi 
poiition»). A» was cooaontod by INCSA's (Industria Nacional do 
Cooonto, tho privato soctor coopotitor of CEMPASA) tochnical 
■anag»r, Ing. Joan Piorro Ratton during tho author*» visit to tho 
coopany's installations in April 1985 tho rofinory has in 
tho past sold excess bunker C fuel abroad at prices way below what 
it charges its local custooers (oven though largo consuoers of 
this specific derivative like INCSA wore sore than willing to 
purchase those shipoonts for thoosolves). In othor words, the oil 
coopany has in the past duoped this excess production.
♦
11«
To avoid probleos arising in the future 
fro» uncoordinated energy policy taking, it is essential to opt 
for a central liason unit. Restricting its scope to the area of 
our interest, oil substitution prograes, such an entity should at 
the very least include CODESA, Ministry of Industry, Ministry of 
Transport, and RECOPE.
Following Berrie's classification, we have
the following areas of action: (2B)
"Area No. 1. National supply -
' • '/'I
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seaand energy balances
- Develop an energy sector 
deeand forecasting eodel for the country in question; train 
personnel to use and develop the eodel in that country.
- Exasine the physical,
aconoeic, financial and institutional substitutability of 
different primary and secondary fuels in the country concerned.
- Examine the role of new and
t".
renewable energy sources.
Area No.2. Institutional /
technical assistance required in the energy sector
- Exasine what is required for
investment planning.
- Examine what is required for 
coordination between energy ministries. Is there need for a 
Is there need for a Ministry of Conservation?
Area No.3. Energy planning /
pricing
- Examine the cost of extension 
of present energy systems into industrial, urban and rural sectors
and also the question of grants and subsidies.
Consider energy sector pricing
policy. Should there be uniform prices geographically? Are prices
= c- approx 1mately according to marginal costs of supply? Mhat
^culd be the effects of using "spot“ energy prices.
Area No. 4. Energy conservation
- Consider the need for energy
• .• •*
. f.
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audits*
«ansgtatnt snd control
isprovmtnt oi tntrgy rfficitncy,
loss rtduction.
f-;.
- Considtr tht notd for tntrgy
Considtr tht cast for
- Considtr tht cast for tntrgy
Rtcoiatndations for carrying out tntrgy stctor asstssntnt studits:
- Bt fltxiblt in outlook. Dtspitt tht prtstnt oil glut, tht 
takings of anothtr oil prict rist tight alrtady bt in tha 
piptlint.
- Do not bt dotinattd by tithtr tht supply sidt or tht dttand 
sidt.
- Otvtlop a sitplt cotputtr todtl for fortcasting tht national 
dttand for tntrgy, starting with tacrotconotic parattttrs, to bo 
used for tasting difftrent scenarios for energy planning and 
energy pricing; do not atteapt a sophisticated approach to energy 
sector optitization.
- Hake sure that the need for follou-up to any energy 
sector assessaent study is properly considered during the study
and is adequately covered in the report.
- Make alloManct for different systeas of tntrgy aanageaent
and energy pricing coaing into practice, including energy 




Typical terms of reference for a short energy sector assessaent
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study:
- Exa«int thi historical trond for tnirgy dtoand in thi 
country in quistion by coootrcial iuols and non-co««#rcial futís 
and by stctor, i.g. transport, eltctricity, industry, 
dontstic,ttc.
- Projtct tht tnergy dttands into tht futuri, btaring in tind 
projictid growth in population, industrial growth, tconoaic 
growth, itc.
- Split tht futuri tntrgy dttand projictions by typi of futi 
and by indigtnous and itportid futís; also show tht contribution 
Bxptcttd to bt tadt by ntw and rtntwablt tntrgy sourcts.
- Modify tht tntrgy dttand projtctions in tht light of liktly 






laportant points whtn taking an inirgy stctor aodtl:
- Concentrate on making energy sector demand forecasts, not
sector optiiization.
- Use econotic resource costs.
- Use sote form of input-output table.
- Bt flexible: each country's energy stctor is different.
- Be able to cope sotthow with poor or inadequate data.
- Concentrate on indicative planning of the tntrgy stctor 
using a scenerio approach.
- Build the model to be able to cope with step function 
changes, e.g. in fuel prices.
- Build the todel to be capable of being used in the field.
• I
I*:,.
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M i
- Use » «ixid di»ciplin# approach of aconoaiit*, fiscal 
spacialiiti, tschnologists, institution spscialists and cosputtr 
tcisntists* * (28)
% * I
Ktoping this broad approach for Entrgy 
sactor policy saking, shtrs alcohol-for-futl would play an 
inttgral, though sinor part (i.s., not a panacta) to start with, 
seass to ba tht wisar argusant to follow.
Tha naxt sactions will daal in datail with 
tha actual iaplaaantation of tha athanol production prograa to 
ba institutad whan and if it is daaaad to ba appropriata undar tha 
fora~aantionad National Enargy Stratagy. r«
It say ba contandad at prasant that any 
substitution, or altarnativa anargy affort in tha transportation 
sector appsars to ba fruitlass with tha currant prica laval of 
oil. Nevarthalass, it oust ba rackonad that oil doas not raprasant 
a stable coaaodity at all. Tha iabalanca batwaan producing and 
consuaing regions of tha world, tha concentration of aost reserves 
in politically volatile areas, and tha poor record of rasarvas 
reaaining in tha western world, are strong reasons which contend 
against prices stabilizing around tha low levels of today. To sake 
this situation clearer, a nuabar of charts published by British 
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S.*.3.b Alcohol-<or-Fu«l Unlfintitlon Str«tMYi
Th® line of action chosen ior this siction 
is broadly based on the principles of dynaeic decision A4king. The 
accoapanying table presents, first, the various stages involved 
<100 sq.ka. land availability, 750 sq.k«. land availability, and 
the ultieate sugar cane/cassava scenario); second, the relevant 
states Nithin each stage; and third, the action options open at 
the coopletion of each state chosen. It is here where the dynaaic 
approach plays such an iaportant role, as it provides at every 
point along the way, a clear picture as to what policy options are 
available.
As was presented above, the choice of 
stages has been defined by the availabilty of land for energy 
crops. Stage 3 is confined to the current potential of the CATSA 
production facilities and dedicated lands.
t •
Stages 3 and 2 have been developed 
numerically, as these are the more easily quantifiable. Stage I 
has been left as a technically feasible future option (long tera). 
The main reason for opting out of extensive analysis at this 
stage, relates with the difficulty of assessment at this early 
point in time of the importance of land competition with food 
crcps (if it is ever decided that more than 750 sq.km, of good 
quality land are to be aa/cted to energy crops) , as well as the 
evaluation of negative energy balance conditions when using 
feedstocks other than sugar cane, etc.
I .
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5.4.3.b Alcohol-for-Fual laoUttntatiQn StrattflXL
Tht line of action chosen for this saction 
is broadly basad on tha principias of dynaaic decision making. The 
accoapanying table presents, first, the various stages involved 
<100 sq.ka. land availability, 750 sq.ka. land availability, and 
the ultiaate sugar cane/cassava scenario); second, the relevant 
states within each stage; and third, the action options open at 
the completion of each state chosen. It is here where the dynaaic 
approach plays such an important role, as it provides at every 
point along the way, a clear picture as to what policy options are 
available.
As was presented above, the choice of 
stages has been defined by the availabilty of land for energy 
crops. Stage 3 is confined to the current potential of the CATSA 




Stages 3 and 2 have been developed 
numerically, as these are the more easily quantifiable. Stage I 
has been left as a technically feasible future opticn (long tera). 
The main reason for opting out of extensive analysis at this 
stage, relates with the difficulty of assessment at this early 
point in time of the importance of land competition with food 
crops (if it is ever decided that more than /50 sq.km, of gooa 
quality land are to be as/cted to enargy crops), as well as the 
evaluation of negative energy balance conditions when using 
feedstocks other than sugar cane, etc.
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a. Forfflulation:
The purpose ai the present 
exercise is to build a basic system o-f analysis, by which the 
decision-making process may be aided, in the event of
implementation. The ultimate outputs of the process would yield 
the price level of alcohol required to provide viable options to 
given prices of the oil derivatives it is to substitute at each 
state, within each of the stages mentioned before. The influence 
of other variables, such as the cost and output potential of new 
plant and equipment, the alcohol yield per land area, etc., would 
be reflected in the prices for alcohol provided as a result of the 
calculations.
Notet The use of a spreadsheet programme (Sorcim's Supercalc) has 
enhanced the scope of this approach, as it provides the benefits 
of accuracy and quick recalculation, offering the possibility of a 
"what if?" (sensitivity analysis) approach. Keeping this in mind, 
most of the cells in the worksheet have been linked, in order to 






a. Land available: 100 kms sq. x 100 ha/km sq.= 10,000 ha.
b. Alcohol yield from sugar cane:
70 litres/ton x 50 tons/ha » 3.500 litres/ha.
t '
y
i L C 0 H o L P ^ O D t i C r i Q J L 205
c. Tot»I pottntial oí alcohol production:
3,500 litras/ha x 10,000 ha « 35.000.000 litras/vr.
d. Convart to US gallons:
35,000.000 litras/3.785 litres/gal « 9.247.028 oal.
a. Convart to barrals:
9,247,028/42 US gal/bb » 220.167.3 bb/vr.
2. Oil Consuaption:
»
Oil iaports paaked in 1978 Mhan tha leval 
raachad 6,927,000 barrals/yr (J2). Navarthalass, this figura 
droppad to “̂5,500,000 bb/yr by 1980 ilO/, and has raaainad around 
that valua avar sinca (according to currant astiaatas irotn Racopa 
(33;. Theraiora for tha purposes oi this study, tha basa iigura oi
5,500,000 bb/yr Mill be used.
a. Total consuaption: 5.500.000 bb oil/vr.
b. Consusption in transport sector: 66X (10) or
5,500,000 bb oil x .66 » 3.630.000— l̂tj/yr.,.
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Description: Substitute 20% of petrol by adding anhydrous 
ethanol (C2-H5 S 99.8%) to gasoline, i.e., to gasoline; gasohol on 
a 80% Petrol, 20% Alcohol aix.
a. Capital investaent required: Sealing of distribution tanks 
to avoid Mater leaking into the reservoirs, ahich could cause 
phase separation betMeen the tao constituents.
b. Alcohol required: Due to better overall aileage because of 
the better anti-knock properties of ethanol over petrol, presented 
earlier in this chapter, an efficiency gain of ^8% is feasible 
over LDC petrol.
Hence:
1.089.000 bb gas/yr - (0.08 x 1,089,000) or
1.089.000 -87,120 » 1.001.880 bb oasohol 
Mould be needed, yielding savings of 87.120 oil/vr.
Of these:
20% Mould be alcohol or: 200.376 bb/vear.
(‘̂10% less than available), 




c. Reduction in imports:
1,089,000 bb - (87,120 ♦ 200,376) bb * 801.504 bb/vr. 
Present Imports - (eff.gain+ alcohol) * Future iaports
a reduction of 26.4%, of which 3% would not be consumed at all, 
y i e l d i n g  tharefore a positive energy balance (along with 
quantifiable savings).
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Btlow th« cottpltt* for«ul4tion, using 
Suptrcalc, is prasantid. Also an anargy structura tabla, including 
Hast distributions and alcohol production schadulas is providad.
a. Sansitivity analysis for tha oil prica rangat UStl4.00/bb| 
and US$ 22.00/ bb to US436.00, at two dollar intarvals. 
Notat In all of tha abova, both ovarall balanca valuas and balanca 
of payaants figuras ara givan.
b. Tha corrasponding Enargy Balanca situation, rasulting froa 
tha iaplaaantation of Stata 3.1. Kara tha raspactiva valuas for 
each fuel used are presented in bb/yr and 2. Also, the anargy 
ratio betwaan iaplaaanting stata 3.1 and continuing with tha 
present iaport policy is givan. Finally, tha astiaata of land use 
requireaants to carry out tha policy and tha corrasponding 
plant-days needed to produce tha necessary alcohol voluae is put 
forward.
Note: This saae order is followed for all tha successive states, 
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Dynamic Decision Making: Stage 3: 
State 3,1 indifference Policy
( .
Dynamic Decision Making: Stage 3: 







TABLE S .S T 3 -1 .« : OynMic D K iiio n  Rakinq: Stag« 3: S ta ti  3 ,1  
For t h i  la p liiin ta tio n  of a P itr o l  
S ub stitutio n  Proqraa in Costa Rica
210
S m s. Analysis S m s. Analysis S m s . Analysis 
U SIU /b b  crudi USI20/bb crudi USI22/bb crudi
Cost oi Policy I ,1 .*
Cost USI/bb of O i l : 14.00 20.00 22.00
Consuiption bb: 1089000.00 1089000.00 1089000.00
1. P ris m t— > 1 15246000.00 21780000.00 23958000.00
2. Profiosid— > 1 
Sasohol Savings: bb 87120.00 87120.00 87120.00
Sasobol Consuaption: bb 1001880.00 1001880.00 1001880.00
Ethanol Coiponm t: bb 200376.00 200376.00 200376.00
Patrol Coiponm t: bb 801504.00 801504.00 801504.00
a. Fo re ig n  Currm cy: 1 11221056.00 16030080.00 17633088.00
b. Local Currm cy: t  iq u iv . 2805264.00 4007520.00 4408272.00
3. N it Proposid — > 1 14026320.00 20037600.00 22041360.00
4. Balancis:
a. OVERALL —  t 1219680.00 1742400.00 1916640.00
B. Balance o f Payunts — > 1 4024944.00 5749920.00 6324912.00
In d iffir m c i P o lic y:
Cost/bb of ETHANOL S 20.09 23.70 3 1.5 7
Cost/US gal ETHANOL $ .48 .68 .7 5
C o s t/ litri ETHANOL - >  1 .13 .18 .20
f .
. * ' '1
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S! Sens. A n tlys is  Sens. Analysis Sens. Analysis Sens. Analysis Sens. Analysis 





lo: i. .* .•
11! 24.00 26.00 28.00 30.00 32.00 i  .
12! 1089000.00 1089000.00 1089000.00 1089000.00 1089000.00 a.
13! r  '
i * **14! 26136000.00 28314000.00 30492000.00 32670000.00 34848000.00
IS! j •
16! !■
17! 87120.00 87120.00 87120.00 87120.00 87120.00 ■ é
18! 1001880.00 1001880.00 1001680.00 1001880.00 1001880.00  ̂•
19!
20! 200376.00 200376.00 200376.00 200376.00 200376.00
21! 801S04.00 801S04.00 801504.00 801504.00 801504.00 ■ »
22! •.1 •*
23! 19236096.00 20839104.00 22442112.00 24045120.00 25648128.00 f*'
24! 4809024.00 5209776.00 5610528.00 6011230.00 6412032.00 i
25!






2090880.00 2265120.00 2439360.00 2613600.00 2787840.00
% .
1
7*9 « • 6999904.00 7474896.00 8049888.00 8624880.00 9199872.00




35! J .  ■'
36!
37!
¥  ' .38! 34.43 37.30 4 0 .17 43.04 45.91
39! .82 .89 .96 1.02 1.09
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8t«tf 3.2
Diffcriptions Introduction of ilcohol, rtoulting froo 100 
kfl.sq. of land dtdicattd to tho production of lugar cano (aa an 
antrgy crop)• at a subatituto of patrol. -I*
a. Total Alcohol Production* froa Stag# 3* 220,167 bb/yr.
b. Approxiaata flaat affactadi baaad on tha aatiaataa 
praaantad in Calia, 1980, thara ara currantly 140,000 vahiclaa in 
oparation in Coata Rica. Conaidaring that tha total conauaption in 
tha tranaport tactor it of approxiaataly 3,630,000 barrala/yr 
(again froa Staga 3) aa hava that tha avaraga conauaption par 
vahicla it:
3,630,000 bb/yr / 140,000 vahiclaa « 25.93 bb/yr. 
Taking into account that athanol on ita own it a lata afficiant 
fuel than LDC patrol (dua to loaar apacific haat valuaa , at Mas 
explainad bafora), tha baat yiald that could ba axpactad froa this 
fuel, Mhan converted to patrol oil equivalent, Mould ba around 
90%. This means that:
220.167 bb ethanol mould correspond to*
220.167 bb X .9 * 198,150.3 bb oil aquiv. (patrol) 
Transforaing this figure into tha number of vehicles affected me 
get that:
198,150.3 bb oil eq./yr / 25.93 bb/veh/yr * 7,642 
veh/yr mould run on alcohol, mhan substituting patrol units.
c. Conversion Cost: if present patrol vehicles mare to ba
•I *
I .
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convtrttd to tlcohol onis, (initoid of • phtii-in of purpoit built 
alcohol units), a convtrsion cost would htvt to bo accountod for, 
in tho soloction of this policy option. According to Sltssor (Í6) 
and Colis (10) i tho por unit invostoont roquirod would bo around 
$500 r^£400). Basod on tho floot ostioato this would constituto an 
addod cost ofi
7642 vohiclos x $500 > $3,821,000.
It oust bo notod though, that such a cost could bo avoidod by 
iaplooonting floot targotting (taxi floot, polico cars, otc.) to 
provido tho initial usor baso of purposo built alcohol units. In 
tho calculations providod bolow, both options aro oxaoinod. First, 
valuos for an indifforonco policy, aro givon boforo tho inclusion 
of convorsion costs. Subsoquontly, this paraootor is providod 
aftor this invostoont has boon accountod for, basod on a 10 yoar 
vohiclo sorvico lifo.
d. Moving on to tho socond tablo, wo oust noto tho following. 
Due to tho roducod officioncy of othanol (whon cooparod with 
petrol) used as an indopondont fuel, an energy ratio of loss than 
unity would result. This ooans that ooro barrels of fuel would bo 
needed overall, whon cooparod to the current potrol/diosol policy.
Tho reflection of this condition on tho indifforonco policy 
calculation would bo that tho cost per barrel of alcohol oust be 
lower than that of petrol. Also, this would yield a negative 
overall balance, whon assuoing equal costs of production, as is 
presented in the first sot of tables. For more detailed analysis, 
the full nuoerical devolopoent of State 3.2 has been included 
below; please note that the sequence of tables follows tho saoo
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ordtr as dascribtd for Stats 3.1:
' i
Dynamic Decision MaKing: Stage 3: 





Dynuic O K itio n  Nakinf: S ta fi 3: S t ^ f .3 .2  
Oiract Substitution of Hydratid AlcoKbr
Vohiclis fo r P itro l Qnts
Sans. A n a lys is .S a o f. Analysis.Sans. A n a lys is , 
as lU / b b  cruOaUS 120/bb crudaUS l22/bb cruda
COST OF POLICY:
Cost USS/bb of O i l : 14.00 20.00 22.00
Ccnsuaption bb: 1089000.OC 1089000.00 1089000.00
i .  Prasant — ) t 15246000.00 21780000.00 23958000.00
2. Proposad:
Avallabia Land: hactaras 10000.00 10000.00 10000.00
Alcohol V ia ld : 1/hactara 3500.00 3500.00 3500.00
Hydratad Alcohol: bb 220167.33 220167.33 220167.33
Ethanol Conponant: bb 198150.59 198150.59 198150.59
Patrol Coaponant: bb 890849.41 890849.41 890849.41
a. Foraign Currancy: 1 12471891.68 17816988.11 19598686.92
b. Local Currancy: t 3082342.58 4403346.54 4843681.20
3. hat Propasad — > t 15554234.26 24442368.12
sA.AHCES:
a. OVEWLL — ;  t -308234.26 -440334.65 -484368.12
b. BAl&hCE CF PAYKEKTS 1 277A1C3.32 3963011.69 4359313.08
IhDIFFEREHCE POLICY:
C:*t.'bb of Ethanol — » s 12.60 18.00 19.80
Cost/L3 qal Ethanol **■ S .30 .43 .4 7
C o st/litra  Ethanol —> 1 .08 .1 1 .12
INCLUDING CONVEPSlOh COST:
Conversion Cast: l/vehicl# 500.00 50C.00 500.00
Total Con-'j«ctian: bb o il eq. 3630000.00 3630000.00 3630000.00
Total No. of Vehicles: 140000.00 140000.00 140000.00
Av. Consuaption: bb/veh/yr 25.93 25.93 25.93
Affected F le e t; Vehicles 7642 7642 7642
Total Conv. Costs: f 3821000.00 3821000.00 3821000.00
C. Total Cost — > 1 19375234.26 26041334.65 *4»
10 yr Straight Line Oep.:
Cost/bb Ethanol — > I 10.86 16.26 18.06
Cost/US gal Ethanol — > 1 .26 .39 .43







¿¡Sens, n n a ly s is je n s . A n a ly s is je n s . A n e ly s is je n s . Analysis.Sens. An*lysis_ 











24.00 26.00 28.00 30.00 32.00
¡089000.00 1039000.00 1089000.00 1089000.00 1089000.00
6136000.00 28314000.00 30492000.00 32670000.00 34846000.00
10000.00 10000.00 1 oooo.oo 10000.00 10000.00
3500.00 3500.00 3500.00 3500.00 3500.00
220167.33 220167.33 220167.33 220167.33 220167.33
198150.59 198150.59 198150.59 198150.59 198150.59
890849.41 890849.41 890849.41 890849.41 890849.41
:i380385.73 231620S4.54 24943783.36 26725482.17 28507180.98
52S4:‘ 5 .S ! 5724350.51 6164685.16 6605019.32 7045354.4?
¡¿6644V1.59 28886435.v! 31106468.52 33330501.98 35552535.45
-»*340» 50 -572435.05 * w 4 64 -66>501.93 -'M 5 3 5 .4 5
*• • • .*0 • •• • i  i ::5 I*1 5 .4 6 5548216.64 -:=:4517.33 6340819.::
•»I Lf t• • W V ; : .4 o 4b W ■ *  V r . o o 28.80
<4• W • .56 .60 .64 .69
.14 i t. • « «« .  16 .1 7 .18
500.00 500.00 500.0C 500.00 500.00
3630000.00 3630000.00 3630000.00 3630000.00 3630000.00
140000.00 140000.00 140000.00 140000.00 140000.00
25.93 25.93 25.93 25.93 25.93
7642 7642 7642 7642 7642
 ̂  ̂ / *1 .0 . »V-.*'. . 3S2l(;Of'.'oO 3821000.00 3821000.CO 3321000.00
33^j'4 3 5 .05 3472946S.52 :*;5 1 5 0 I.9 6 39373535,45
19.86 21.66 23.46 25.26 27.06
.4 7 .52 .56 .60 .64
n.
.14 .15 .16 .17
Page 221
6 :S tn s . A n i l y s is .S c n s .  A n a l y s is .  
7 : US 134/bb crudtUS 136/bb crude
8! —  
9!
* ' ‘ 1
10!
ii: ’ ■ . ]
12! 34.00 36.00
1?» iV t 1089000.00 1089000. CC %
14!
• r 1
• at 37026000.00 39204000.00 « t
16! •I*«
17! ' •1





23! 890849.41 890849.41 •,
*.4.
25! 30288879.79 32070578.60 •1 I
26! 7 4 8 5 6 8 '.;: 7026023.76 t’’
27; 1-.!, • •
28! r r 4 5 6 B .9 1 39996602.3S «
29
; ‘
Tl • V 4 •
% . .
• -748568.91 -792602.38 «
«av • •
34! 5 '3 7 !2 0 .2 I 7133421.40
35! 1 .




40! TO. 60 32.40 f





46! 500.00 500.00 • *
47! 3630000.CO 3630000.00
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ENERGY STRUCTURE STAGE 3: STATE 3,2 
INTRODUCTION OF AlCOHCL-ONLY VEHICLES
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State 3.3i
Otfcriptiont Subetitution of diesel vehicles by alcohol 
powered units, using the potential provided by 100 sq.ka. planted 
with sugar cane.
a. Total Alcohol Production:
froB Stage 3: 220,167 bb/yr.
b. Approxieate fleet affected: Siailar to the situation 
discussed in State 3.2, alcohol is a less efficient fuel than 
diesel. Unfortunately, because of differences in engine design 
(higher coepression ratios, up to 20:1 in the case fo diesel power 
plants vs. ^11:1 for alcohol t and reduced rpa ranges: ‘̂lOOOrpo 
idle to *^2,600 rpe at full power; diesel yields sieilar econoey 
figures for city and highway driving vs. “̂500 - 6000 rpa for
alcohol), the disparity in this instance is even greater than 
before. The best relation possible, according to various sources 
quoted before in this chapter, would be: .8 bb diesel * I bb 
alcohol. Pros this it follows that only
.80 X 220,167 bb/alcohol « 176,133.9 bb/oil
equivalent (diesel)
would be available for this substitution option. Translating this 
potential oil equivalent production to the nuaber of vehicles that 
would be affected, we get:
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(aviragt contuaption/yr « 25.93 bb/yr/vth)
c. Convarsion Coitti Choosing this policy option nould antâil 
iaportant convortion costs, nhich Mould involvi tho ixchangt of 
diastl anginas, substituting thaa uith alcohol onas. Tha cost of 
such an action has baan astiaatad at around $3,000/unit by Calis 
<i0). Again, this capital cost could ba avoidad by a phasa-in 
prograa, as axplainad in Stata 3.2. Siailar to tha approach chosan 
bafora, rasults for an indiffaranca policy hava baan calculatad 
Mith and uithout accounting for this invastaant.
^ . .
d. Enargy: Concantrating on tha sacond sat of tablas for this 
Stata, Ma nota that as in tha pravious casa (3.2), an anargy ratio 
of lass than ona has rasultad. Navarthalass, bacausa of tha 
graatar saparation in taras of afficiancy batuaan alcohol and 
diosai, than batuaan alcohol and patrol, tha ratio in this casa is 
loMar (than in Stata 3,2). In fual taras (barrala) such a policy 
Hould consuaa avan aora barrala ovarall than Stata 3,2 to covar 
thè presant oil aquivalant daaand. In aonay taras, again, 
iapleaenting Stata 3,3 uould raquira tha prica of alcohol (par 
barrai) to ba loNar than that of diasal, in ordar not to yiald a 
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(aviragt coniuaption/yr « 25.93 bb/yr/v«h)
c. Convarsion Coatsi Choosing this policy option would tntail 
iaportant conversion costs, which would involve the exchange of 
diesel engines, substituting thee with alcohol ones. The cost of 
such an action has been estiaated at around $3,000/unit by Celis 
(iO), Again, this capital cost could be avoided by a phase-in 
progran, as explained in State 3.2. Siailar to the approach chosen 
before, results for an indifference policy have been calculated 
with and without accounting for this investeent.
d. Energyi Concentrating on the second set of tables for this 
Stats, we note that as in the previous case (3.2), an energy ratio 
of less than one has resulted. Nevertheless, because of the 
greater separation in teres of efficiency between alcohol and 
diesel, than between alcohol and petrol, the ratio in this case is 
lower (than in State 3,2). In fuel teres (barrels) such a policy 
would consuee even wore barrels overall than State 3,2 to cover 
the present oil equivalent deaand. In eonsy teres, again, 
iepleeenting State 3,3 would require the price of alcohol (per 
barrel) to be lower than that of diesel, in order not to yield a 
negative overall balance. The coeplete nuesrical analysis of this 
State follows:
é -
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Dynamic Decision Making: Stage 3: 
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Dynamic Decision Making: Stage 3: 
State 3^ Reet Compoeition
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DynMic Dk ì s ì m  Hiking: S t ig t  3 S t i t i  3 ,3  
Convcrfioti of O i f f i l  V th ic lt«  To Usi 
H yd ritfd  Eth in ol is  Full lEth in o l F i n t i
Sins. A n ily s is .S n s . A n ily s is .S in s . A n ily s is ,
US tl4/bb crudiUS t?C/bb crudiUS 122/bb crudi
:0ST OF p o l i c y :
Cost USt/bb 0« O i l : 14.00 20.00 22.00
Ccr.suiption bb: 2541000.00 2541000.00 2541000.00
1. Prisint — > 1 35574000.00 50820000.00 55902000.00
2. Prcposid:
A v i il i b li  Lind: h ic t ir is 10000.00 10000.00 10000.00
Alcobol Y i i l d : 1 / h K t i r i 3500.00 3500.00 3500.00
Hydritid Alcohol: bb 220167.33 220167.33 220167.33
Ethinol Coiponint: bb 176133.86 176133.86 176133.86
O iis il Cooponmt: bb 2364866.14 2364866.14 2364866.14
1. Foritgn Currincy: I 33108125.94 47297322.77 52027055.04
b. Locil Currincy: S iq u tv . 3082342.58 4403346.54 4843661.20
Z. N it Propsiia — > 1 3o190468.52 51700669.31 56870736.24
BALmNCES:
a. OUSPAa — ) f -016468.5: -S30669.31 -P68736.24
b. BALANCE OF PAVHENTS - )  1 2465874.06 3522677.23 3874944.96
INDIFFERENCE POLICY:
Cost/bb of Ethinci 1 11.20 16.00 17.60
Ccst/'JS g il Etftm ol — » .38 .42
- o s t / I it r i  Ethinoi —> 1 .0 7 .10 .1 1
INCLU0IN8 CCNVERSI3N COST:
Convirsioa Cast: I/,•€*>.;: l i 3000.00 3000.00 3000.00
Totil Consuaption: bb o il iq . 3630000.00 3630000.00 jòvOOOO» 00
-a til No. of V ih ic lis : 140000.00 140000.00 140000.00
Av. Ccnsuoption: bb/vih/yr 25.93 25.93 25.93
AHicted F l i i t :  Vihicles 6793 6793 6793
Totil Canw. Costs: f 20379000.00 20379000.00 20379000.00
5. Total Cost 1 !i569468.52 "20'?669.31 7T249736.24
10 vr Straight L in i  C ip .:
Cost/bb Ethanol — > 1 1.94 6 .74 6.34
Cost/liS gal Ethanol — > 1 .05 .16 .20





6!Sea5. Analysisjens. Analy5 is_S«as. Analysisjeas. Analys:s_Sins. Analysis,





I*?'4*4 24.00 26.00 28.00 30.00 32.00
13! 2541000.00 2541000.00 2541000.00 2541000.00 2541000.00
14!
• Cl4̂4 60994000.00 36066000.00 71148000.00 76230000.00 81312000.00
16!
17!
IS! 10000.00 lOOOO.OC 10000.00 10000.00 10000.00
19! 3500.00 3500.00 3500.00 35CO.OO 3500.00
20! 220167.33 220167.33 220167.33 220167.33 220167.33
4il
*>ni441 176133.86 176133.86 176133.86 176133.86 176133.86
n?l4̂4 2364866.14 2364866.14 2364866.14 2364866.14 2364866.14
111 4* 1
nc»4̂4 56756787.32 61486519.59 66216251.37 70945984.15 75675716.42
26! 5284015.85 5724350.51 6164685.16 6605019.82 7045354.47
*7 • 




** »4̂ I -1056803.17 -1144870.10 at* * v*7 t  * -132!003.96 -1409070.89
33!






40! •Q1 7 • 20.80 22.40 24.00 25.60
41! .4c .50 .53 e** • w/ .61
^4*
♦ ^ 




46! 3000.00 3000.00 3000.OO 3000.00 3000.00
47! 3630000.00 3630C70.00 3630000.00 3630000..0 3630000.00
46! 140000.00 140000.00 140000.00 140000.00 I400CO.OO
49! 25.93 25.93 25.93 25.93 25.93
50!
51: 675! : 7 9 T 6793 67»3 5793
w* ■ 
C? I03750vC*.OO 2v37*-)0-;.O*. : ) : ? « o o o . o o • V . V .• V • .'V 20379000.00
54:
CC 1 




59! 9.94 11.54 13.14 14.74 16.34
60! .24 .27 .31 .35 .39







6;Str.s. A n a ly fis .S in s . A n a lys is . 
7:iiS 134/bb crudfUS 136/bb crude
H i - -
T .
10!
I I ! .
♦ •5'« A» 34.00 36.00 ••
13! 2541000.00 2541000.00
14! *
•C 1««i • 86394000.00 91476000.00 i
16!
17! ■ •a'





n? • 2364966.14 2364866.14 •
24! ,  • ^
25! 80405448.70 95135180.98 t
26! 7435689.12 7926023.78 •
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40! 27.20 28.80 ■f( .
4 i: .65 .69




46! 3000.00 rfVOO* 00 ■ •
47! 3630O0C.00 3630000.00
48! 140000.00 140000.00
49! 25.93 25.93 . .  •
50! .  a  ‘









60! .43 .4 7 i t
61! .1 1 .1 2
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ENCMV ITRUCTURE STAIE 3t STATE 3,3 
INTRODUCTION OF ALCOHOL-ONLY VEHICLES 
«Instead o< Distal Ones)
231
ENERSV STRUCTURE .ACTUAL btoX FLEET vaht YIELD bb X
PETROL 1089000 29.64 42000 30 1089000 30
ALCOHOL 2201A7 5.993 6793 4.8S2 176134 4.852
6AS0H0L
DIESEL 2 • »4.37 91207 6S 2364866. 65.IS





land use '.lisctarat 000
100
Productisn Davi Noair.at Cao.:
P'’C3uct;on Days Achisvad Cae. : 39.T4:;q
^ ^ Q 9 9 C T I 0 It ^aft 2J2
Staga 3i Suaaary
Having raviawtd tha thraa option« availabla at thi« 
point, it i« claar that Stata 3,1 i« tha ao«t favourabla 
altarnativa. This Mould ba tha caaa not only bacauia of a nat 
anargy ratio of aora than ona (uhich Mould aaan diract saving« a« 
a rasult), but bacausa no convarsion cost« Mould ba involvad.
On top of this, tha distribution of tha naa fual Mould raquira 
no naa installations, sinca a tao fual systaa (gasohol and diasal) 
instaad of tha currant (patrol and diasal) sat*up Mould ba 
naintainad. In tha casa of tha othar tao statas, aost probably naa 
invastaant in distribution aquipaant is callad for, sinca a thraa 
fual systaa (alcohol, patrol, diasal) Mould rasult.
Nota: Plaasa obsarva that tha choica of Stata 3,1 Mould not 
constrain the dacision aaking procass at Staga 2, sinca all Stage 
2 statas can ba raachad froa any Staga 3 stata. It Mould dapand on 
Mhat the ultiaata goal of tha policy aaking procass is to ba, to 
deteraina Mhat staga 3 stata is chosan. For Exaapla, if tha aia is 
to reduca the diasal problaa (Stata 3,3) axplainad bafora, tha 
easiest path would ba to targat prasant flaat usars (and tharafora 
de able to count this base for further substitution), even though 
the inicial results are not to be as encouraging as state 3,1.
•I '
Stage 2i
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The ttcond itig», it has ba«n axplaintd btfort, it 
detsraintd by tht liait of 7S0 iq.ka. (650 sq.ka. and tha CATSA 
100 tq.ka.) of agricultural land in Cotta Rica (SEPSA) for onorgy 
crop cultivation.
Thrti ttattt can bt idintifiid htris thi
subttitution of tht prtttnt patrol float (Stata 2,1), tha 
balancing of tha national daaand for vahicla fualt to aqual tha 
typical yiald of tha cruda rafinad locally (uting alcohol at tha 
fual to achiava thit parity), (Stata 2,2), and finally, tha 
partial tubatitution of dittai by alcohol (Stata 2,3).
Tha potantial production of alcohol availabla for
thit ttaga it:
75,000 ha x 3,500 litrat/ha « 1,651,255 bb alcohol/yr.
Whan trantlatad to oil aquivalant thit figura Mould bacoaa: 
1,651,255 X .9 * ‘̂1,486,129.5 bb patrol aqiuvalant 
or: 1,651,255 x .8 « 1.321,004 bb dittai aquivalant.
Tha naxt pagat art davotad to tha davalopaant of all thraa optiont 
in datali.
Stata 2,li
Description: Diract substitution of hydratad athanol vahiclas for 
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Two altarnativi« havo bttn «tudiad hart. Tha first 
Mould ba rastrictad to tha total substitution of tha prasant float 
by alcohol vahiclas. Tha sacond would antail tha total usa of tha 
availabla alcohol, to carry tha prograa furthar by substituting 
soaa of tha diasal float (which could gradually ba changad to 
patrol bafora tha Staga 2 tioa coaas). '» ■ •
Apart froa this diffaranca, tha ganaral approach 
followad whan dascribing Staga 3, is obsarvad. Nonathalass, tha 
cosputation axarcisa is aora axtansiva, sinca capital costs for 
new distilling capacity would hava to ba takan into account. Kara 
a aarkad diffaranca batwaan tha two options dascribad abova 
exists, for as whan tho substitution is hold to tha prasant patrol 
fleet, approxiaataly two distillarias lass would ba nacassary, 
reducing tha overall cost by sons 428,000,000, according to 
Slesser (i6),
Dua to tha abova condition, option 2 appears to ba 
the better altarnativa for State 2,1, as can ba seen froa tha 
indifference policy values quoted at the and of the first set of 
tables. To provide a aora detailed analysis, tha coaplata sat of 




TABLE 5. S T2 -I.A Oynaaic Dtcifion Itaking: Stagt 2t S U t t  2.1 
DIRECT SUiSTITUTIQN OF HYDRATED ETHANOL 
VEHICLES FOR PETROL ONES P l«e 237
Cost 0̂  Policy
Zzn USl/t)b o4 O i l :  
Consuaption: bb
Prestnt — > Y
2. Proposed:
Available Land:
Alcohol Y ie ld : l/hectare 
Alcohol: bb
Sasohol Savings: bb 
Sasohol Consuiption: bb
Ethanol Coeponent: bb O ile q . 
Petrol Coeponent: bb
OPTION No. 1:
!using ail available landl 
ttbar.ol Coaponen:: C L e g .
Diesel Coaponent: bb
a. Foreign Currency: S
b. Local Currency; t eguiv.
Net Proposed - » D  — > f
OPTION No. 2:
Up to Present Petrol Use)
Land Usage: hectares 
Alcohol Y ie ld : 1 /hectare 
Alcohol: bb
Ethanol Coaponent: bb OlLeg 
Diesel Coaponent: Pb
a. Foreign Currency: I
b. Local Currency: I  equiv.
Net Proposed f
_Sens. Analy$is_.Sens. Analysis_ .Stns. A n a lys is . 



























































OPTION No. 1 : 
OPTION No. 2:
* ss sx * * x x x s s x » * s s s s rs x » * * s x x * x * * x s * * * s s a * * s x * x * s
-23 U 75 A .9 4 -3302509.91 -3432760.90
-1694000.00 -2420000.00 -26620C0.0O**xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
b. BALANCE OF PAYHENTS: 
OPTION No. 1: — > I
» X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X B * S X X X X X X X X X X X X « X X X X X X
20805812.42 29722589.17 32694848.08
OPTIM «0 . 2: — > « 
4. INDIFFERENCE POLICY: 
i .  Option No. 1:
1S24&000.00 21710000.00 2SOSMOO.OO
« s s s s s s s s s s s u s s M B s s s a a u n s n s s n »
Cost-:a oi  Ethanol — > t 12.60 18.00 19.80
Cost/US gal of Ethanol —* )  t .30 .43 .4 7
C o s t'litr e  Ethanol —  ̂ S .06 .1 1 .1 2
i. Option No. 2:
Cost/bb of Ethanol — > 1 12.60 18.00 19.80
Cost/US gal of Ethanol — > I .30 .43 .4 7
C o st/litre  Ethanol — > 1 .08 .1 1 .1 2
238
4
5. CAPITAL COSTS: 
a. VEHICLE CONVERSION:
Conversion Cost: l/ve h icle 500.00 500.00 500.00
Total Consueption: bb QILeq 3630000.00 3630000.00 3630000.00
Total No. of Vehicles: 140000.00 140000.00 140000.00
Av. Cc-'.suiption: bb/ven QILeo 25.93 25.93 25.93
Affected 'ie e t : .ehicles
1̂̂ 4 i A« 4 tsap#iaw** 'Nv* a* j •* a 9 • V N* 57316.00 57316.00
Option No. 2: 42000.00 420CC.0C 42000.00
Subtotal VeMcle Conve^sior.: 
Option No. 1 : S 286580CC.00 23653000.00 28658000.00
Option No. 2: S 21000000.00 2IOCOOOO.OO 21COOOOO.OO
b. PLANT AND EOUIPNENT:
C o st/D istille ry (Slesser) f  
Nc. :̂ eM D is tille r ie s : nca cap
14620000.00 14620000.00 14620000.00
Option No. 1: {ap p ro ...• 6.00 6.00 1 AA0 • vv
Option No. 2: (approx.) 4.00 4.00 4.00
Subtotal Plant and Eouipeent: 
Option Ns. ! :  t 87720000.00 87720000.OC 87720000.00
Coticn No. 2: t 5848000C.OO 58480000.00 584800C0.0C
CTAL CAPITAL COSTS;
CPTION No. I ;  t 11 6o 78000 • 0(/ 116378000.00 116378000.00
o p t io n  No. 2: 1 79480000.00 79480000.00 79480000.00
. •rcccrf«• ww* • Cw k H I
a. 10 yr S tra ig rt Line Dep.:
IV e h iclis: Oeo/yr)
OPTION No. I :  $ 286S800.00 28&SBOO.OO 28&S800.00
OPTION No. 2: t  2100000.00 2100000.00 2100000.00
15 yr Straight Line Dcp.:
(Plant and E q u ip .: Oop/yr)
o p t io n  No. 1 : I  5848000.00 5848000.00 5848000.00
■OPTION No. 2: f  5898646.67 38V8666.67 3878486.47
•( '
••u.
TOTAL O t p r K ii t io n / y r .:  
OPTION No. I :  I  








7. T C T A i. C O S T :
OPTION No. 1 : I  
OPTION No. 2: t
8. NEN BALANCES:
i .  OVERALL:
OPTION No. 1 : S 
OPTION No. 2: I
3 :s :s : :s z s s :s :s :x s :x s :x s s s s s s s s s z s s s c 3 s s s s s s s s s m
6184SSS6.94 84616309.91 92206560.90
58512666.67 81018666.67 88520666.67






a. BALANCE OF PAyNENTS:
OPTION No. 1 : I  




9. NE« INDIFFERENCE POLICY:
i.  OPTION No. 1:
3cst/bb ol Ethanol — ; f  
Co5t/LS 9« !  oi Ethanol — > t  




b. OPTION No. 2:
Cost/bb o4 Ethanol —  f  
Cost/US qal o4 Ethanol — > I  
Cost <■ I l ir e  Ethanol — > f





TOTAL D i p r K i it i a n / y r .:  
OPTION No. 1 : I 








7. T C T A i. C O S T
OPTION No. 1 : f  
OPTION No. 2: I
: :3 s s :s : ::s s :s s s z s :s s s z s s 3 s s x s 3 s s s s s s x s s s m s s s s s s
61845556.94 84616309.91 92206560.90
58512666.67 81018666.67 88520666.67:s*ss:ssx x x x sx sx x x ssssx x x sx sx x x x x sx x sx x x x x x x x x x x
8. MEN BALANCES:
a. OVERALL:
OPTION No. 1 : I 
OPTION No. 2: I
X S X X X X X X X X X X X B X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X S U X X
-11025556.94 -12016309.91 -12346560.90
-7692666.67 -8418666.67 -8660666.67xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxsxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxsxxxxxxxx
9. BALANCE OF PAVKENTS:
OPTION No. 1 : I 
OPTION NO. 2: I
X X X X X X S X X X X X X X X X X X X X B X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X S X X X X X X X X X
14957812.42 23874589.17 26646848.08
11347333.33 17881333.33 20059333.33xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxsxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
?. NEii i n d i f f e r e n c e  POLICY:
GrTIDN No. 1 :
Ccst/bb ol Ethanol — ; I  
Cc>t/uS gal of Ethanol —  




9. OPTION No. 2:
Cost/Db of Ethanol —  f  
Cost/US gal of Ethanol — > I 
Co5t<’ h t r e  Ethanol — > *
.33 1 4 .’ 8 .6.58
• 44 .35 .39
.06 .09 .10
1»
Colt 0  ̂ trolley
.Sons, •̂ nal yf t s_^Stnt. Anilyiis..Stns. Anolysis 
US t24/bn crudo US «26/bb crudo US f28/bb crudo'








1. f^rosont-- t 87120000.Oü 94380000.00 101640000.00
2. Proposod:
Aval labio Lands 











Basonol Savinqst bb 
Sasohol wonsuaptiont bb
Ethanol Cooponontt bb Oilog. 
Potrol Canpononti bb
OPTION No. 1:
'Usinp all avái.ablo land) 








a. rcrai^n Currsney: 1







Not Prooosod -tl)— / $ â • a a 0̂ 98673262.38 106263513.37
OPTION Nc. 2t
(Up tc ^rtson' Potrol Uso) ‘;s'’'‘Ov.oo 1089000.00 1089000.00
Land Usaqoi noctaros 











Ethanol Cooponont: bb 'OILoq 
Siosol loopononti bb






a. Porat;;in Cur'oncvs f











option No . t! --- I -:<»e:0ll.8? 





9 9 9 9 9 X 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 X 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
b. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS!
OPTION No. l! — *> « 3S6&71O7.00 7863936S.92 416I1A24.83 
OPTION No. 2: —  ̂ 1 26136000.00 28314000.00 30492000.00
Iv
< *
1. Option No. It 
Coot/bb o f Etbonol -- > f 21.40 23.40
Î Ê g Ê  2 « 1
25.20
Cost/US 9âl of Ethanol —  5 « .SI .34 .40
Cost/Iitrp Ethanol -- > t .14 .15 .14
. Option No. Z:
Cost/bb at Ethanol — s A É. 1. av 23.40 * 9 • * V
Cost US gal of Ethanol —  f C f • 56 • 60
Cast iitra Ethanol -- t . 1-S 1 « • It
s .  C A f l T A L  C O S T S :
«. vehicle CONVERSION:
.1 •
Ccnvirfisn Cost: l.'vchiclt 
TotsI Consuaption: t>b OILsç 
Tatsl No. o4 Vthicltt:
■iv. Cor;u«oticn: 96/vtr. OILts
A^ftctto ristt: vthicltt 
Option No. 1:
Option Nc. 2:
SabtctSi .'•hide Convtrsion: 
Cotter. \ s .  1: t 











40000.Ov 140000. :) •i**
• w « 25. *3
i •
573 le.00 57310.:o 1 *





3. -V.4N* ANC £3UIP«E.NT:
Cast Ciitiilery ’Slasstr) f 
No. Net» 2. i 1 *r ; es: roe :ac 
jatt:.' No. 1: aporax.'







*. - oiuooo. :: 
Ô. (' c
Subtetéi *lar.t ana Egutaaent: 
jct:cp No. f 





3 7 7 2 0 V . : : 
5848000. . ' ;•
TCTAc capital COSTS:
OPTION No. 1: t 
OPTION Nc. 2: »
'. 16378')00. ‘)0 
7<J46000u.0'..





a. '.0 yr Straight Line Oep.: 
(Vehicles: Oep/vr>
OPTION No. 1: I 







b. !5 vr Straight Line Oep.: 
(Plant ane Equip.: Dep/yr) 
OPTION No. i: t 
OPTION No. 2: »







OPTION No. 1: 1 
















.3«nf. 4n«lyfis_Stns. An«ivsis__Stns. Analyti«,
US *Ct'> äo erada US i32/bo cruda JS t34/bb cruda








i . rt- (Stil i -- S i OSrvOO'70.00 1 lòlaOO'l'C'.OO . 2342v*300. 3*7
3. PrcBOitds
Ayiiiabla Land:











Siiohol S«vinqt: DO 
3««ohol Contuaption: bb
Ethanol Coaponant: bb Oilao. 
Pttrai Coaponant: bb
0P7I2:. Me. 1:
f̂ing all 4v«il«ola lana; 
£tn«nal Coaponant: bb GiLao. 
Diattl Coaponant: bb






a. Foreiqn Curranev: f
b. wcca. Curranev: < adui..




Mat -roocsfo -il)—  1 > ; r357''64..9c ;:i4440l5.S5
OP'̂ IÙN No. 2:
“Je í5 Prejtnt Patrol Usa> . c . ! j 10 3 9 7 !*.*. 0 j 1 !• S *' .
Lane Usaqa: hactarat 




1 2 • *30*30. O'.
54955.2v
u 5 *,*. y 0 
111 '."700. OC
36?5c.2‘
111 ̂ . 0»’. !






1 '.’S’ry'v'i.*. '.*0 
25*̂  1V 7'"'. OC
a. Foraiqn Currancy: 1
b. Local Currancy: 4 acuiv.
■̂ 6230000.00
36 3-3'30*)0. <30








s ¿ « « « a a 3 « s « s « s « « a s s s s s s s s r s : . s s s « r r s 8 s & : s u s s s s r s s
SP’TON Nc. l: ---. I -4y53^64.86
3P’’’0N Mo. 2 : -- I
8 8 s « « s s s a s a s £ s s s a a s a s s z s s r s s 8 8
-5284015.35 -56;4;6*.34
- 337 2000.y0 -4114000.00
6. balance OF PAVNENTSt
3PTI0N No. It ---- » 









«. Option No. It 
Cost/bh of Ctbanel — > $
Co«t/US gol of Ethonol — ' t 
Co«t/litri Cthonol —  $
2M
0. Cption No. 2:
Ccft/bb Ethonoi —  l 
Cost'US gol of Ethonoi —  l
28.80
.69 </l
Coot/litro Ethonoi -- t .17 . 18 .19
S. CAPITAL COSTS1
0. VEHICLE CONVERSION! •
Convtrtion Coot! */vthxclk 
Totol Conouaption: bb CILog 
Totol No. of Vohicltti 














Affoctod Flotti vthicltt 








Subtotol Vtniclt Convtrsicr: 
Cation No. It f 






1 V 0 .* V • 0 c
- „ A N T  AN3 £QUI®'NENT:
lott.DiftiIItrv slotftr' f 
No. NtM Oittilltriti: noo eoa 
Option No. it (opprox'.i 
Oction No. 2: ioppro^.i






i4ì200̂ :k . jc 
4. CC
Subtotol Plont ond Equipntr.t: 
Option No. : *
Cption No. 2s 4
7 '20000.00 
3Ò460000.00
tì * 0 0 i> 0 • 0
S8480000.00
G V * V V 0 V’ 6 0 V 
58^80000.00
’CTAl capital COSTS:
OPTION No. It « 





1 l6378oC'o. oc 
79430000.00
3. DEPRECIATIONS
0. 10 yr Straight Lint Dtp.: 
iVthieltti Otp/yr)
OPTION No. It *







b. i: yr Straight Ltnt Dtp.: 
iPlant and Equip.: Dtp/yr) 
OPTION No. 1: t 








CPTION No. It t 









7. T O T A L  C O S T t
OPTION No. Il $ 122SA7SA4.86 130IS781S.8S 137748044.84
OPTION No. :i t M8S28AAA.67 I26030A4A.67 133S32A44.47
8. NEM BALANCES:
1. OVERALL:
OPTION No. l: f -1 7667564.86 -;79979lS.35 -;43:6066.34
OPTION Mo. 2 : f *9628666.67 -9870666.67 ■10112666.67
b. BALANCE OF PAVNE.NTS:
OPTION No. t: * :87:53fi:.75 41708142.67 44630401.59
OPTION NO. 2: « 26771333.33 30940333.::
9. NEW INDIFFERENCE FOLIC<
à. OPTION NC. I:
Coit^bD o4 Ethcnol — ' I 
Cost/US qal o f Ethcnc! —  
Co»t-litr* Etbanol -- I
. '•5 25.26 27.06
.56 .80 .64
. 15 . 16 1 7 « « *
b. OPTION Ne.  2:
2ist-3t r> EthèncI -- • l
2oî*. Uè 31. at Etninc; —  
Cost litre E t M n o i --  l
J-
- ' ■ •••*• .■ >■ *V
Anélyii« 




















Saaohol Savinqs: 3b 
Sasohol 2cnsuaption: bb





tUtinq All Avá.lac.t iand>
Ethancl Co^csrant: ao CiLao. 
Oiattl Coas<?n«nt: 03
1 48o 124.46 
2:433^0.54
30014:87.SS
*•*4« ' ^ • V«
4. Fortiqn wwrrtncyx 1 
D* L0C4í Lu*̂**9i*>w*»! f
771 79339.5-/ 
59443;-̂ 3.:4
Kat Prosotac - ii-- i a<̂ 0O***î 6 •w«'
;0B900i.>.0u
OPTION No. 2:




Lañe úsa^a: hactaras 













a. Foraiqn Curraney: t
b. Local Curraney: t aouiv.
91476000.0.;
43560000.0')





OPTION No. 1: —  » 
OPTION No. 2: — - 1
-5944517.83 
-4356000. o'j
b. BALANCE OF PATNENTS:
20105812.42
15246000.00
OPTION No. 1: — ; t 










i. Option No. li 
Coft/bb of Ethonol > f
Cait.'US 9«1 of EtMnol —  f 







b. Option .Vo. 2:
Ccst/bb of Ethanol —  t 
Coft.L'S 9il of Ethanol —  1 










Convirfion Coit: 4/vtntcl« 
Total Contunption: bb OlLas 
Total No. of Vthiclti:












286330;■ .■ . jO 
2:')00oo>.. OC
Suototal Vtniclc Cor.vt>'-icr.; 
Coti O' N‘c. 1: T 
Optio.n No. t
2So56v0v.
2 1 V. O'i
0. fLAvr an;- ECUIPHENT;
Ì 4e2 . ''0
4.00
4.00
Coft Cistiller/ iSltkser. i 
No. Ntta Ih $t 11 pr 1 •«: .13S oao 
Cation No. ! : ■- appro:.
Crt;-..* f.c. 2: aoprj ..
; 4t2 ;'-v0. -liO




subtotal Plant ano Equis-ntr-t :
QOt.wi- 1. W. .1 f






OPTION No. It 4 






a . ij yr 3trai9nt Lin* Otp.: 
(Vphiclta: Otp/yri 
OPTION No. 1: 4 





b. 13 tf Straight Line Cas.: 
(Plant and Equip.: Dep/yri 
option No . 1: 4 






OPTION No. 1: 4 






7. T O T A L  C O I T t
■ ■ ■ • • ■ • ■ ■ ■ • ■ • ■ ■ • • ■ ■ • « « ■ ■ I
OPTION No. It f 








OPTION No. 1: 1 




b. BALANCE OF PAVHENTSt 
OPTION No. I: t 47652660.50
11347333.33 OPTION NO. 2: t 35305333.13
9.06
9. NEM INOIFFERENCe »OLICV: .
a. option No. 1:
Cost/bb oi Ethanol — : t 6̂ • 86
.22 w06t/US 9al oT Ethanol -- t .69
.06 Cost, litre Etr.anoi —  r . 15
9.38
3. option No. C:
Cost/bb oT Etha-sol —  l 2^, *3
. 2 2 C;$t u£ 3«. :t Efiansl — • t • i “
. 1)6 Csst‘iit-e Etnansl —  T • • i

A L C O H O L _____ 0 0 0 0 0 C T ì 0 H 2 0 0
StAtt 2,2i
Tht purpoit of this ttagi Mould bo to ro-structuro 
consuoption by introducing alcohol supply to countor tho 
pravailing iabalanco botNOon tho yiold of tho crudo oil rofinod in 
Costa Rica, and tho consuoption of oil dorivativos in tho 
transport soctor.
Alcohol Mould a sorvo a catalyst rolo, Maintaining 
(as far as possiblo) an oquilibriuo stato in tho oil sector of tho 
•conooy. Rolcvant foaturos of tho stato aro prosontod boloM:
a. Alcohol availablo: t,6Sl,2S5 bb/yr.
b. Consuoption Profilot
Curront Oil Consuoption valuos (15):
Ovorall Relativo (Potrol>Diesel«100)
Equilibriuo Consuoption Z ‘s (» (.agotroco crudo yield)
Petrol 28.1 1 56. 88
Diesel 21.3 % 43. 12
Other 50.À X (Mhich M o u l d b
alcohol, either as gasohol, or as hydrated ethanol substituting 
diesel vehicles.)
1 r
à L C 9 n 9 L_____ 9 9 9 9 9 C r I 0 9 9»99 25t
Tht figures btloN provid« «n insight into tho 
benifits of adopting this coursa of action. Tht tangiblt rtsult of 
this policy is a bttttr tntrgy ratio, than tithtr of tht two othtr 
statts availablt at this stags. Tht intangiblt btntfits, 
navarthtltss, tay bt tvtn tort itportant, as tht country would bt 
ablt to purchast tht oil it will still rtquirt in a tort 
structurtd tanntr, avoiding ”incrtttntal cost of ditstl* 
situations, as dtscribtd btfort.
Tht full dtscription follows:
Dynamic Decision Making: Stage 2: 
State 2^ indifference Policy
□  Coti bb 01
B  CotlbbAleolMl + CtplW 
—^ —  Coat bb Alcohol
SeiwiMljf Anahfsls (USI)
M  g..g. /y. g t f ^ 0 9 (t C T I 0 H P»g§ 757
Dynamic Decision Making: Stage 2: 
State 2^ Energy Structure
Dynamic Decision Making: Stage 2: 
State Fieet Composition
OlMil
H 5 0 _ i Z ^n
0
u 4 0 . Z b
8
A 3 0 . L — &
N
0 2 0 _ ^ — &
s
1 0 . 1 ^ ^ ^  L u b






Tablt S. S t 2 - 2 .i Oynaaic Otcision Naking Staga 2 Stata 2 ,2  
Enargy Balanca Situatio n H ith R a ip K t To
Lagotraco Cruda Viald
_Sani. A n a ly s is ,,,Sans. A na lysis, .Sens. A n a l y ii i ,
Colt oF Policy US il4/bb cruda US S20/bb crude jS 122/bb cruda
Cost USI/bb of O i l : 14.00 20.00 22.00
Coniuaption: bb 3630000.00 3630000.00 3630000.00
1 . Prtsont — > 1 50820000.00 72600000.00 79860000.00
2. Proposid:
A v a iU b li Land: 75000.00 75000.00 75000.00
Alcohol Y i t ld : I/hoctaro 3500.00 3500.00 3500.00
Alcohol: bb 1651254.95 1651254.95 1651254.95
Saiohol Coniuaption: bb 1516886.25 1516886.2! 1516886.25
Saiohol Oilaq 1638237.15 1638237.15 1638237.15
E th iio l Coaponant: bb O ile q . 303377.25 303377.25 3033’ ‘’ .25
Patrol Coapor.ar.t: bb % 1213509.00 1213509.00 1213509.00
8asoncl Savings: bb 121350.90 121350.90 121350.90
Sasshol Savings S: : 593912.60 24270I S .00 2669719.80
Eth a 'sl Available fcr Diasei 1347877.7(1 13478'?.70 l '4 'g 7 7 .7 0
Ethanol Cwispcnent: bb OILeq. 1071920.85 1071920.35 1071920.85
Diesel Coaponant: bb 91: 342.00 919842.00 919842.00
Ethanol Not Iliac bb 6381.31 6381.31 6381.31
a. Foraign Currancy: 1 29866914.00 42667020.0c 46933722.00
b. Local Currancy: 1 23028230.97 32897472.82 36187220.10




CfTION No. 1 : — > t
t. balance of FAvììEntS: 
o p t i o n  No .  1 :  - - -  t
-2075144.97 -2964492.82 -3260942.10;s s s s s s s s s s r :s s s s s s s s s s x s s s s s s s s s s s :s s s s s s s s
20953086.00 295:;980.0C
4. INDIFFERENCE POLICY: 
4 . Option No. 1 :
Coit/bb of Ethanol — > t 12.69 18.13 19.94
Cost/US gal of Ethanol — > f .30 .43 .4 7
Cost/ lit r a  Ethanol — > 1 .08 .1 1 .13
Page 254
S. CAPITAL COSTS:
« . VEHICLE CONVERSION:
Conversion Cost: l/vchicle 
To til Consueption: bb Clusq 
Total No. oT Vehicles:
Av. Consusption: bb/vch CILeq
AHected F le e t: vehicles 
Option No. ! :
Subtotal Vehicle Conversion: 







b. PLANT AND EQUIPNENT:
C o s t/D is tille ry  (Slesser) I  14620000.00
No. New D is t ille r ie s : not cap
Option No. 1 : (approx.) 6.00
Subtotal Plant and Equiptent:




TOTAL c a p it a l  CCSTS: 
OPTION No. 1: t 108390500.00 103390500.0C 10B39050C.00
6. CEPRECIATION:
a. 10 yr Straight Line Dep.: 
(Vehicles: Oep/vi 
n o .  i :  $ :067050.00 2C67C50.0.) 2067050.00
b. 15 yr Straight Line Dep.: 
(Plant and E q u ip .: Dep/y*-! 
OPTION No. 1 : I 5848000.00 5848000.00 59430^0.00
112
to t a l  D epreciation /yr.: 
OPTION No. 1 : S 7915050.00 7915050.00 7915050.00
7 . T 0 T A L C O S T :  
uPTIQN No. 1: t
3. NEN BALANCES:
a. OVERALL:
OPTION No. 1 : I
b. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS:
6 0 810 194 .^ 3I479542.3:
ss sx ss sss sss ssx s x x s
-9990194.97
1 •





I X X S S Z S S S S X S X X X X
-11175992.10





':_Sens. A n a ly s ii._ S fn s . H n ily s is ^ .tio s . H n *ly s i5 _ _ 5 m . An*lysj5__Sens. A n a ly s ii. 





24.00 26.00 28.00 30.00 32.00
36300<K).00 3630000.00 3630000.00 3630000.00 3630000.00
87120000.00 94380000.00 101640000.00 108900000.00 116160000.00
75000.00 75000.00 75000.00 75000.00 75000.00
3500.00 3500.00 3500.00 3500.00 3500.00
1651254.95 1651254.95 ¡651254.95 1651254.95 1651254.95
1516886.25 1516886.25 1516886.25 1516886.25 1516886.25
1638237.15 1638237.15 ¡638237.15 1638237.15 1638237.15
303377.25 303377.25 303377.25 303377.25 303377.25
1213509.00 1213509.00 ¡213509.00 1213509.00 1213509.00
121350.90 121350.90 121350.90 121350.90 ¡21350.90
2912421.60 3155123.40 3397825.20 3640527.00 3883228.80
¡347877.70 . 1347877.70 ¡347877.70 1347877.70 1347877.70
1071920.85 1071920.35 1071920.85 1071920.£5 1071920.85
919842.00 919842.00 919842.00 919842.00 9:9642.00
6381.31 6381.31 6381.31 6381.31 6381.31
51200424.00 55467126.00 59733928.00 64000530.00 68267232.00
3*5476967.38 4276c*l4.66 4o05c44l.94 49346209.22 52635956.50
30677391.38 98233840.06 1057'5j : o9.?4 113346739.22 ¡20903188.50
.1-
c s : s s s s x s s « s : r s : s s s r s s s : : s s s s s s : s : : : : : s : s s s : : s s s s s s z s x s z z s c 3 » s x s x x s s s s s s s : s
-3557391.38 -3853840.66 -4150289.94 -4446739.22 -4743188.50'






38*51:374.00 41906172.00 44899470.00 47892763.CO
2 1.75 23.57 25.38 27.19 29.00
.52 .56 .60 .65 .69




7 ! ,S fn s . A n a ly s is .Je n s . Analysis, 













4125930.60 4368632.4C •»A• V  V
1347877.70 13472?7.70
1071920.85 1071920.85 -163823?.15



































:s r :s s s x s s :: :s z 3 x s rs s s s s s s s s s s s rs : :x s s :s :
136374697.79 143931137.07
« I
S S X S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S M n S S X S S S S C S S S S S X S X S S S
-12954687.79 -13251137.07
S X X X X m S B S X M S X X X X B S S S M B S S S X X B S S S X X X X X X X X X S S X B
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St«tt 2,3i
The final atatt to bi contidarod at atagt 2, Mould 
be that of utinq alcohol am a coapltoont to patrol (gasohol), and 
substituting diasal tharaaftar.
Thara Mould ba an iaaadiata banafit (as dascribad in 
state 3,1) Mith the first step. Unfortunately, this Mould not ba 
enough to offset the relative inefficiency of alcohol Mith respect 
to diesel (as presented in section 3,3).
Overall, the results here are less encouraging than 
those found in states 2,1 and 2,2. For this reason extensive 
analysis of the state, does not sees relevant. Even so, as a 
natter of illustration, the results of the stage are presented 
in the folloMing pages.
« 1
A L C O H O L f R O O U C T I O H Ra99 2i4
Dynamic Decision Making: Stage 2: 
State 2,3 Indifference Policy
!l
Dynamic Decision Making: Stage 2: 
State 2.3 Energy Structure
■i-'
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Dynamic Decision Making: Stage 2: 







L - & ....^ ....
30.
.... ............... ....L - & .....
20.
.... .............. ....t Z f e .....
10. .... .............. ....d f e ..... ....S i •
0
Alcohol
Ü T a b lt S. S t2 -3 .4
B : :  c : :  D
D yn u ic  D K if i o n  Nakinq S ta ff  2 S ta ti2 |3  
Sasohol, D i f i t l ,  and ¿Icohol S u b ititu tio n  




11 ¡Cost USI/bb of O i l :  
12!Consufption: bb
13!
1411. Prtsfn t — ' S
17!2 . Propostd:
18! Aval labia Land:
19: Alcohol Y ia ld : 1/h tc ta rt 
20! Alcohol: bb
2 1 !
22! Sasohol Consuaption: ob 
23! Satohol Oilaq
»
2S; Ethanol Cotponant: bb O ll t q . 
2o; Patrol Coaponant: bb
27:
23: Sasoho! Sawir.qs: bb 
29: Sasohol Savinqs I :
2C
31 Ethanol Available for Diesel 
32: Ethanol Csaponant: bb O I L « ; .  
33. Diesel Conponent: bb 
34! Ethanol Not liseo ab
35:
36:a. Foreigr. Carrency: f 
37:a . Local Currency: I
-O'WW •










49: OPTION No. 1 : — > t
:2 : a. BAIANCE OF ^-AvHENTS: 
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S t a g e  l i  The S co p e  Beyond
At c a n  be  g a t h e r e d  f r o e  t h e  c a l c u l a t i o n !  p r e s e n t e d  
above ,  ( b a r r i n g  t p e c i f i c  l u b e t i t u t i o n  a i a t ' ) ,  i n  g e n e r a l ,  t h e  
p r e f e r r e d  p a t h  of  i a p l e e e n t a t i o n  wou ld be  s t a t e  3 , 1  and 
s u b s e q u e n t l y  s t a t e  2 , 2 .
I f  t h i s  was  a c h i e v e d ,  ( t h r o u g h  t h e  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  
and a a n a g e r i a l  e x p e r t i s e  g a i n e d )  t h e  c o u n t r y  wou ld be i n  a 
p o s i t i o n  t o  d e v e l o p  a d d i t i o n a l  s c h e e e s  u s i n g  e t h a n o l  a s  an i n p u t .
The v a r i e t y  of  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  a t  t h a t  s t a g e  would be 
v e r y  g r e a t :  f r o a  t h e  t o t a l  s u b s t i t u t i o n  of  o i l  ( i f  i t  e v e r  b e c o a e s  
a r e a s o n a b l e  p r o p o s i t i o n ) ,  t o  t h e  e s t a b l i s a e n t  of  an e t h y l e n e  
i n d u s t r y ,  or  e v en  t h e  e s t a b l i s h a e n t  of a  c o a p l e x  p r o d u c i n g  a a a o n i a  
i U )  f o r  FERTICA's  p r o c e s s ,  a auch  d e s i r e d  s y n e r g y  s i t u a t i o n  so 
l a c k i n g  i n  t h e  p r e s e n t  d a y  o p e r a t i o n s  be tw e e n  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n ' s  
s u b s i d i a r i e s .
N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  t h e  f i r s t  s t e p p i n g  s t o n e  would  be t h a t  
of t h e  r e l a t i v e  p o s i t i o n  of  t h e  c o s t  of  p r o d u c t i o n  f o r  a l c o h o l  and 
oil d e r i v a t i v e s ,  due  t o  t h e  s i a i l a r i t y  i n  t h e  two i n d u s t r y  s  f i e l d  
of a c t i o n .  T h i s  r e s t r i c t i o n  i s  no t  l i a i t e d  t o  t h e  t r a n s p o r t  
s e c t o r ,  f o r  a s  d i s c u s s e d  b e f o r e ,  i n  t h e  c a s e  of  a a a o n i a  
p r o d u c t i o n ,  e t h y l e n e ,  e t c . ,  bo th  i n p u t  g r o u p s ,  a l c o h o l  and o i l  
d e r i v a t i v e s ,  s e r v e  a s  a l t e r n a t i v e s .
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¿ . 1  O r i g i n a l  S t r u c t u r t i  ( 1 )
As d i f c u f i e d  i n  tht I n t r o d u c t i o n ,  CODESA tut 
o r i g i n i l l y  s t t  up t o  s t r v »  a t  a  t r a n s i t o r y  i n v e s t o r  i n  e n t e r p r i s e s  
0  ̂ “n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t “ , whe r e  e i t h e r  b e c a u s e  o-f t h e  s i z e  of t h e  
o u t l a y s  r e q u i r e d ,  o r  b e c a u s e  of  t h e  i n i t i a l  r i s k s  i n v o l v e d  i n  t h e  
v e n t u r e s ,  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  was u n a b l e  or  u n w i l l i n g  t o  
p a r t i c i p a t e .  I t  was  c l e a r  f r o «  t h i s ,  t h a t  t h e  e s t a b l i s h n e n t  of a 
pe rmanent  h i e r a r c h i c a l  management  s t r u c t u r e  was  not  t o  ba a main 
co n c e r n .
COOESA i n  t h o s e  e a r l y  d a y s  c o n s i s t e d  of a Board of 
D i r e c t o r s  formed  by s e v e n  members ( f o u r  b e i n g  a p p o i n t e d  by c e n t r a l  
gove r nm en t ,  two by t h e  Chamber of I n d u s t r y ,  and one by t h e  Chamber 
of A g r i c u l t u r e ,  i . e . ,  f o u r  members f rom t h e  p u b l i c  s e c t o r  and 
t h r e e  from t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r ) ,  and a s m a l l  g roup of s p e c i a l i s t s  
( c o n s u l t a n t s  i n  e n g i n e e r i n g ,  e c o n o m i c s ,  e t c . ,  f rom v a r i o u s  
b a c k g r o u n d s :  i n d u s t r y , d e v e l o p ment i n s t i t u t i o n s )  e i t h e r  p a i d  
emp lo yee s  of t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n ,  or  a d v i s e r s  from i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  who s e r v e d  a s  s u p p o r t  s t a f f  f o r  t h e  Boa rd .
WSi
T h i s  o r g a n i z a t i o n  was t o  r e c e i v e  p r o p o s a l s  from 
central gove rn men t  and p r i v a t e  i n v e s t o r s .  After a s t u d y  p e r i o d ,  
iuring whi ch  t h e  p r o j e c t s  wer e  analyzed, often with the 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  of o u t s i d e  ( f o r e i g n )  c o n s u l t a n t s ,  a d e c i s i o n  was 
taken w h e th e r  t o  a c c e p t  or  r e j e c t  t h e  p r o p o s a l .  ( P r o p o s a l s  were  t o
W
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i n c l u d e  t e c h n i c a l ,  a s  Ma l i  a s  e c o n o e i c  f e a s i b i l i t y  s t u d i e s .  Iii 
a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  s u g g e s t e d  s o u r c e s  of  f i n a n c i n g  wer e  a l s o  r e q u i r e d ) .
I f  a c c e p t e d ,  t h e  p r o p e r  c o n t a c t s  we r e  n ade  t o  c a r r y  
t he  n e c e s s a r y  work t o  e s t a b l i s h  t h e  t i e e  f r a e e  f o r  t h e  c o e p l e t i o n  
of t h e  p r o j e c t ,  i t s  c o s t ,  and o t h e r  r e l e v a n t  i n f o r m a t i o n .  A f t e r  
a l l  t h i s  p r o c e s s  was  f i n a l i z e d ,  t h e  d o s s i e r  was r e m m i t t e d  t o  t h e  
A s a e b l e a  L e g i s l a t i v e  ( C o n g r e s s ) , f o r  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  d i s c u s s i o n  and 
a p p r o v a l .
From t h i s  p o i n t  o n w a r d s ,  t h e  c o r p o r a t i o n ' s  r o l e  
became a s u p e r v i s o r y  on e ,  o v e r l o o k i n g  t h e  p r o g r e s s  of  e a ch  
i n v e s t m e n t ,  t h e  s e l e c t i o n  of p e r s o n n e l ,  and f i n a l l y  t h e  s t a r t - u p  
of e ach  e n t e r p r i s e .  In t h e o r y  i t  was  h a r e  wher e  CODESA's 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  was t o  e nd ,  and whe r e  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  w i t h  i t s  
s upposed  " b e t t e r  e f f i c i e n c y *  r e c o r d  and s u p e r i o r  management  
knowhow was  t o  t a k e  o v e r .
A l l  i n  a l l ,  t h e  i n i t i a l  c o r p o r a t e  s t r u c t u r e  i n v o l v e d  
m a i n l y  t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  of a Deve lopmen t  Sank, which i n  soma 
i n s t a n c e s  was  t o  u n d e r t a k e  s t a r t - u p  management  s i t u a t i o n s  ( I ) ,
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k.2  Analvtii of Currtnt Btructurti 
4 , 2 , 1 .  l n t r o d u c t i o » $
I t  N«t  no t  l o n g  b t f o r t  c l i t h o «  t oo k  p l a c o  
Ni th in  COOESA't b o a r d ,  a a i n l y  b o c a u s o  of  t h o  p r t o a u r t  o x o r t o d  on 
tha  O i r i c t o r i  by a o o b a r «  of t h t  non A d a i n i a t r a t i o n ,  1974 -  1 97 8 ,  
and p a r t i c u l a r l y  by  t h o  P r o t i d o n t  o f  t ho  R o p u b l i c ,  Oan i o l  Odubor ,  
p roB o t i ng  aooo v a r y  l a r g o  i n v o i t o o n t  p r o g r a a o o s .  Tho ooo t  
c o n t r o v o r s i a l  of  t ho oo  p r o p o s a l s ,  Cooontos  d o l  P a c i f i c o ,  had 
p r o v i o u s l y  boon r o j o c t o d  by t h o  c o r p o r a t i o n  uhon i t  had boon 
p rocos sod  th r o u g h  tho  n o r o a l  c h a n n e l s ,  a s  was  o x p l a i n o d  i n  an 
o a r l i o r  s e c t i o n .
Dur ing  t h i s  p e r i o d  (Novoobor ,  1974)  now 
noobor s ,  wore  a p p o i n t e d  t o  t h a  b o a r d  r e p l a c i n g  oven t h o  f i r s t  
e x e c u t i v e  p r e s i d e n t .  Hr .  R a f a e l  A. Zun i g a  who r e s i g n e d  b e f o r e  
a c c e p t i n g  t h e  i n d i s c r i o i n a t e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  of  c e n t r a l  go v o r n o o n t  i n  
CODESA's d e c i s i o n - o a k i n g - p r o c o s s o s  ( 2 ) .  f r o m  t h i s  p o i n t  on ,  t ho  
coapany  b e c a a e  « o r e  and « o r e  a  d i r e c t  e x e c u t o r  of c e n t r a l  
g o v e r n a e n t  o r d e r s .  F i r s t ,  c l o s e  a s s o c i a t e s  o f  Hr .  Oduber we re  
a p p o i n t e d  t o  t h e  Boa rd  a s  " a d v i s e r s * ,  and f i n a l l y  on 1 s t .  Ha r ch ,  
1976,  f o u r  D i r e c t o r s :  t h e  s e c o n d  e x e c u t i v e  p r e s i d e n t ,  R o b e r to  
I ) o b I e s ,  t h e  v i c e - p r e s i d e n t ,  Hr.  J o s e  F .  A g u i l a r ,  and t h e  two 
r e p r é s e n t â t ! v e s  f r o «  t h e  Chaebe r  of  I n d u s t r y ,  Hr .  R i c h a r d  Beck and 
H r .  A l v a r o  H e r n an d ez ,  w e r e  o f f i c i a l l y  s e p a r a t e d  f r o «  t h e i r  p o s t s  
by t h e  B ov e r nn en t  C o u n c i l  ( P r e s i d e n t  Oduber and  h i s  e i n i s t e r s ) ( 4 ) .
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This  c r e a t e d  t h e  e o s t  i a p o r t a n t  e c h i e e  i n  t h e  i n i t i t u t i o n *• 
h i s t o r y .  A l l  t h e  o t h e r  a e a b e r t  of  t h e  Board r e t i g n e d ,  and s i n c e  
t h en ,  a s t r o n g  l o b b y  f r o a  t h e  Ch aa be r  of  I n d u s t r y  h a s  a t t a c k e d  t h e  
v e r y  e x i s t e n c e  of  COOESA. The c o r p o r a t i o n  t h u s  b e c a a e  a  
s t a t e ' o u n e d  h o l d i n g  c o a p a n y ,  and w i t h i n  a s h o r t  p e r i o d  of  t i a e ,  
t h r e e  of  t h e  f o u r  l a r g e s t  i n v e s t a e n t  p r o j e c t s  ( s u g a r  and a l c o h o l  
p r o d u c t i o n ,  c e a e n t  p r o d u c t i o n ,  and a l u a i n i u a  s e a i - p r o c e s s i n g )  we r e  
w e l l  unde r  way .  C o n c u r r e n t l y , s e r v i c e  o r i e n t e d  e n t e r p r i s e s  ( n o t  
d i r e c t l y  r e l a t e d  w i t h  i n d u s t r i a l  p l a n n i n g )  w e r e  c r e a t e d ,  
o v e r - e x t e n d i n g  t h e  r e a c h e s  f i r s t  e n v i s a g e d  f o r  t h e  r o l e  an 
i n d u s t r i a l  ( and  a g r o - i n d u s t r i a l )  d e v e l o p a e n t  i n s t i t u t i o n  was t o  
p l a y ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  p r e p a r i n g  t h e  g ro u nd  f o r  * t r a s h  c an  i n v e s t a e n t *  
p r a c t i c e s  ( 1 . -  R e s c u i n g  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  c o a p a n i e s  -  e i t h e r  by 
p r o v i d i n g  s o f t  l o a n s ,  p u r c h a s i n g  s u b s t a n t i a l  a a o u n t s  of  s t o c k ,  or  
e f f e c t i v e l y  n a t i o n a l i z i n g  t h e  e n t e r p r i s e s  -  of  no s i g n i f i c a n t  
n a c r o - e c o n o a i c  i a p o r t a n c e ,  whose poor  f i n a n c i a l  s i t u a t i o n  was  t h e  
r e s u l t  of  f u n d a a e n t a l  f l a w s  i n  t h e i r  s t r a t e g i c  p o s i t i o n s .
2 . -  I n v e s t i n g  i n  s u b s i d i a r i e s  w he r e  f i n a n c i a l  p e r f o r a a n c e  was  
d i f f i c u l t  t o  a s s e s s ,  w i t h o u t  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  p l a n n i n g  -  t h e s e  a r e  
e n t e r p r i s e s  c r e a t e d  t o  a t t a c k  p e r c i e v e d  p r o b l e a  a r e a s  f o r  c e n t r a l  
g o v e r n a e n t ,  f o r  e x a a p l e  a a s s  t r a n s p o r t ,  wher e  t h e  s u b s i d i a r y  i n  
q u e s t i o n  was  t o  o p e r a t e  a s  n o t h i n g  e l s e  bu t  an e x t e n s i o n  of  t h e  
M i n i s t r y  of  P u b l i c  Works and T r a n s p o r t ) .
The p u r p o s e  of  t h i s  s h o r t  r e v i e w  of e v e n t s  
i s  not  t o  s e e k  c u l p r i t s ,  bu t  i n s t e a d  t o  s t r e s s  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  
CQDESA, a s  an o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  had no t  b een  p r e p a r e d  t o  f u n c t i o n  a s  a
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Mill f t r u c t u r i d  on g o i n g  b u s i n i t t - o r i i n t i d  i n t i r p r i i i f  p r i o r  t o  
the  l o i i n t  Nhin t h i r t  ma«  no o t h t r  v i i b l i  o p t i o n  bu t  t o  t a k t  on ,  
p r i c i p i t a t i l y I  n t u  r i s p o n i i b i l i t i t t  ( i n v i i t o o n t t  a o o u n t t d  t o  
CR C l y S 1 6 . 4  a i l l i o n  o r  US $ 1 7 6 . 3  M i l l i o n  d u r i n g  197S and 1976 
a l o ne )  ( 4 ) ,
Dui t o  t h i l l  d i v i l o p i i n t s ,  g r a v i  
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  d i f i c i i n c i i i  w i n  g i n i r a t i d .  Th i  f o l l o w i n g  i i c t i o n s  
a n  d i d i c a t i d  t o  t h i i r  a n a l y s i s .
6 . 2 . 7 .  P m o M t i  S t à b i l i t Y f
n i »
As i s  c l i a r  f r o i  t h i  l a t t i r  s i c t i o n ,  j ob  
s t a b i l i t y  a t  CODESA's top  l a n a g i i i n t  p o s i t i o n  h a s  b i i n  l ow .  Thi  
t r e n d  ha s  no t  v a r i e d  such  s i n c e  t h o s e  d a y s ,  f o r  d u r i n g  t h e  
t h i r t e e n  y e a r s  ( 1 6 t h .  F e b r u a r y  1973 t o  F e b r u a r y  1986)  t h e  co a p a n y  
has  o p e r a t e d ,  e i g h t  c h a n g e s  h a ve  t a k e n  p l a c e  a t  t h e  C h i e f  
E x e c u t i v e  O f f i c e r  (CEO) l e v e l  ( c a l l e d  e x e c u t i v e  p r e s i d e n t  i n  t h e  
Cos t a  R i c a n  P u b l i c  S e c t o r ) .  The a v e r a g e  t e n u r e  t h e r e f o r e ,  h a s  been 
of j u s t  ove r  one and one h a l f  y e a r s .
I t  i s  u n r e a s o n a b l e  t o  e x p e c t  a an y  
i m p o r t a n t  a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s  i n  s uch  s h o r t  p e r i o d s .  M o r e o v e r , i t  
seeas u n l i k e l y  t h a t  CEO's a a y  have  a t t e a p t e d  t o  d e v e l o p  f a r  
r e a c h i n g ,  l o n g  t e rm  p o l i c i e s ,  knowing  t h e y  p r o b a b l y  wou ld ho ld
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t h a t  po s t  f o r  o n l y  a  f sw  a o n t h s .  L a s t l y ,  i t  i s  no t  p r o b a b l t  t h a t  
in t h e  f u t u r a ,  t h e  a o s t  s u i t a d  i n d i v i d u a l s ,  a i t h  a a n a g a a a n t  s k i l l s  
and e x p a r i a n c a ,  a s  a a l l  a s  k n o a l a d g a  of  and c o a o i t a a n t  t o  t h a  
d a v a lo p a a n t  r o l a  t h a  c o r p o r a t i o n  s h o u l d  p l a y  i n  C o s t a  R i c a n  
s o c i a t y .  M i l l  ba  a t t r a c t a d  t o  t h a  j o b .
R a p l a c a a a n t s  i n  o t h a r  k a y  p o s i t i o n s  h a va  
not baan a s  f r a q u a n t ,  b u t  on t h a  a v a r a g a ,  t h a  p o s t s  h a v a  c h a ng ad  
hands f o u r  t i a a s  i n  t h a  c o r p o r a t i o n * s  h i s t o r y ,  a  a a a n  s t a y  of  
t h r e e  and one q u a r t e r  y e a r s .  Mora i m p o r t a n t  h a r e ,  i s  t h a  f a c t  t h a t  
the  p o s t s  t h a a s a l v a s  h a v e  b a an  m o d i f i e d  r e p e a t e d l y  t h r o u g h  
numerous r a * o r g a n i z a t i o n s  of  t h a  mangamant  c h a r t ,  a s  m i l l  ba  
d i s c u s s e d  i n  t h a  f o l l o m i n g  s e c t i o n . -<ii
I t  i s  i m p o r t a n t  t o  n o t e  t h a t  no e x e c u t i v e  
p r e s i d e n t  h a s  coma f rom m i t h i n  t h a  r a n k s  of  t h a  o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  a 
situation whi ch  i s  a l s o  t r u e  f o r  o t h a r  h i g h  l a v a l  o f f i c e s .  From 
this, i t  c a n  ba  s a i d  t h a t  c a r e e r  d a v a l o p a a n t  h a s  n o t  baan  
e x e r c i s e d  t o  t h a  p r e s e n t ,  a  c o n d i t i o n  wh i ch  a p p e a r s  t o  s u g g e s t  
that young p r o f e s s i o n a l s  w i l l  b a  d i s c o u r a g e d  from j o i n i n g  t h a  
c o r p o r a t i o n ,  b e c a u s e  of  poor  a d v a n c e m e n t  p r o s p e c t s .
In summary ,  t h a  r e c o r d  d o e s  no t  show a 
.■ronising p i c t u r e  f o r  p e o p l e  a t  e i t h e r  and of  t h e  managamant  
.cale. The l a c k  of  p l a n n i n g  and o n - g o i n g  t r a i n i n g  s c h e m a s ,  
iiéveloping c a r e e r  o p t i o n s  f o r  v a l u a b l a  e m p l o y a a s  a t  a l l  l e v e l s ,  
an only l e a d  t o  s t a g n a t i o n  and b u r e a u c r a t i z a t i o n  of  t h a
¡¿If
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organization.
Tht  a t i u r i n c i  o i  j o b  « t a b i l i t y  t h r o u g h o u t  
t h t  a a n a g t o t n t  « t r u c t u r t ,  M i t h i n  g t n t r i l l y  a c c t p t t d  l i o i t i ,  i o  an 
t f s a n t i a l  t l a a o n t  i n  an y  l o u n d  b u l i n a t a  a n t a r p r i i a .  CODESA'i 
o r i a n t a t i o n  h a i  b a an  t a r i o u t l y  a f f a c t a d  by  p o l i t i c a i  i t r u g g l a .  
I n t e r v a n t i o n  by  c o n t r a i  g o v a r n a a n t  i n  t ho  a p p o i n t a a n t  of  kay  
p a r t o n n a l  a o r a  b y  a f f i n i t y  t h a n  by  a a r i t i  i i  j u i t  an a x a a p l a  of 
such i n f l u a n c a  i n  t h a  i n t a r n a l  a f f a i r i  of  t h a  c o a p a n y .  U n l a i i  
c i t a r  p r o c a d u r a t  a r a  a i t a b l i i h a d  t o  r a g u l a t a  t h i i  r a l a t i o n i h i p ,  no 




I t  i t  i a p o r t a n t  t o  n o t a  t h a t  l i a i l a r  
e n t e r p r i t a t  i n  L a t i n  A a a r i c a  h a v a  b aan  a b l a  t o  o p a r a t a  w i th
c o n s i d a r a b l a  i n d a p a n d a n c a  ( H a x i c o  and B r a z i l , f o r  a x a a p l a )  ( 5 ,  i )  
undor what  i t  known a t  t h a  " b u r a a u c r a t i c  a u t h o r i t a r i a n *  r a g i a a i  
"BA, i n  t h a  a y a t  of  i t t  a d v o c a t a t ,  o f f a r t  t h a  s h o r t a i t  
r o u t a  t o  t h a  k i n d  of  i t a b i l i t y  and t o c i a l  p r a d i c t a b i l i t y  
c o n d u c i v a  t o  t h a  a a a r g a n c a  of  a  b r o a d  b a t a d  and c o a p l a x
i n d u s t r i a l  t a c t o r .  By s a n i t i z i n g  a  c o u n t r y ' s  p o l i t i c s ,  BA 
can d a f u t a  t h a  t h r o a t  b u t i n a t t a a n  f a c a  f r o a  t udd an
c h a n g a t  i n  p o l i t i c a l  a o o d t  ( a  conaon p r o b l a a  i n  C o t t a  R i c a ) ,  
q u a i l i n g  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t y  and c o n c a n t r a t i n g  a c o n o a i c  
' " «^c i s i onaak ing  i n  t h a  h a nds  of  t a c h n o c r a t s  c o a a a n d i n g
t>' j reaucrac i  a s  w i t h  d a v a l  op ad s u r v a i  11 a n c a  and c o n t r o l
<^<ipab i l i t i a t ,  BA a x a l t t  a c o n o a i c  g o a l s  a b o v a  a l l  o t h a r s . "  ( 6 )
I ' •
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6.2.3. PoUticâl Oiftortioni on Ptrforaénctt
6 .2 .3 .1  S t Ê k § k 0U § r  A Ê t r o ê c h t
Al â  f i n i  i t t p i  I s h a l l  p r t s i n t  
a r i v i i M  o i  t h t  r i l a t i o n s h i p  b i t i t i a n  c o i p a n i a s  and t h i i r  
s t a k a h o l d i r s  ^3 ,  7 ) .
1  ̂ I '
Any f i n  h a s  i a p o r t a n t  
i n t e r a c t i v i  r i l a t i o n s  w i t h  i i i b a r s  of  i t s  i i i o d i a t i  t n v i r o n i i n t t  
c o n s u a t r s ,  b a n k o r s ,  t r a d #  u n i o n s ,  N o r k i r s ,  s u p p l i t r s ,  g o v t r n s t n t  
^ H i c i a l s ,  s a n a g i o o n t ,  s h a r i h o l d s r s ,  and t h t  c o t s u n i t y  i n  g t n a r a l .  
*ïso, e v e r y  e n t e r p r i s e  i s  i n f l u e n c e d  by t h e  s e t  of r u l e s  g o v e r n i n g  
■^e w ide r  e n v i r o n n e n t  i n  wh i ch  i t  o p e r a t e s ,  n a a e l y :  l e g i s l a t i v e  
^or p o l i t i c a l ) ,  c u l t u r a l ,  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  and e c o n o n i c  c i r c u n s t a n c e s  
or a t t i t u d e s .
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Under  i d e a l  c o n d i t l o n t ,  a  f i r e  c o e p e t e s  
Mith o t h e r  c o e p a n i e e  f o r  t h e  f a v o u r  of  t h e  " i n t e r e i t e d  g r o u p s *  
l i s t e d  a b o v e ,  u n d e r  t h e  g u i d e l i n e s  r e g u l a t i n g  t h e  e i d e r  
e n v i r o n e e n t ,  wh i ch  a f f e c t  a l l  e n t r a n t s  i n  a s p e c i f i c  i n d u s t r y  i n  
t he  s a e e  e a n n e r .
Ch an ge s  a r e  g e n e r a l l y  b r o u g h t  
about  a t  t h i s  b r o a d e r  l e v e l .  In t u r n ,  b e c a u s e  of  t h e  new s c e n a r i o ,  
p r e s s u r e s  b u i l d  up a t  t h e  s t a k e h o l d e r  l e v e l ,  wh i ch  t h e  f i r e  e u s t  
r e l i e v e  by  e f f e c t i v e  and t i a e l y  p o l i c y - e a k i n g ,  i n  o r d e r  t o  keep 
i t s  p l a c e  i n  t h e  e a r k e t .
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I t  i s  e s s e n t i a l  t h a t  any  
b u s i n e s s  l e a r n s  t o  r e c o g n i z e ,  and i s  p r e p a r e d  t o  r e a c t  t o  new 
c o n d i t i o n s  f a c i n g  i t ,  s o  a s  t o  s u r v i v e  i n  t h e  bad t i e e s ,  and a l s o  
to t a k e  a d v a n t a g e  of  h i d d e n  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  whi ch  nay  improve  
o v e r a l l  p e r f o r m a n c e .  I f  d i s t o r s i o n s  of  any  k i n d  c r e e p  i n t o  a 
company ' s  d e c i s i o n  mak ing  p r o c e s s  <DHP) i n  i t s  d e a l i n g s  w i t h  t h e  
i a c t o r s  of d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  (FDH) and h i n d e r  i t s  c a p a c i t y  t o  
i d e n t i f y  i t s  s c o p e  of  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  (SDM), i t s  c o m p e t i t i v e  
p o s i t i o n  nay  be s e r i o u s l y  i m p a i r e d .
‘ I* • A
The f o l l o w i n g  two e x a n p l e s  
r r a s e n t  t h e  ways  i n  wh i ch  f i r m s  r e a c t  t o  new c o n d i t i o n s ,  m o d i f y i n g  
i h e i r  b e h a v i o u r ,  by c a r e f u l  e x a m i n a t i o n  of t h e i r  p o s i t i o n  w i th  
f e s p e c t  t o  o t h e r  c o m p a n i e s ,  t h u s  e n a b l i n g  them t o  be c o m p e t i t i v e .
V  i<i *
s i m i r n 2Bi
E x M p l t  No. l i  C h a n g t «  In T t c h n o l o g y :
I f  «  d i r t c t  c o o p o t i t o r  s t a r t s  
o f f e r i n g  a b o t t t r  d i a l  f o r  a c e r t a i n  p r o d u c t ,  e i t h e r  by  i n p r o v i n g  
the  p r o d u c t ' s  p e r f o r n a n c e  and s e l l i n g  a t  t h e  s a n e  p r i c e  a s  b e f o r e  
(p roduc t  i n p r o v e n e n t ) , o r  s e l l i n g  t h e  s a n e  p r o d u c t  a s  b e f o r e  bu t  
a t  a l o w e r  p r i c e  ( p r o c e s s  i n p r o v e e e n t ) ,  or  b o t h ,  a  f i r e  s h o u l d  
choose be twe en  l a u n c h i n g  a s i n i l a r  e n t r y ,  t o  p r e s e r v e  c o n s u e e r  
l o y a l t y ,  o r  w i t h d r a w  f r o «  t h a t  s p e c i f i c  l i n e ,  n o v i n g  t h e  e m p h a s i s  
to o t h e r  e o r e  p r o e i s i n g  a c t i v i t i e s .  R e l u c t a n c e  t o  a d j u s t  t o  t h e  
new e n v i r o n n e n t  a l o o s t  i n v a r i a b l y  w i l l  l e a d  t o  s i g n i f i c a n t  
f i n a n c i a l  l o s s .
' • • él\
Í <1
A s h o r t  r e v i e w  of  t h e  w or l d  
v i d e o  c a s s e t t e  r e c o r d e r  (VCR) ma rk e t  na y  i l l u s t r a t e  how t h e s e  
f a c t o r s  a f f e c t  company b e h a v i o u r .  ( 8 )
P r o d u c t  i n n o v a t o r  p a r  t x c e i i e e c e  
SONY, i n t r o d u c e d  t h e  VCR ( t h e  B e t a n a x  s y s t e m )  t o  t h e  g e n e r a l  
consumer i n  t h e  mid s e v e n t i e s ,  e n j o y i n g  t h e  p r i v i l e d g e  of a lOOX 
3ha r e  of t h e  m a r k e t ,  due  t o  p a t e n t  p r o t e c t i o n .
The l a u n c h  by SONY of t h i s  
• cduc t  l i n e ,  f o r c e d  home e l e c t r o n i c s  g i a n t ,  ¡1ATSUSHITA, a 
c a c o g n i z e d  p r o c e s s  i n n o v a t o r ,  t o  embark on t h e  d e s i g n  of a b e t t e r  
and c h e a p e r  v i d e o  r e c o r d i n g  m a c h i n e .  As a  r e s u l t  of  t h i s  e f f o r t
! «. ^
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th> VHS s y t t t M f  A l o n g i r  p l A y i n g ,  ch f f ap t r  v t r t i o n  of  t h e  
B e t a ' s y s t e e  mas i n t r o d u c e d .  The s i t u A t i o n  t e n  y e e r i  A f t e r  i s  t h a t  
HATSUSHITA p r o d u c e s  ”tNO o u t  o f  t h r e e * o r  *'66Z of  a l l  VCR' s  
so l d  Mo r l d u i d e  ( u n d e r  d i f f e r e n t  b r a n d s ) .  SONY s t i l l  c a t e r s  f o r  t h e  
high end q u a l i t y  c o n s c i o u s  c o n s u e e r ,  ( B l a c k  T r i n i t r o n  T V ' s ,  
B e t a - s c a n  I I I  VC R ' s ,  e t c . ) ,  b u t  h a s  p r o g r e s s e d  on t o  t h e  
i n t r o d u c t i o n  of  a  new,  s u c c e s s f u l  p r o d u c t  l i n e  : t h e  "NAN* 
(Hatchean ,  H a l k e a n ,  O i s c e a n )  g roup  of  " p e r s o n a l  e n t e r t a i n e e n t "  
g a d g e t s .  A l s o  c o n t i n u i n g  w i t h  i t s  t r a d i t i o n ,  t h e  c o a p a n y  h a s  
deve loped  ( w i t h  NV P h i l i p s )  new l e a d i n g  ed g e  CD-ROH t e c h n o l o g y  ( 9 )  
for  f u t u r e  c o a a e r c i a l i z a t i o n .
Both c o a p a n i e s  h a ve  d e v e l o p e d  
v e r y  w e l l  d e f i n e d  s t r a t e g i e s  i n  o r d e r  t o  a d j u s t  t o  c h a n g i n g  
c o n d i t i o n s .  Each h a s  c o n c e n t r a t e d  on what  i t  c an  do b e s t ,  t h e r e b y  
c r e a t i n g  i t s  n i c h e  i n  t h e  a a r k e t p l a c e .
T e c h n o l o g y ,  bo th  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o
the p r o d u c t  and t o  t h e  p r o c e s s  i n v o l v e d  i n  a a n u f a c t u r i n g  i t ,  was
the d e t e r m i n i n g  f a c t o r  f r o a  t h e  w i d e r  e n v i r o n m e n t . The
r e l a t i o n s h i p  a o s t  a f f e c t e d  be tw een  e a c h  c o a p a n y  and i t s  FDN's was
\
t h a t  w i th  t h e  c o n s u a e r s .  On t h e  one  h a n d ,  SONY knows i t  wou ld be 
h az a rdous  t o  c o a p e t e  i n  an a l l  o u t  p r i c e  war  w i t h  HATSUSHITA, 
omething i t  would  h a ve  t o  c o n f r o n t  i f  i t  d e c i d e d  t o  p r e s e r v e  
'■•irket s h a r e .  On t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  HATSUSHITA u n d e r s t a n d s  t h a t  i t  
>^ight not  be a s  s u c c e s s f u l  a t  p r o d u c t  i n n o v a t i o n  a s  i t s  
c o m p e t i t o r ,  and i s  t h e r e f o r e  r e l u c t a n t  t o  v e n t u r e  i n t o  t h a t  f i e l d ,
O H S A n Z M T I O H A L  S T ^ T m f§t§ 29B
p ’ ’ . ' 4
8ven though i t  « a y  « « a n  l o s i n g  o u t  on p r i v i l t d g t d  i n i t i a l  h i g h  
p r o H t / u n i t  s a l t s .
Exaaplt No. 2t Changos in Logislationi
Tht  a b i l i t y  t o  a d a p t  t o  
p o l i t i c a l  ch a n g o s  i s  a n o t h o r  i a p o r t a n t  c h a r a c t o r i s t i c o f  s u c c i s s f u l  
o n t o r p r i s o s .  Tht  d o - r t g u l a t i o n  of  t h o  a i r l i n t  i n d u s t r y  i n  t h t  
Un i t td  S t a t o s  i t  an t x a a p l t  t h a t  s h o u l d  t a k o  t h t  p o i n t  
c l t a r t r . ( 1 0 )
Hhtn t h t  ntM r u l t t  c a s t  i n t o  
e f f e c t ,  o x i s t i n g  a i r  c a r r i e r s  had t o  r t - s t r u c t u r e  i n  o r d e r  t o  be 
in a p o s i t i o n  t o  c o n p e t e  w i t h  new e n t r a n t s  who d i d  n o t  h a ve  t o  
dea l  w i t h  t h e  l e g a c y  of  t h e  f o r a t r  p r o t e c t e d ,  non**oarke t  l e a d  
e n v i r o n a e n t .  E x i s t i n g  c o o p a n i t s  wh i ch  r e s i s t e d  t o  e x e r c i s e  
p o l i c i e s  t o w a r d s  t h i s  end a r e  c u r r e n t l y  e i t h e r  f i g h t i n g  f o r  t h e i r  
s u r v i v a l  ( E a s t e r n )  ( i O )  o r  h a v e  d e c l a r e d  t h e e s e l v e s  i n  b a n k r u p t c y  
( B r a n i f f  I n t e r n a t i o n a l ,  wh i ch  l a t e r  was  r e - l a u n c h e d  a s  a  s n a i l  
r e g i o n a l  o p e r a t o r  i n  s o u t h e r n  USA).
<•
T h e r e  h a v e  been  two s t a k e h o l d e r  
' ' e l a t i o n s h i p s  t h a t  h a ve  e x p e r i e n c e d  c h a n g e s !  f i r s t ,  t h e  c o n s u n e r  
becone  e o r e  c o s t  c o n s c i o u s .  S e c o n d ,  we h a v e  t h e  e e p l o y e e s .  
Since p e r s o n n e l  was  t h e  o n l y  r e a d i l y  a v a i l a b l e  c a t e g o r y  f o r  c o s t  
^ e d u c t i o n ,  ( i t  a n o u n t e d  t o  a p p r o x i n a t e l y  SOX of  t o t a l  c o s t s  p r i o r  
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cane i n t o  t ho  « a r k t t  r t d u c i n q  o v o r - a a n n i n g ,  and o f f a r i n g  l o n t r  
« a l a r i t f  a e r o s i  t h i  b o a r d .  Ai  a r i i u l t  t h i y  M i n  a b l t  t o  o f f t r  
loMir  f a r t i .
E i t a b l i i h t d  c o t p a n i t i  h a v t  l i n c t  
had t o  d t v i i t  n o t  t t p l o y o t n t  p r a c t i c a l  l u c h  a i  t h a  a n c o u r a g a a a n t  
of v o l u n t a r y  t a a p o r a r y  l a y - o f f i  and a a r l y  r a t i r a a a n t  i c h a a a i  f o r  
o l d a r  M o r k a r i ,  and t h a  r a c r u i t a a n t  of n a a  p a r i o n n a l  a t  a uch  l o a a r  
(up t o  SOX l o a a r )  l a l a r i a i  and bonus  p l a n s .  Through t h a n  t a c t i c i i  
a anpoaa r  c o s t s  h a v a  baan  r a d u c a d  a t  a  p r o p o r t i o n  of  t o t a l  c o s t s  t o  




F u r t h a r  a d j u s t a a n t  h a s  baan  
a c h i a v a d  by t h a  i n t r o d u c t i o n  of d i s c r i a i n a t i n g  ( s i a i l a r  t o  
d i s c r i a i n < t i n g  a o n o p o l i a s )  p o l i c i a s .  Naa c o a p a n i a s  h a v a  a l a o s t  
i n v a r i a b l y  c a t a r a d  f o r  t h a  c h a r t a r  and l o n - f a r a  t r a v a l l a r  i n  h i g h  
d e n s i t y  r o u t a s .  O ld a r  c o a p a n i a s  h ava  c o n c a n t r a t a d  on t a r g a t i n g  n a a  
s e r v i c e s  t o  s p e c i f i c  u s e r s  ( u s i n g  e x t e n s i v e  s a g a a n t a t i o n :  f i r s t  
class, b u s i n e s s  c l a s s ,  Y c l a s s ,  H c l a s s ,  s t a n d - b y ,  o f f - p e a k ,  and 
apex f a r e s ,  a t e . )  i n  an a t t a a p t  t o  k eep  up h i g h  l e v e l s  of  s e a t  
>^ccupancy/f 1 i g h t , j u g g l i n g  t h a  n u a b a r s  of  s e a t s  t o  b a  a a d a  
a v a i l a b l e  f o r  e a c h  c l a s s / f l i g h t  u s i n g  v a r y  s o p h i s t i c a t e d  
m o n i to r i n g  s y s t a a s  (N or th w es t  O r i e n t ,  f o r  a x a a p l a ,  i s  i n  t h a  
'-<rocess of d e v e l o p i n g  a c o a p u t a r  b a s ed  e x p e r t  s y s t e a ) .
Mhat i s  i a p o r t a n t  t o  n o t e  f r o a  
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c é»9 i n t o  t h t  « A r k t t  r t d u c l n g  o v o r - a a n n i n g , i n d  o f f t r i n g  l o M t r  
s a l a r i t t  a c r o s s  t h a  b o a r d .  As a  r a s u l t  t h a y  a a r a  a b l a  t o  o f f a r  
lowar f a r a s .
E s t a b l i s h a d  c o a p a n i a s  h a v a  s i n c a  
had t o  d a v i s a  n a a  a a p l o y a a n t  p r a c t i c a s  s u c h  a s  t h a  a n c o u r a g a a a n t  
o-f v o l u n t a r y  t a a p o r a r y  l a y - o l f s  and a a r l y  r a t i r a a a n t  s c h a a a s  f o r  
o l d a r  w o r k a r s ,  and t h a  r a c r u i t a a n t  of  naw p a r s o n n a l  a t  auch  l o u a r  
(up t o  SOX l o u a r )  s a l a r i a s  and bonus  p l a n s .  Through t h a s a  t a c t i c s ,  
■anpouar c o s t s  h a v a  b a an  r a d u c a d  a s  a  p r o p o r t i o n  of  t o t a l  c o s t s  t o  
around 33X, u h i c h  h a s  a n a b l a d  t h a n  t o  ba  c o a p a t i t i v a  a g a i n .
.-.K-
F u r t h a r  a d j u s t a a n t  h a s  b aan  
a ch i a v a d  by t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  of  d i s c r i a i n a t i n g  ( s i a i l a r  t o  
d i s c r i a i n ^ t i n g  a o n o p o l i a s )  p o l i c i e s .  Nau c o a p a n i a s  h a v a  a l a o s t  
i n v a r i a b l y  c a t e r e d  f o r  t h a  c h a r t e r  and l o u - f a r a  t r a v e l l e r  i n  h i g h  
d e n s i t y  r o u t e s .  O lda r  c o a p a n i a s  h a v a  c o n c e n t r a t e d  on t a r g e t i n g  nau  
s e r v i c e s  t o  s p e c i f i c  u s e r s  ( u s i n g  e x t e n s i v e  s a g a a n t a t i o n i  f i r s t  
c l a s s ,  b u s i n e s s  c l a s s ,  Y c l a s s ,  H c l a s s ,  s t a n d - b y ,  o f f - p e a k ,  and 
apex f a r e s ,  a t e . )  i n  an a t t e n p t  t o  keep  up h i g h  l e v e l s  of  s e a t  
o c c u p a n c y / f 1 i g h t , j u g g l i n g  t h a  n u a b a r s  o f  s e a t s  t o  ba  a a d a  
a v a i l a b l e  f o r  e a c h  c l a s s / f l i g h t  u s i n g  v a r y  s o p h i s t i c a t e d  
m o n i to r i n g  s y s t a a s  ( N o r t h e a s t  O r i e n t ,  f o r  a x a a p l a ,  i s  i n  t h a  
o r o c e s s  of d e v e l o p i n g  a c o a p u t a r  b a s e d  e x p e r t  s y s t e a ) .
What i s  i a p o r t a n t  t o  n o t e  f r o a  
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succesfful firai «utt b« in touch Mith the invironeent in Mhich 
they exist. Their behaviour oust be shaped by careful analysis of 
the threats and opportunities Mhich they face. Mhen coepanies 
loose sight of this ieportant contingency approach, they becoee 
vulnerable, reducing their potential to function as independent 
concerns. CODESA, as eany other developaent institutions elseNhere 
has groNn under very protected conditions. Moreover, in the case 
of this corporation, the addition of another eleeent, 
adeinistrative ieaaturity, has resulted in chaotic perforeance.
« '  •*
6 , 2 , 3 , b  Th9  s p e c i a i  C a s e i  CODiSA
Central governnent intervention 
in CODESA has led to ieportant distortions in FDH relationships. A 
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Dirict Influence:
- Nanagtatnt: Naeing exacutivti 
and substituting thaa at will, has in aost instances, transforaed 
their role into that of "yes-aen". Due to this, the expectations 
of people in aanageaent positions <as was discussed earlier) are 
very different froa those of their counterparts in the private 
sector.
Workers: Because of poor 
aanageaent practices, the uinning party has been able to replace 
large nuabers of eaployees after each election. (Within a two 
party deaocracy, the incuabent party has traditionally failed to 
stay in power since 1948. Only in 1974 and sore recently in 
February 1986, has this been reversed, both tiaes by the PLN). 
Contrary to central governaent eaployees, CODESA's workforce is 
not protected by any "civil service* legislation rights. 
Consequently, the process of aass substitition of eaployees has 
not encountered iaportant obstacles, even though the motives for 
substitutions have seldoa been associated with perforaance. This 
awkward practice has led to interruptions in noraal trading due to 
the training of new personnel. Another fault that has becoae 
lommon practice in recant tiaes is the transfer of eaployees, paid 
«/ the corporation or its subsidiaries, to work directly for 
central governaent dependencies. This has been brought about by 








instituitionsi on th* opining of niH civil sirvict posts,l.t.« 
C0DE5A has sirvid as a tool to git around iiployiint ligislation. 
(An ixaipli of this is TRANSHESA iiployiis at HOPT, thi Ministry 
of Public Works and Transportation).
- Banks: Cintral govirniint has 
facilitatid thi corporation's acciss to thi nationalizid banking 
systei's cridit. Also, govirniint guarantiis havi biin grantid to 
back largi invistiints ihiri foriign capital was riquirid. Thus, 
bankirs, having thi assuranci of risponsibility by thi ”6ovirniint 
of Costa Rica" (not CODESA) havi not worriid unduly about thi 
possibility of difault on loan ripayiints.
i ': ■
> Shariholdirsi CODESA's sharis 
ara hild by thi govirniint. As a risult, thi corporation's fati is 
handled by thi council of linistirs. Bicausi of legal 
restrictions, no president aay ever run for re-election, and 
therefore, long t e n  planning is discouraged, since short tin 
rasults are lore relevant. This situation clearly constitutes one 
i-f the lost iiportant difficiincies of the perfonanci of the 
corporation and its subsidiaries. Shareholders (or i o n  precisely, 
their representatives) do not have incentives to think in the long 
tprm survival of the enterprise.
Indirect Influence:
- Suppliers: Sieilar to foreign
V' r:-*
in̂
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cofiipany-tMploytff association coordination. For txaapli, two 
diffartnt tradt unions havs baan astablishad in a saaa subsidiary 
to raprasant tha workar's intarasts.
+ . •
¿•2.3.C Coaciusioasf
Having prasantad tha distortions 
brought about on CODESA's daalings with its anvironaant by tha 
InHuanca axarcisad by cantral govarnaant, it is ralavant to 
ralata this axparianca with tha axaaplas introducad in tha 
previous section (b.). Having aora indapandancai CODESA eight not 
have ventured into uncertain projects, such as ALUNASA. Having 
more Financial limitations and controls, the corporation‘s 
managaaant of infrastructural, service oriented enterprises eight 
have baan lass extensive. Having baan aora aware of tha conditions 
prevailing both in tha iaaadiata, as wall as tha wider 
environnant, at the national and international level, it is 
certain that overall parforaanca would have baan wore sound, 
erected on aora solid bases.
If
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6.2.4. Structurfi
6 .2 .4 .« Conc«ptu«l Fr««eiiorki
I •
School« of Thought
(Basod on Hintzborg (i2), Tuias and Mainshall (3), and 
Pugh, Hickion and Hinningi (i3))
OoHnitiont Foraal Structurot Oocuaantad, official rolationships





Sine« th« b«ginning of this 
century, various approach«« hav« b««n r«cord«d conesrning th« way 
a coapany is to b« structursd, so that it can conduct its businsss 
in an officiant aannar. So«« of th« «ora ralavant ara prasantad 
below.
5 Ml
- Principles of Hanagaaant 
School: This aovaaent, whose aain exponent was Henri Fayol, 
introduced tha basic notions of foraal authority, the role of 
direct supervision within tha organization. Taras developed by 
this school include:
Unity of Coaaand: the
'ule that any "subordinate" should report to only one "superior".
Scalar Chaim the
direct hierarchy of coaaand froa CEO, through superiors to
'4
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subordinâttSy to Norktrs.
Spin of Control: the
nuabtr of lubordinitt« a luptrior ii to luptrvitt.
- Standardization of Hork 
Schoolti Anothtr broad «tratoqy prttonttd by othtr authors 
concantratfd on standardization of thi tasks to bt ptrforatd. Tmo 
groups can bt idtntifitd within this frattwork:
Scitntific Hanagtttnt:
First dtvtloptd by Frtdtrick Taylor in 1903, whilt working at 
Btthlthto Stttl in Ptnnsylvania. This systtt laid down tht basis 
of tht traditional functional structura wt know nowadays. Its ait 
was to program tha contants of oparating work; davaloping saparata 
standard dapartaants to handla spacific tasks, as opposad to 
having ona tain oparating unit handling all tha work, frot 
beginning to and.
A similar lint was followad by Max Uabar 
in Gartany. Nonathalass, hart tha amphasis was on tha ragulation 
of tha activitias to ba carriad out. Fortalizad by rulas, job 
descriptions, and training, a *by tha book", tachina-lika 





- Tha loportanca of Infortal
■itructures:




In tht Btcond half of
this ctntury, «n incrtAting tophAii« has boon givtn to tht study 
of tho itportsnct of tutual adjustaont bttwttn ttabtrs of an 
organization. Thtst rtlationships tay in rtality vary 
substantially frot that stattd on organizational charts, thus tht 
ttra inforaal structurt.
An txponant of this 
approach, Hichatl Crozitr discusstd hot unofficial poMtr 
rilationships afftctod standardization and foraal systtas of 
authority in Tht Burtaucratic Phtnoatnon (1964). (i2)
Anothar iaportant Nork
by Jay 6albraith, Dtsionino Coaoltx Organizations (1973) (¿3;, 
analyztd tho rolt of autual adjustaont dtvicts such as task forcos 
and aatrix foras within widtr foraal structurts (at Booing).
•«a
- Contingoncy Thtory: A soparato 
line of thought involving tht study a fira's optrations, and tht 
effect this had on its structurt, has betn advanced by various 
 ̂esearchers.
As in all the previous 
ases, special iaportance has been given by different people to 
pecific areas of study. For exaaple, Joan Woodward (2fl2) 
•embarked on a project to identify if there was a *aost appropriate 
alternative structural fora" for a fira under a specific set of
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conditioni. Sht concludidi after itudying nueerout coepanii« in 
South Etftx (19S0*s) that a fire's structure is related to the 
technical systee of production it uses.
I  ̂0
Taking a sieilar
approach, but this tiee with size as the detereining factor, a 
series of studies Mere carried out at the University of Aston 
during the years 1963 - 1969, under the leadership of Derek Pugh 
and David Hickson. The conclusions here Mere that size is the 
variable that better explains the characteristics of the structure 
of an organization. The larger a coepany is, the sore ieportant 
standardization becoees as a neans of coordinating its 
activities.(12,13)
i * . '
More Definitions 
(Pros Hintzberg, 1979) (Í2)
a. Organizational Structure: The sue total of the Mays in Mhich an 
organization divides its labour into distinct tasks and then 
achieves coordination aeong then.
b. Coordinating Hechanisns: Means by Mhich control and 
comnunication are achieved: eutual adjusteent, direct supervision, 
"tandardization of work processes, standardization of work 
outputs, standardization of Morker skills.
I *1
A
• Mutual Adjustnent: Coordination of Mork by the sinple process
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of inforaal coaaunication, i.a., tht control of tht work rttts on 
ths hands of thosi involvad in it diractly. (thi dotrs).
d. Dirtct Suporvisiont Ono individual taking tho rosponsibility 
for tht work of othtrs, issuing instructions to that and 
■onitoring thtir actions.
 ̂ . •
t. Standardizationt Hhan coordination of parts is incorporatad 
into a structura froa tha tiaa it is astablishady raducing tha 
netd for continuing coaaunication. Coordination is tharafora 
devalopad *at tha drawing board* bafora tha work is carriad out.
al. Standardization of work procassasi Mhan tha contants of 
the work art spacifiad or prograaaad baforahand.
a2. Standardization of outputs! Nhan tha rasults of tha work 
are pre*astablishad: diaansions, parforaanca, ate.
e3. Standardization of skills! Hhan tha kind of training 
requirad to parfora tha work is spacifiad.
Staots in tha Davalopaant of • Fir» With Rftptct_lft 
tha Coaplaxitv of its ftetivitias (12)
Simple <-------------------------------------------------- Coaplex
¡iutual----- > Direct-------> Standardization--------- > Mutual
Adjustment Supervision (3 types) Adjustment
'A
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o-f in-foraal coaaunication, i.t., tht control oi tho work rtsts on 
ths handf oi thosa involvad in it diractly. (tha doars).
d. Dirict Suparviiiont On# individual taking tht rtiponsibility 
^or tha work oi othar«, iituing inatructioni to that and 
aonitoring thair actions.
a. Standardizations Mhan coordination of parts is incorporatad 
into a structura froa tha tiaa it is astablishad, reducing tha 
need for continuing coaaunication. Coordination is therefore 
developed "at tha drawing board* before tha work is carried out.
al. Standardization of work processes: Mhan tha contents of 
the work are specified or prograamad beforehand.
a2. Standardization of outputs: Mhan tha results of tha work 
are pre*astablishad: diaansions, parforaanca, etc.
e3. Standardization of skills: Mhan tha kind of training 
required to parfora tha work is specified.
Stages in tha Davelopaant of a Fire Mith Respect to 
the Coaolexitv of its Activities (12)
Simple <------------------------------------------------- - Coaplex
<1utual----- > Direct------- > Standardization--------- > Hutual
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Thm F i v  Balie Part« of tha Organization»
(Fro# Hintzbirg, 1979)
Introduction! Jiott D. 
Thoopion ftAtfd <1967) <i2) th«t unctrtàinty constitutos tho
fundaoontal probità oi cotpltx organizations. Ht propottd that 
conpaniss rtduct uncortainty by staling off thtir cort fro« tht 
outsidt Morld, so that optrating activitits can bo protaettd. Thty 
seek to doainate their environnent and with this reduce 






















This is accoaplished 
in two ways: firsti by the standardization of work processes; 
second, by anticipation (planning, stockpiling, doing preventive 
inaintenance, levelling production, conducting intelligence 
activities).






- Strattgic Apax: At this lavil, 
ptoplt art chargtd tith ovtrall raiponsibilty for tht cotpany. 
This part of tht organization is constituttd by tht Chitf 
Extcutivt Offictr, any top Itvtl officials thost conctrns art 
global, and thtir cltrical staff, assistants, ate. Also, tht 
stratagic apax is rtsponsiblt to thost paoplt who control or 
otharwisa havt powar ovar tha fira: ownars, govarnaant agancias, 




- Hiddla Linai This laval is 
constitutad by tha chain of supariors and subordinatas (in a 
succession of foraal authority) that joins the Stratagic Apax and 
the Operating coaponant of tha organization. Tha nuabar of staps 
down tha hiararchy of tha fira is datarainad by tha dasirad span 
of control. Tharafora, tha aiddla aanagar oparatas in tha flow of 
direct supervision, controlling his subordinatas, and passing on 
feedback to his supariors. Also, ha relates horizontally to fallow 
middle aanagars, and custoaars. Depending on the coapany aiddla 
Tianagers may or may not have a say in strategic aattars concerning 
their own units.
4i
- Tachnostructura: People hare
ire analysts, and clerical staff, who develop standards and 
hanges within organizations, so affecting the work of others, 
'hey are not involved in the workflow itself, but instead design 
it, plan it, change it, and train people to do it.
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The tachnostructuri is 
tht sost iaportant part in standardization prograas. Tht n o n  a 
fira riliis on standardization thi noro it raliis on its 
technostructurtf and at tha saaa tin«, through standardization, 
the need for direct supervision is reduced.
- Support Staff: These are 
specialized units which provide support to the organization as a 
whole but are reeoved froa the workflow itself; for exaaple: legal 





- Operating Core: These are the 
aeabers of the organization who carry out the the basic work 
related directly towards the output of goods or services. It is 






Note: As a general rule, the 
lower one goes in an organization, the aore standardized working 
conditions are. As a result, the decision aaking process is 
simpler at the operating level than at the strategic apex (aore 
■oncrete and proapt solutions are possible, to problems which may 
srise).
m  *’
t ■ I l i T i
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V*ri*tionf oi Qraanizationâl Structura:
(Bastd on Hintzbtrg (12), Hajaro (7), Tuiit and Uainshall (3))
Dafinitioni Variationsi Tht Maya in Nhich difftrtnt coapontntt can 
ba arrangtd to rtach an appropriato itructuro for tho activity to 
bo dtvtlopod.
- Tho Sioplo Structuro: This is 
the layout gonorally associated with snail, young firns. Tho nost 
inportant part of tho organization is tho stratogic apox, which in 
«any cases nay bo an ontropronour. Tho sain design paranotors are 
centralization and organic structure (no staff or 
technostructure). I would divide this level of organization into 
two distinct alternatives.
1 r '..
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involvBf coipanitf Mhtra thi livtl of ttchnology is not tha 
deteroining factor. Instaad ths Mhola organization aay consist of 
a nanagor-oNnor and a ftit rolativoly unskilltd (roplactablo) 
optrators. Contrary to th« structura prasantad in tha naxt 





associatad with initial innovation (what gives an enterprise tha 
opportunity to enter tha aarkatplace) launched fires whara
relatively sophisticated technical systaes eay be coeeon. Hare, 
the people in the organization oust have considerable expertise in 
ĥe subject they are involved in. As a result of this the priee 




nOHNO-STMWTUM MOtTMNimWr 1 .• •
- Tht HAChint BurtAucrAcy: In 
this fora of orgAnizAtion, coaaon in oAny lArgt institutions 
(sspaciAlly in govornaant), tha aost iaportant alaaant is tha 
stAndArdizAtion of work procassas. Tha dasign goals involvai tha 
foraalizAtion of bahaviour, job spacialization <both horizontal 
and vertical), tha grouping of activities in functional units, 
high vertical centralization, and restricted horizontal 
independence. An iaportant feature is that coordination and 
control are achieved by direct supervision, in an environment 




"ithin this form becomes tha most important part of the 
rganization, since it is there where standard procasses are 
developed. The strategic apex is involved pri*arily in fine tuning 











- Tht ProftstioDAl BurtAucrAcy: 
The unifying -factor here is the st andArdizAtion o-f skills 
(universities, hospitals for exaeple). The eost ieportant part of 
the organization beccees the operating core. The design 
characteristics involve training, horizontal job specialization, 
as Mell as vertical and horizontal decentralization, relying on 
the expertise of the personnel involved (only highly trained and 
indoctrinated specialists). Through sophisticated training 
prograes specific patterns of behaviour are developed for 
different employees (exaeple: different types of doctors). In this 
process inherent coordinating features are introduced, and hence 
the tere "bureaucracy” is used.
I ‘I
Divisionalized Fornt The 
'egulating force in this structure used extensively by 
transnational corporations is the standardization of outputs. The : IV
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«ost iaportant units ara thosa associataci aith aiddla aanagaaant. 
The aain design considerations ara thè grouping oi activities by 
•arket (by product, service, client or region), the establishaent 
0  ̂ per-fornance control systees and the liaitation of vertical 
decentralization. An iaportant aspect uhlch sets this approach 
apart froa any other is the fact that each division devotes all of 
its effort to its oan task or business.
• •
•
Hajaro has described 
various uays in which divisionalized organizations aay go about 
their business, based on the level of independence of the 
divisions (headless or thinking divisions). These are as follows:
( 7 ) «i
MDOU UNI MOfT IMPORTANT
he Macropyraaid: In this organization, all strategic level 
decisions are taken at the corporate headquarters. Also, since a 
complete "backup" structure exists at HQ, Middle and operating 
decisions are also closely eonitored froe here. The divisions are
»■ •(
J I  V
• ir
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there^ori conposBd by only four parts: oiddlo lint, staff, 
technostructura, and optrating cort.
MOOU UNI MOfT MMmTANr
Tht Uabrtllat This stt-up calls for thinking HQ's as Mtll as 
divisions, navirthtlasts, tichnostructuri and support activitits 
are reserved for the corporate unit, leaving each division eith 
three parts: strategic apex, middle line and operating core.
Ö Ä Ä
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The Conglottratt (Inttrgloatrate (7)) t Finally, a lait ftructurt 
exists where divisions operate for all practical purposes, as 
separate entitities, i.e., they preserve all five essential parts 
of an organization. HQ, only affect perforeance at the strategic 
level, leaving the rest of the activities to its subsidiary 
coepanies.
- The Adhocracy: This tere 
developed by Toffler in The Future Shock (1970) (12)^ is reserved 
for coapanies operating under rapidly changing conditions (at the 
forefront of technological developaent, for exaaple: space 
exploration, genetic engineering, etc.). Reflecting these 
characteristics, the structure itself is constantly redefined , 
jobs are transforaed, responsabilities shift, titles change, etc. 
Not surprisingly, the aeans for coordination most coaaonly used is 
mutual adjustaent.
In these firas, aatrix
organizations are the order of the day, since repetitive work is 
not coaaon. Instead,operations are conducted on a project basis 
''Specified beginning and end). The design parameters relevant here 
áre liason devices, organic structure, selective decentralization, 
horizontal job specialization, and training programs. By 
'sfinition, the firm must avoid all bureaucratic practices as this 
/*ould impede its flexibility.
Two distinct
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subdivision! art dtiintd by Mintzbtrg in his book Tht Structuring 
of Qroanizations (1979) (12)^ vuhich art:
, ’
The Optrating Adhocracy: Thtst art cotpanits that lolvt problttt 
for othtrs on rtqutst. Exatplts of such fir as "think tank* 
consulting firts, advtrtising agtneits, and tanufacturtrs of 
enginttring prototypts. As may bt inferrtd, such a firm tust rtly 
on txptrt ptrsonntl: a proftssional burtaucracy.
The Adisinistrativt Adhocracy: This typo of organization undtrtakts 
projects to serve its oen ends and not those of others. A sharp 
distinction is made betNoen its two tain coeponents: 
adeinistration and operating core. If necessary, the latter is 
isolated (operating as an independent unit) froa the aain 
structure so that the adeinistrative coaponent can be eanaged as 
an adhocracy. The goal of practice is to keep one step ahead into 
the future; coepany executives are concerned more with the 
development of future projects than with managing those already 
operating.
1 '..'fV
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6 * 2.4 ,b__Aitêlysis 9f COÜESA^s Chàrtss
Having rcviawad raltvant 
literatura on tha aubjact of organizational structurai CODESA's 
organigraat m ü I noM ba prasantad in chronological ordar. A 
standardizad analysis and classification of the charts (basad on 
the concepts set down on tha last section) mill ba carried out, in 
order to spot errors or inconsistencies in these layouts. 
FurtheraorSi Modifications Mill ba introducadi whan deeaad 
necessary, to explain alternative approaches Mhich Mould have 
enabled the company to function batter under the circumstances. An 
effort Mill be made to limit these changes to relocation of 
existing departmentSi in order to avoid the advantage of 





No less than five different 
structures have been officially recognized by the corporation 
during the period betmeen late 1977 and early 1984. These have
bean published in the annual reports of 1977, 1978, 1980, 1981,
1982 / 3 .
Chart No. 1; As at December 1977; (t5)
The first available official chart, as 











In general terns, it appears to show the 
<<orking arrangements oi a white collar machine bureaucracy, having 
financial, administrative, and development operating groups: the
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financial activity Nould bt in chargt of stcuring funds (or 
flieans), ths adsinistrative stctions Mould setk thi rtsourcss 
(huaan and oattrialt rtcruitoont of qualifitd ptrsonntl, drafting 
bid carttlSf purchasing tquipsint, itc.), and finally tht 
dsvslopsont arta Mould study proposals and txtcutt approved 
projacts.
«f . *
Taking a closor look, tMO iaportant foraal 
errors can be spotted. The first is, where the External Auditors 
are placed. At such a level, they would not even have seniority 
over the Internal Auditors. Even eore so, the Executive President 
(EP) would be left free of any control eechanises governing his 
behaviour. <1
The second is related with the
relationship between the Board of Directors and the EP. Under the 
present layout, the top executive operates both as a Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) and as a Chief Operating Officer (COO). 
Nonetheless, the authority of the Board as a whole (of which the 
EP is a voting eeeber) is euch greater than his, and should so be 
depicted in the charts. If not, collusion would be ubiquitous, 
elieinating altogether the purpose of constituting a responsible 
Board of Directors.
Another flaw relates to an inconsistency 
‘situation. The problem area is project formulation and execution. 
Project coordinators, as presented (in a staff or technostructure
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role), have no direct authority over the developaent o-f the 
projects theeselves, and therefore, it nay be inferred, no 
responsibility. On the other hand, the preparation and evaluation 
departeent, ehich does not actually execute projects, appears at 
the operating level of the organization. Matrix foreats, task 
forces, and the like nere already in connon use by 1976 (for 
exanple. Jay Galbraith in 1973 discussed the subject thoroughly in 
his book Desianino Coeolex Organizations. (13) ). Such s concept 
Mould have aided in the definition of the channels of authority 
and responsibility, in a project-based orgnization such as the one 
CODESA Mas intended to be. Other minor changes have been carried 
out to clarify the bearing of each unit on the company's 




Chart No. 2: As at 31 December 1978; (16)
Apart from the External Auditors being 
maintained on the same level as before, another formal error is 
Introduced into this second organigram. This concerns the Internal 
Auditors office. It not only has been placed in a line as opposed 
to a staff role (as its external counterparts ), but also the 
department's hierarchy has been reduced to that of middle 
management. At this level, it is not reasonable to expect much 











Auditors *re suppostd to obssrv# that 
‘the accepted accounting practices“ are •folloMed by all «eubers 
the enterprise! but most oi alii by those involved in line 
activities. For this reason, they should appear on a support role 
■outside the nor.ua! workHow) and above middle management.
■4
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Finally, thi technostructurc coApontnts 
have been elieinatcd, and project coordination has been dropped to 
the operating core beloM the developeent director's supervision.
Chart No. 3; As at 30 Seoteaber 198Q{ <17) « •
This nay Mell represent the corporation's 
flost un-fortunate atteapt to present an organizational chart. In it 
nuaerous ■foreal, as Nell as inconsistency conflicts are present.
Apart froA soee already aentioned above, 
other foraal errors appear in the definition of hierarchical 
levels;
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Secrete* ProsraR Lesal IlnternaJ Public











Chart No. 3; 1980
conpany peveiopMn^ Financial














First, the general ««nager s <COO) office 
IS introduced, but its authority is restricted to the developeent 
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span of control both the adMinistrativ» and financial functional 
Mhich ar« sssential operating groups, Mithin the layout presented.
Second, the coeputer services departeent 
is placed at the operating core but eith no superiors other than 
the EP.
Third, Mithin the adeinistrative and 
development offices, different hierarchical levels are presented 
Mithout the appropriate definition of superior-subordinate 
relationships:
- the juep of scalar authority, 
similar to the computer case above Mith respect to the library, 
broker and investment promotion offices
- the division of departments 
into single subordinate dependencies: Technical Administration — > 
Registrar's Office and Seneral Services — > Seneral Supplies 
Office.
Furthermore, , inconsistency situations 
are also visible. A nem change has been exercised Mith respect to 
program management: program assessment is introduced at the
3chnostructure level, ard the project coordination unit has been 
iised in seniority to the middle line. I
i' V.
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Ch«rt No. 4i Ai it StDt«»b»r IŸ8I1 (13) ■ I #
Moving on to tht next orgAnigrAo, Mt ttt 
that fona of thn flans found on that of tha pravious yaar, hava 
bean eliainated. Naverthalass, sona aajor problaa areas persist. t «
The aore iaportant fornal aspect is that 
of the scalar juap concerning the General Services and Personnel 
Departnents. In the present plan, clear definition has been given 
to the offices of the EP (as a CEO) and the General Manager (as a 
COO), a nelcoine iaprovetnent fron the pravious year. Even so, ne 
find that because of the dual role the GM is to play, as COO and 
as Adainistrative Director, serious levels of authority 
misunderstandings aay easily crop up. This problem Mould arise 
either by the subordinates in the adainistrative area behaving as 
directors, or the Financial and Development Directors considering 
the SM as an equal (as nothing aore than the Administrative 
Director).
In relation to inconsistency situations, 
we encounter that the project activity has been juggled about the 
organization once more: the Coordination Director has disappeared, 
and in its place a company and project supervision unit is now 
presented at the operating core. Also, the analysis function has 
been divided into two: the Special Programs Assessment department 
at the technostructure level and the Project Analysis and 
Evaluation office operating under the Development Director.
• 4*
. Vi-'-;
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It is spparsnt that this shifting policy 
Mith rtsptct to projict aanagosont provts that ths corporation had 
a poor concfpt of hoN to doal with tht aost important activity it 
was craatsd to ptrfora.
Chart No, 5; Sines July 1982 (Annual Report 1983) _ q 9)
This brings us to study tha final 
availablf chart. In general terns it shows a clearer set up. No 
great fornai variations are pertinent (no nodified structure 
applies). In contrast, fundanental philosophical questions are 
raised.
It can be argued that this layout 
reflects a «ore rigid structure than ever before. Such an approach 
fuakes project coordination a difficult proposition. A new 
ìlierarchical level has been implicitly created by introducing two 
inanagers. In essence, the EP has once more becone CEO and COO, 
since he would have to coordinate (hopefully only through 
S'Ception management) between the two defined broad areas of 
activity: Administrative and Financial, and Development.
i . *
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Uhat  t h i s  s u g g e s t s  i s  t h a t  CODESA o p e r a t e s
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»ore likt a ainistry than a projtct oriented Institution, thereby 
losing its raiîon d'etre, i.e., the machine bureaucracy has been 
decidedly adopted as the organizational structure aost appropriate 
to guide the corporation's behaviour.
E x c e s s i v e  h i e r a r c h i c a l  l e v e l s  l e a d  t o  poor  
c o o r d i n a t i o n ,  u n l e s s  t h e  t a s k s  u n d e r t a k e n  a r e  s t a n d a r d i z e d  r o u t i n e  
f u n c t i o n s .  Such  a  p r a c t i c e  l e a d s  t o  o v e r m a nn in g  ( 1 4 6  " p r o f e s s i o n a l  
emp loyee s"  i n  1980 ,  177 i n  198 1 ,  a t  HQ, t a k i n g  i n t o  a c c o u n t  t h a t  
each s u b s i d i a r y  h a s  i t s  own c o m p l e t e  o r g a n i z a t i o n ) ,  a s  w e l l  a s  t o  
l o s s  of d i r e c t i o n ,  a s  t h e  p r o j e c t  c o n c e p t  ( s t a r t  and end 
p r o c e s s e s )  i s  s u p e r s e d e d .
I t  i s  p r o b a b l e  t h a t  t h e  above  p r o b l e m s  
have  a r i s e n  a s  a  r e s u l t  of  two main f a c t o r s !  t h e  f i r s t  b e i n g  t h e  
m i n i s t r y - l i k e  a p p r o a c h ,  and t h e  s e c o n d  t h e  g e n e r a l  l e v e l  of 
management e x p e r t i s e  and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  of t h e  p e o p l e  i n v o l v e d  
( i m m a t u r i t y  of  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  s t r u c t u r e )  wh i ch  l e a v e s  much to  
be d e s i r e d .
A new o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  c h a r t  f o r  t h e  f u t u r e  
a c t i v i t i e s  o f  CODESA w i l l  be  s u g g e s t e d  i n  a l a t e r  s e c t i o n .  In i t  
an e f f o r t  w i l l  be made t o  l i n k  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  of  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n  t o  
the r o l e  i t  i s  t o  p l a y  i n  t h e  C o s t a  R ; c a n  economy,  as an i n t e g r a ,  
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It is noM time to prisent a
proposal ior the corporation's future structure.
The -first eleeent that aust be 
considered is independence. This tera must be understood here as 
the restriction of entrance of shifting party politics into 
CODESA, as well as, an aim towards financial self-reliance (as 
has been possible in other Latin American countries: Mexico and 
Brazil in particular). This would provide the company the 
opportunity of serving as a long term industrial developaent wool. 
Unless this independence is achieved, the introduction of other 
iaproveaents would be a futile exercise.
1
In order to accomplish this end, 
the original "national concensus" principle (similar to the French 
case of indicative planning) must be re-instated. Multi-sector 
representation on CODESA's board, including permanent bipartisan 
presence, is indispensible. A five member board is suggested as 
follows: one member from the government, who would preside, one 
.member from the opposition party, one member from the party in 
power, one member from the Chamber of Industry, and one member 
from the Chamber of Agriculture. Mote that with such a working 
arrangement it is feasible that on critical issues the governing 
•'arty could face a two to three losing margin. Such a condition 
'̂ ould encourage long term planning over a present day political 
tactics approach. To ensure further commitment to development 
oriented activities, it could be that the use of strategic
4
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AAnagaaenty as dtfinsd by Sluack and Jauch (20)  ̂ should bt 
institutad on a paraanant basis.
•I *
Tha rasulting unit, coabining 
the abova alaaants, a) indapandanca, b) bipartisan raprasantation, 
c) explicit coaaitaant to devalopaent activities (long tara), 
would constituta tha stratagic apax oi tha naw organization.
.1
This brings us down to tha 
structuring o-f tha corporata unit (or headquarters). Three 
activities are daaaad to be iaportant haras banking, project 
foraulation, and parforaance aonitoring, all being handled on a 
separata basis. (A similar approach has been adopted in Sweden 
(21)  where tha Ststsforetig is in charge of running enterprises, 
where as tha Labour Market Board handles planning ~ project 
devalopaant and approval - as wall as a credit •function, to give 
•financial support to successful proposals).
a. Tha Banking functions
Working with
approximately tan people (in liaison with tha SBN), this would 
constitute tha corporation's link to the banks (national and 
foreign capital raising activities). Further fund» would be 
secured through tha already existing channels: -foreign exchange 
transactions contribution, financial services - intermediary role 
between international financial agencies (mainly US AID) and
• *1
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privata banks, and niM policies such as subsidiary contributions 
(proportion o^ profits after adequate working capital reserves 
have been appropriated) and independent bond (debenture) issues, 
for exaeple.
The idea
behind a centralized funding activity is to provide incentives and 
restrictions for subsidiary coapanies to coapete for the available 
capital, hence stiaulating efficiency and sound proposal 
■anageaent (for extensions, plant renewal,etc.), to develop 
technical capability as defined by Oahlaan, et al. (This policy is 
used by soae large transnational corporations such as flatsushita).
b. Project Foraulationt
U i t h
approximately fifty people, this unit would work along the lines 
of an operating adhocracy, using five distinct subunits within a 
professional bureaucracy (engineering, management science, 
economics, marketing - including international marketing, and 
industrial worldwide intelligence such as links to Datastar and 
other tehcnical and business information databases - as its 
supporting structure. Extensive utilization of mutual adjustment 
r.ractic9 5 , i.a., matrix organigrams, task forces, etc., could be 
envisaged here. Potential projects would be analyzed, subjected to 
Board approval, and if the implementation phase is reached, 
'venture management' (on the lines of the Du Pont definition,
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Twiss p. 196), Mould take ov«r. Th» primt goal o-f folloMing such 
an approach is to incrtase as such as possibla, the technical 
proficiency of the «embers of the adhocracy, by providing concrete 
incentives. After the venture eanageeent stage, Mhen operations 
call for a standardized approach, the child company Mould be 
"spun-off", i.e., sold to private investors (totally or partially) 




performance monitoring unit. Mould consist of a small team of 
specialists supervising company performance. From this department, 
the operating structure could folloM on a hierarchical 
arrangement, similar to a conglomerate divisionalized form. Linder 
such set up, for all practical purposes (except for funding) as 
independent enterprises, Mith HQ intervention at the strategic 
level only, and emphasizing the principle of exception management.
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Btntrtl Findinof
Thtri ar« a nuabtr of facta Nhich can bi drann froa tha 
analysis of tha corporation's prasant situation.
Tha lost iaportant is tha lack of a univarsal 
approach which would solva all of tha corporation's (subsidiarias 
and corporata unit) problaas.
1 •
Privatization as such (which has baan ragardad by 
many in Costa Rica as a panacaa), aay in soaa casas próvida an 
appropriata altarnativa to the prasant status quo. This say well 
be advisable for ALUNASA, since its activity constitutes an 
interaediate staga in a businass where vertical integration is 
particularly iaportant. Supply and aarket links would appear to be 
necessary to ensure a ¡»ore stable position for the current plant s 
future.
* *■.
Nevertheless, in the case of the other subsidiaries 
studied, (especially in tha case of CEMVA and FERTICA, which coae 
froa tha private sector), tha expectations of prosperity due to a 
transfer of ownership is unrealistic. These enterprises are more 
directly affected by strategic factors prevalent at the present 
-iRie. In the first sector (ceaent), the excess supply of the 
product in the national aarket, and the poor coaparative position 
with respect to other producers in the bulk export arena, offers
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analysis of tht corporation*s prasant situation.
Tha aost iaportant it the lack of a universal 
approach which would solve all of tha corporation's (subsidiaries 
and corporate unit) probleet.
Privatization as such (which hat been regarded by 
many in Costa Rica as a panacea), «ay in so«e cases provide an 
appropriate alternative to the present status quo. This aay well 
be advisable for ALUNASA, since its activity constitutes an 
interaediate stage in a business where vertical integration is 
particularly iaportant. Supply and aarket links would appear to be 
necessary to ensure a aore stable position for the current plant s 
future.
Nevertheless, in the case of the other subsidiaries 
studied, (especially in the case of CEMVA and FERTICA, which coae 
f r o «  the private sector), the expectations of prosperity due to a 
transfer of ownership is unrealistic. These enterprises are «ore 
directly affected by strategic factors prevalent at the present 
time. In the first sector (ceaent), the excess supply of the 
product in the national aarket, and the poor comparative position 
with respect to other producers in the bulk export arena, offers
• I
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little scope for action, other than to increase aggregate internal 
demand, or to develop package deals or "specialist" capability.
In the case of FERTICA, the Central Aeerican ear, 
the obsolescence of soee of the processes used, and the strategic 
role it plays as a support activity to the ehole of the 
agriculture sector of the country. Mould again leave little scope 
for action other than the optimization (tactical) of the present 
operation, leaving oore substantial strategic decisions for the 
future.
Finally, in the case of CATSA, it is unclear Nhat 
its contribution to the economy is to be. If viewed as a source of 
energy substitution, its links with the rest of the energy sector 
(publicly owned) should remain strong so that global sectorial 
planning and implementation is possible (synergy considerations). If  on the other hand its macroeconomic impact is to be limited to 
the production of additional goods for local consumption (sugar), 
or for potential export (alcohol), privatization could one day be 
considered if prevailing conditions changed for the better 
provididng an environment of financial self~sufficiency for the 
enterprise.
• *1
On the whole, it may well be the case that a balance 
ostween the management of the current industrial base and the 
planning activity at CODESA must be found, as suggested in the 
previous chapters. This, in order to establish clearer goals; to
4
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identify target anas where investeent aay be of significant 
nacroeconoeic inportance (seeking synergy between investeents, for 
exaeple)} be able to select appropriate technological processes 
suited to the local environaent (as well as the conditions under 
which the transfer of technology involved is to occur); and 
finally iepleeent policy/incentive scheaes (as are required in 
nixed econoaies) to promote the succesful contribution of the 
selected projects to the national economy (i.e., avoiding 
confrontation with the private sector, and instead persuading it 
to participate).
It is important to recognize the 
society in which COOESA is to operate: the flaws of the political 
system of which the corporation is part of, the relatively 
unsophisticated economic environment (with respect to developed 
countries) it has to operate in, etc. Only acknowledging these 
initial shortcomings (and problem areas), will it be possible to 
conduct strategic management activities, the main aim of a 
development institution. Development planning is a long tern task, 
for which stability in the OMP is a vital part.
The next section investigates important 
aspects of the acquisition of technology and the consequent import 
new business practices into LDC's so that the contex«. of 
CjDESA's -uture role is better understood.
C O U C L f l S l O I I U 7
Hmu Tachnoloqicil and Ad«ini«tr«tivt Practicii in LDC'i
Industrial dtvalopatnt in Lass Davalopad Countrias 
(LOG'S) d apands usually on tha introduction of naa tachnological 
knoMhow, as aall as naa businass practicas into tha pictura. 
This is due to tha fact that a country aould probably ba aabarking 
cn a nea industry altogathar.
Taking into account that in tha best of cases there 
already exists a ”aanagaaant gap'H^ (currant state of aanagaaant 
in developing countrias vs. aanageaent in industrializad 
countrias: nuabar, education, practical axparianca and coopatanca 
of aanagars, tha techniques and systeas used and the perforaance 
and effactivaness achieved), tha task of being conpetitive is not 
an easy one by any standard.
Adding to tha above, the paraaount undertaking of 
becoaing proficient in tha technology eaplayed to the point of 
mastering it to adapt the processes to local needs, or to changing 
circumstances in order to achieve the best possible return on the 
investaent aada, it is clear that vary eel 1 oriented efforts both 
rroe govarnaant and tha private sector are required to attain 
success.
To stress the importance of this aspect, an analysis 
of what is understood by technology follows.
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Derinition: T e c h n o l o g y M e t h o d  o i  t r e n s f o r a t i n g  i n p u t s  i n t o
o u t p u t s .  T he r e  a r e  t h r e e  l e v e l s :
1 .  Means o i  t r a n s f o r e a t i o n  ( s )
2 .  I n f o r a a t i o n  a b o u t  t h e  ne thod  ( * )
3 .  U n d e r s t a n d i n g  o^ hoM and Nhy t h e  a e t h o d
works.
I .|i
When a  t u r n k e y  p l a n t  i s  c o n s t r u c t e d  i n  a LOC ( s uch  
a s  ALUNASA, CATSA, and CEMPASA, i n  t h e  C o s t a  R i c a n  c o n t e x t ) ,  t h e  
i i r s t  and t o  s o a e  e x t e n t ,  t h e  s e cond  l e v e l  ( * )  p r e s e n t e d  above  a r e  
p r o v i d e d .  N o n e t h e l e s s ,  i t  i s  t h e  t h i r d  s t e p  wh i ch  i s  r e a l l y  
i m p o r t a n t ,  a s  i t  p r o v i d e s  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of s o r e  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  
i n d e p e n d e n c e .  U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  b l a c k  b o x e s  a r e  common, and t h e  newer  
t he  t e c h n o l o g y  u s e d ,  t h e  more d i f f i c u l t  i t  w i l l  be  t o  u n r a v e l  t h e  
m y s t e r i e s  h i d d e n  i n s i d e  them.
As p r e s e n t e d  by Oahloan e t  a l .  <2)^  b e c a u s e  of t h i s  
i t  IS no t  a l w a y s  w i s e  f o r  an LDC to  go f o r  t h e  most  ad van ced  
t e c h n o l o g i e s  a v a i l a b l e .  I n s t e a d ,  i t  s h o u l d  s e a r c h  f o r  t h o s e  where  
i t  i s  l i k e l y  t o  a c q u i r e  t h e  most k now l ed ge  f rom.  (Was t h i s  t h e  
c a s e  a t  ALUNASA? The p r o c e s s  i s  h i g h l y  a u t o m a t i z e d ,  t h e  c a p a c i t y  
of t h e  p l a n t  i s  r e l a t i v e l y  l a r g e ;  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  t o  d a t e ,  an 
i n s t a l l e d  m o u l d in g  l i n e  t h a t  p r o d u c e s  u t e n s i l s  s u ch  a s  s p o o n s ,  
‘ o r k s ,  k n i v e s ,  e t c . ,  h a s  not  y e t  been u s e d ) .  Such an a pp r oa ch  
' o u l d  e n a b l e  t e c h n i c a l  p e r s o n n e l  t o  manage more e f f i c i e n t l y ,  and 
in t h e  p r o c e s s  d e v e l o p  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  c a p a b i l i t y .
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As dttcribsd in tht ssnt work (2), ttchnologicsl 
capability usually progressss in a raverst fashion in LOC's than 
that in industrializtd econosits, i.e.t
Pros Production to Investeent to Innovation (in LDC's)
vs.
Pros Innovation to Investment to Production (in Dev. Countries)
This is clear from the fact that LDC's start out 
with iaported technological processes. Further along in tiae, 
expertise is required in choosing technology (expansions of 
existing facilities, for example). Finally, through experience and 
concerted efforts to get better performance from the equipment, 
process innovations may follow (minor innovations). The added 
impact of various minor innovations may lead to dramatic increases 
in performance as was the case at Usiminas in Brazil: a steel 
producer which through adaptation of existing Japanese supplied 
machinery, to the Brazilian conditions, as ws.l as the 
introduction of new minor innovations, was able to double output 
(nominal) with little new investment. It is important to note that 
this effort came about due to the fact that the country faced an 
economic recession at the time, and the company, having been 
denied financial assistance for expansion, had to adjust to the 
changing environment.
Country Cowpirisont
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acquiring and «anaging tichnology than othiri. It it rilavant 
therefore, to note which of these countries have been successful, 
as soee experience nay be drawn froe thee to aid in the case at 
hand.
Within the Latin American context, Brazil 
and Mexico (2,3) appear as the most experienced and successful 
countries in this field.
These two nations initially geared their 
emphasis towards Import Substitution Industrialization (ISIi 
(which was used throughout Latin America since 1960 —  CEPAL 
directives), and have gradually shifted to Export Oriented 
Industrialization (EOI), not in the least because they have been 
able to easter the technologies they had previously acquired from 
developed countries.
A striking sinilarity in the two cases of 
industrial development (Brazil and Mexico) is the vast government 
intervention: Mexico with wholly state owned companies, and Brazil 
with its "associate development" approach involving joint ventures 
with foreign companies and private local investors.
1»
The other successful LDC's (now NIC's - 
Newly Industrialized Countries) in the technological field are uhe 
Southeast Asian countries of Singapore, Taiwan, Korea, and Hong 
Kong. All of the above oriented their aims towards an EQI policy
4
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(mainly) at the latest since the early 1960'S| and through it 
achieved very respectable results.
With respect to these countries, it has 
been argued that earket forces ruled the transforaation of their 
econoaies into successful ones. The evidence, according to various 
authors, points to another source: governaent planning (4)^ not so 
■uch by direct investaent (even though, for exaaple, in Korea this 
was still an iaportant eleaent in the aid - I970's —  M X  of 
exports originated, directly or indirectly, froa public 
enterprises) but by dirigiste policy aaking.
The other comnon claia, that EOI is 
superior to ISI is yet to be substantiated according to 
Kirkpatrick et al.(3;. It aay well be the case that it is 
expertise, and technological and managerial competence, 
irrespective of the special emphasis on EOI or ISI, (which may 
depend aore on particular situations demanding a contingency 
approach) which ultimately gives an edge.
For exaaple, Korea, Brazil and Mexico have 
benefitted froa their experience with adapting technology imports 
iron developed countries (meant for ISI), so that in time they 
nave been able to re“export their own modified processes to other 
LDC's. Dahlman (2) goes as far as to state that such exports are 
■nore suited to operate in LOG environments than those coming fro* 
DCs. (CATSA's distillery is Brazilian).
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CODESA-t Rolf in thg Futur#
Hav ing  d i t c u t s a d  i a p o r t a n t  a s p a c t i  of t h t  
LDC t c o n o a i c  s i t u a t i o n ,  i t  i s  noM t i a a  t o  b r i a f l y  a n a l y s a  Nhat 
r o l a  t h a  c o r p o r a t i o n  i s  t o  p l a y  i n  t h a  f u t u r e .
In t h a  s h o r t  t e r n  one  h a s  t o  c o n s i d e r  t h e  
c u r r a n t  t r a n d s  s a t  by  t h a  a g r a a o a n t s  n i t h  t h a  World Bank F i n a n c e  
C o r p o r a t i o n  ( 5 , 6 ) ,  now i n  t h a  c o n s i d a r a t i o n  of t h e  A s a n b l e a  
L e g i s l a t i v a .  S e c o n d ,  i t  i s  i n p a r a t i v e  t o  s t u d y  t h a  c o n d i t i o n s  of a 
don a t i on  of  f l 4 0  m i l l i o n  by USAID to  c l e a r  up t h e  t e r r i b l e  d eb t  
s i t u a t i o n  f a c e d  by most  s u b s i d i a r i e s ,  i n  t h e  i d e a  t h a t  t h e  
compan ie s  a r e  t r a n s f e r r e d  t o  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  ( n a t i o n a l  or 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l ) .  F i n a l l y ,  t h e  c r e a t i o n  of CINDE, a ' p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  
o n l y ” e q u i v a l e n t  of CODESA must  be  e x am ined  c l o s e l y .
Hav ing  l o o ke d  a t  t h e  a b o v e ,  i t  i s  c l e a r  
t h a t  CODESA w i l l  be l i m i t e d  t o  t h a  d e v e l o p m e n t  of a s m a l l  number 
of minor  s c a l e  new b u s i n e s s e s ,  i n  t h e  n e a r  f u t u r e .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  
fo r  v a r i o u s  r e a s o n s ,  i t  w i l l  h a v e  t o  manage a t  l e a s t  t h r e e  of i t s  
major  c o n c e r n s ,  i . a . .  Cementos  d a l  P a c i f i c o ,  C e n t r a l  A z u c a r e r a  d e l  
Tempisque  (CATSA) , and F e r t i l i z a n t e s  da C e n t r o a m e r i c a  (FERTICA), 
which r e p r e s e n t  more t h a n  65X of  t h a  c o r p o r a t i o n  s i n v e s t m e n t  
o o r t f o l i o  t o  d a t e .  For t h i s  c o m b i n a t i o n  of v a r i a b l e s  
■ l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  and s a l e  on one s i d e ,  and r s i t r i c t i o n s  f o r  s a l e  on 
■-ie o t h e r ) ,  t h e  f i r m  w i l l  a p p a r e n t l y  l e a d ,  in  t h e  p r e d i c t a b l e  
f u t u r e ,  a s t r e a m l i n e d  v e r s i o n  of  i t s  p r e s e n t  o p e r a t i o n  w i t h  l i t t l e
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liberty to invest in l«rgt nsM projects.
In the longer tere, i t  Mould be necessary 
to provide the enterprise Mith eechanisas to conduct strategic 
decision eaking, as described in Chapter 6, before atteepting nee
i n v e s tm e n t  s c h e m e s .
Through sound p o l i c i e s  i n  t h i s  f i e l d ,  t h e  
c o r p o r a t i o n  c o u l d  p r o v i d e  a number of  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  to  t h e  l o c a l  
economy:
For e x a m p l e ,  i t  c o u l d  r e p r e s e n t  an 
a l t e r n a t i v e  s o u r c e  of  i ncome  f o r  t h e  gove rn men t  by  g e n e r a t i n g  nee  
r evenue  f rom e x p o r t s  or  l o c a l  d e a l i n g s  ^w i tho u t  c ro wd in g  o u t  t h e  
p r i v a t e  s e c t o r ,  of  c o u r s e ) .  T h i s  would  r e s u l t  i n  a l e s s e r  
a p p r o p r i a t i o n  from t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  by way of  t a x e s ,  t o w a r d s  
c o v e r i n g  c e n t r a l  go ve r nm en t  comm i tmen t s ,  which s h o u l d  make t h e  
f a rme r  more c o m p e t i t i v e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y .
»1 >
A l s o ,  and i f  t h e  d ay  comes when t h e  
c o u n t r y ' s  most  b a s i c  n e e d s  a r e  f u l f i l l e d  t o  an a c c e p t a b l e  d e g r e e ,  
t he  f i r m ' s  c om p an i e s  c o u l d  t h e n  p r o v i d e  a s o u r c e  of w e a l t h  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  by s h a r e d  o w n e r s h i p  s chemes  w i t h  t h e  w o r k f o r c e  and 
the  g e n e r a l  p u b l i c .
• *i
In c o n c l u s i o n ,  i t  i s  w o r t h w h i l e  to 
p r e s e r v e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  such  a s  C0DE3A in  LDC s ,  a s  they  can p l a y  a 
v i t a l  r o l e  i n  t h e  g u i d a n c e  t o w a r d s  t h e  a t t a i n m e n t  of d e ve lo pm en t
4
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goals. Until a broad seotor of the papulation has access (defined
as: 800001010 naturity• aooess to information and disposable
inooae) to shari tht benefits of the systee, econoeic
libtralization ("private enterprise only* policies) Mill result in
a graattr gap in the distribution of Mealth. Until such a
status~quo is aohieved , oonoerns of the type of this corporation
Mill be benefiicial.
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